

4/17 - NYT - US Defense Dept. officials believe that Kabul agents were involved in the ammunition dump explosion in Islamabad (see 4/11). The "overwhelming majority" of the weapons there was intended for the mujahideen & included a third of the total supply of Stingers, anti-tank missiles & long-range mortars. - LA Times - Najibullah said he is prepared to "redeploy" ROA troops away from villages to encourage the return of the refugees. He also said the ROA was prepared to arm the tribes in the frontier so they can provide their own security.

- At a rally in Peshawar, Gulbuddin asked for a show of hands of those who would wait until the last Soviet soldier went home before returning to Afghanistan; virtually all hands went up.

4/23 - NYT - In Kunar, Barikot fell to the mujahideen after a 4-month siege. The garrison was the headquarters of the 55th ROA brigade but 5 battalions were airlifted out before the mujahideen over-ran the base. Its capture will ease the transport of supplies over the border.

4/25 - NYT - Mujahideen have occupied Athgar in Zabul Province & Maruf in Kandahar Province after the towns were abandoned by ROA troops.

- Najibullah described the guerrilla occupation of Barikot (see 4/23) as a "change of position." He also said he wants better relations with the US but first, Washington must stop sending military aid to Pakistan. He said the ROA is hoping to seek private investment from the US.

4/26 - NYT - Najibullah offered to create a demilitarized zone for Afghan refugees to pass through as Soviet troops are withdrawn. The ROA might even withdraw its troops further, if necessary. However, some say this is only to put a good face on defeat since major ROA withdrawals have come only after battles with the mujahideen.

"Things are happening a little faster than we anticipated," an American diplomat said. The guerrillas were expected to close roads first, he said, but "they seem to have skipped that step" and have moved directly to attacks on bases and towns.

Within the past week, the guerrillas also took the town of Maruf, east of Kandahar, near the Pakistani border. Earlier this month, they seized Ghorband, a district center about 50 miles northwest of Kabul, cutting the main east-west road between Bamian and Parwan Provinces.

In March, the guerrillas took Panjwai, a district center in Kandahar Province, after a fierce battle. And Darwazgai, another base that controls access to roads from the Pakistani border also fell to the guerrillas after a hard fight, diplomats report.

- Soviet officials seem resigned to this turn of events, one Western diplomat said. "What we're getting is a shrug," he said. "Their only question is, 'Do you think the mujahideen will attack our troops on the way out?'"

In anticipation of their withdrawal, which is scheduled to begin May 15, Soviet units have been reported pulling back from border positions, consolidat-

ing their forces and departing from the southeastern Zabul Province. The pull out from Qalat, which is Zabul's provincial center, took place about April 18, according to a traveler's report reaching a Western embassy.

Damaged armored vehicles are also being transported on flatbed trailers north into the Soviet Union, according to Western reports.

In what American analysts see as a move to cover the Soviet units during the pullout, the Russians sent a huge convoy, estimated at 1,000 vehicles from Kabul southward in the early morning hours of April 11, apparently to beef up defenses of the so-called "ring road," the main highway that runs in a U-shaped loop from Kabul down through Kandahar and up to the Soviet border. Soviet officials have told Western diplomats that this would be a main route of withdrawal.




4/26 - ABC Nightly News - In Kabul the 10th anniversary of the April Revolution was celebrated with speeches & a parade featuring tanks & rocket launchers. The applause was pre-recorded.

4/27 - NYT - The highest ranking Soviet official attending the anniversary festivities was Vladimir P. Orlov, chmn. of the USSR's Supreme Soviet.

4/28 - NYT - A truck bomb explosion in Kabul killed 6 & injured 49 people yesterday. The truck reportedly had a Pakistani license plate, indicating that guerrillas were responsible.

- The US Embassy sent home 4 of its 13 staff members after receiving reports that Iran was planning to attack the embassy in reprisal for US actions in the Persian Gulf.



Eight Years in Afghanistan
WORLD PRESS REVIEW • APRIL 1988 Roseal-Youssef/Cairo

Key Sections of Accords on Afghanistan

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS. April 14 — Following are key sections of the agreements on Afghanistan that were signed today in Geneva, as they are available by the United Nations. The two bilateral agreements, one signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan, the other on interrelationships, was signed by those countries with the Soviet Union and the United States signing as witnesses, and the Declaration on International Guarantees was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Bilateral Agreement

Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Noninterference and Nonintervention

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to maintain relations and promote good neighborhood and cooperation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Considering that full observance of the principle of noninterference and nonintervention in the internal and external affairs of states is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of states freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their people, and that outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of noninterference and nonintervention, in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of October 26, 1970, as well as the Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of noninterference and nonintervention by states in the affairs of other states.

ARTICLE II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of noninterference and nonintervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

1. To respect the political, social, cultural, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people.

2. To respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and to prohibit outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;

3. To refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to interfere in or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;

4. To ensure that its territory is not used in any way that would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national stability or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;

5. To refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of interference and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, politi-

cal, or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;

6. To refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;

7. To refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action or attempt to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting Party;

8. To prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries to the other High Contracting Party and according to deny facilities, including financing, for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;

9. To refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other states designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

10. To abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

11. To prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;

12. To prevent within its territory the prevention, hindrance in carrying out basic functions of government, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of arms, ammunition and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;

13. Not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

ARTICLE III

The present agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988

ARTICLE IV

Any steps that may be required in order to implement this High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this agreement shall be completed by the date on which this agreement enters into force.

Declaration On International Guarantees

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good neighborhood between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to insuring respect for the sovereign, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment;

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations in Particular on Noninterference and Nonintervention;

Urge all states to act likewise.

The present declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988

Bilateral Agreement

Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good neighborhood and cooperation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

Considering that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements made for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present agreement.

ARTICLE II

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to insure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland:

A. All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;

B. All refugees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;

C. All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the state;

D. All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate in all decisions concerning the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and shall be insured equal benefits from such decisions of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;

E. All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and freedoms as all other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination;

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, the necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

ARTICLE III

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

ARTICLE IV

For the purpose of organizing, coordinating and supervising the operations which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice and manner. The commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE V

With a view to the orderly movement of the refugees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centers. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

ARTICLE VI

At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present agreement. Special agreements may be concluded for this purpose between U.N.H.C.R. and the High Contracting Parties

ARTICLE VII

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this agreement shall commence.

The arrangements set out in Articles IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of 12 months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

Agreement

On the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary General of the United Nations with the support of all governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.

3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the express understanding that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:

"The High Contracting Parties shall refrain in their international relations from the use of force or of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any states, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

"The principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

"The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

"The duty of states to cooperate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

"The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

"The principle of sovereign equality of states;

"The principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

The two Governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations in Particular on Noninterference and Nonintervention and the Declaration on International Guarantees, the Bilateral Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, and the present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the above principles, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan will withdraw all of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will withdraw by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of the other half will be completed within nine months.

6. The interrelationships in Paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement. It is agreed that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no military action and intervention in any form in the affairs of the High Contracting Parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the time frame specified in the agreement; the return of the Afghan refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the time frame envisaged in Paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments constituting as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps

required to insure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be contained in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory arrangements for the implementation of the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement. The representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.

8. The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for prompt and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfill his tasks, the representative shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violation of any of the provisions of the instruments and submit a report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary cooperation from the parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding, which is annexed to and is part of this agreement.

Annex

Memorandum of Understanding

BASIC REQUIREMENTS

a. The parties will provide full support and cooperation to the representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel assigned to assist him;

b. The representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective assistance, including freedom of movement and communications, accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be necessary for the performance of their tasks.

c. Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of the representative of the Secretary General and his personnel while operating in their respective countries;

d. In performing their functions, the representative of the Secretary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. The representative of the Secretary General and his personnel must not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for any of the Parties concerned.

MODUS OPERANDI AND THE PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION

The Secretary General will appoint a senior military officer as deputy to the representative, who will be stationed in the area, and a small headquarters unit, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, each comprising five military officers, drawn from existing United Nations operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff.

The two headquarters units will be organized into two inspection teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the representative of the Secretary General or his deputy, up to 10 additional military officers (some 10 additional inspection teams) will be deployed from existing operations within the shortest possible time (normally around 48 hours).

The nationalities of all the officers will be determined in consultation with the parties.

PROCEDURE

a. Inspections conducted at the request of the Parties;

b. A complaint regarding a violation of the instruments of the settlement lodged by any of the parties should be submitted in writing, in the English language, to the respective headquarters units and should indicate all relevant information and details.

c. Upon receipt of a complaint, the deputy to the representative of the Secretary General will immediately inform the other party of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making on-site inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged violation. This inspection will be conducted using headquarters staff as referred to above, unless the deputy representative of the Secretary-General considers that additional teams are needed. In that case, the parties will, under the principle of freedom of movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their respective territories.

d. Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and submitted by the deputy representative of the Secretary General to the two governments concerned on a bi-monthly basis. (A third copy of the report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential basis, to United Nations Headquarters in New York, exclusively for the information of the Secretary-General and his representative.)

e. In accordance with Paragraph 7, a report on an investigation should be submitted to a meeting of the parties not later than 48 hours after it has been submitted. The deputy representative of the Secretary General will, in the absence of the representative, lend his good offices to the parties and in that context assist in the organization of the meetings and participation. In the context of those meetings the deputy representative of the Secretary General may submit to the parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. (Such suggestions and recommendations will be as a matter of course, consulted with, and cleared by, the representative of the Secretary General.)

f. Inspections conducted on the initiative of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General.

In addition to inspections requested by the parties, the deputy representative of the Secretary General may carry out on his own initiative and in consultation with the representative inspections he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of Paragraph 7. If it is considered that the conditions of Paragraph 7 do not permit a report to the parties, the same procedure used in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at the request of the Parties will be followed.

DURATION

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary General and the other personnel will be established in the area not later than 20 days before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease to exist 30 months after the completion of all time frames envisaged for the implementation of the instruments.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

FRIDAY, APRIL 15



United Nations negotiator Diego Cordovez

Plans are afoot to create an Int'l Institute for Afghan Studies to facilitate scholarly research on Afghanistan. Among other things the Institute would prepare an inventory of Afghan archaeological & historical sites, archives & libraries so that war damages can be recorded. It would also encourage studies on the effects of the war on Afghan society. The FORUM will have more information on this project in future issues.

From an article by
Michael Reisman in
The Hartford Courant
4/24:

The agreements aren't bad for everyone. Gorbachev has turned certain defeat into a fair and economical shot at victory. President Reagan looks good and can go to Moscow in May like a winner. The United Nations looks like it works; it brokered the deal and can claim that it performs an important peace-making role. Najib has a better chance of staying in power than at any time since he seized it.

Perhaps this is what peace has come to mean in the waning years of the 20th century. Considering that Henry A. Kissinger got his Nobel Prize for bringing peace to Vietnam, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin shared one for bringing peace to the Middle East, there may yet be a few laureates here.



Polish postage stamps



But aside from that, sir, how did you like Afghanistan?

Jeff Dunham
The Christian Science Monitor
By Jeff Dunham

NYT 4/17

Afghan Talks Are Strain to All

By PAUL LEWIS
Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, April 4 — As the deadlocked Afghan peace talks enter their 10th week, the two sides' negotiators show signs of strain and are expressing doubts about the outcome.

A peace treaty is half ready for signature. The sticking point is Washington's insistence that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops and that both suspend military aid to the rebels. As the treaty comes into effect and a Soviet withdrawal begins, Moscow requires the demand.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, a usually cheerful figure who watches the negotiations for the Reagan Administration, was unable to conceal his frustration with the continuing deadlock today.

"We've been working at it for a long time, and we may be running out of ideas," he said.

Even Zain Noorani, the normally optimistic Pakistani negotiator, who represents the Afghan guerrillas battling the Soviet-installed Government in Kabul, conceded that "this can't go on forever."

A Set Choreography

By now, the routine for the negotiations is established. Usually, the Pakistani delegation arrives first and climbs a marble staircase to an ornately decorated conference room in the building that was once the headquarters of the League of Nations.

Mr. Noorani, a tough-looking, heavily built man with tinted glasses, likes to banter with journalists as he passes through the entrance hall. As negotiations have proceeded, his broken right wrist has been emerging from a stack of bandages, prompting the United Nations mediator, Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez, to say excitedly, "Look, he's getting ready to sign a peace treaty."

A few minutes later, the Pakistani delegation has gone upstairs, the Afghan Government team arrives, led by Foreign Minister Abdul Wahid, a slight, neatly dressed figure who speaks little English but never fails to flash a smile. Subsequently, the two sides meet to meet. The Afghans go to a separate conference room with a magnificent carpet donated by the Shah of Iran, and Mr. Cordovez shuttles between the two delegations trying to nudge them closer together.

In the afternoon, the representatives of the superpowers, which are the protagonists in the civil war, come to talk with Mr. Cordovez. Like the Pakistanis and Afghans, the two men, Mr. Peck and the Soviet special representative, Nikolai Kozyrev, arrive at different times and never meet.

Mr. Cordovez now seems to be struggling to keep the negotiators here at least some time while Washington and Moscow try to resolve their dispute.

NYT 4/5

The Afghans win another round in the Great Game

KIPLING'S Great Game was moved to Geneva for the day, while it was reduced to a tennis-match with balls of paper. The foreign ministers of the United States and Russia, and most of the Afghans and Pakistanis, sat down on April 14th to confront 39 pages' worth of documents in four languages. The Russians and Americans promised to guarantee the Afghan-Pakistani peace treaty that had been put together by Mr Diego Cordovez, the United Nations mediator, after six weeks of negotiations. All of the Soviet Union's 115,000 or so troops are to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by next February (5th).

The Russians have thereby formally renounced ambitions towards their small neighbour that date back to an invasion plan they drew up in 1971, when Russia's opponent was Britain.

The signing ended a long period of manoeuvring that seemed about to end in failure. Early this month even Mr Cordovez, a world-class optimist, admitted that time was running out. The deal was being blocked by a dispute over whether the Russians could go on arming their Afghans after the Americans had cut off supplies to theirs. The exaggerated Russians threatened to start pulling out of Afghanistan without an agreement, which could have made things even messier than the agreed deal is likely to be.

Mr Mikhail Gorbachev eventually saved the day by accepting a version of the "symmetry" in military aid demanded by the Americans. His foreign minister, Mr Edward Shevardnadze, flew to Kabul to break the news to the Afghan president, Mr Najibullah, who then called in the Soviet city of Tashkent on April 6th to have his turn twisted by Mr Gorbachev himself.

The agreement signed in Geneva does not include the vital understanding on "symmetry". That remains a secret deal between the superpowers, because Russia refused to accept a public display of what it called interference in its relations with a sovereign state. It appears that both America and Russia may initially suspend arms supplies to their friends during the nine-month withdrawal period, but either is free to resume them if it reckons the other has. The proviso seems fated to be invoked, though how America's right to send more supplies to the guerrillas is to be squared with Pakistan's promise not to help them remains one of those mysteries of international diplomacy. Mutual suspicion may be held in check, though not much, by the presence of 60 or so US troops.

It is a fairly safe prediction that the peace treaty will not at first produce much peace. It is hard to imagine the Afghans settling the future government of their country without some more violence. The guerrillas outraged that the agreement has been concluded over their heads, say they will ignore it. They have sworn to fight the communist government in Kabul until it collapses. Then, or even before then, they may turn on each other.

That is not a universal opinion, to be sure. Some blithe spirits think that the guerrillas will become statesmen once they see that the Russians are going. The Pakistani government even professes to think that guerrillas and communists can come together, at least for a time, in a coalition government. It fears that otherwise the 30m or so Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil will not go home, and more may come. To please Pakistan, Mr Cordovez has agreed to try to kip it into a coalition. He is unlikely to succeed.

Iran, which shelters 2m Afghans, is harder-headed. A stout supporter of the Afghan resistance, at least in words, it used to oppose the Geneva talks because they included the Kabul government. It now resists the imposition of a deal specifying what the future government of Afghanistan should be, saving the Afghans should have the right of self-determination.

The Iranians doubtless hope to influence the "Baluchi government" that the guerrillas rather vaguely say they want to establish. But since most Afghans are Sunnis, Muslims, they may not look to Shiraz for guidance. Whatever outsiders do, the final trial of strength between the communists and the resistance seems almost inevitable. So does a resistance victory. Whether this takes weeks or months (or, Allah forbid, years) depends on how many communists flee to the Soviet Union (some evacuation cards are already being issued) and how far either side can unite against its enemy. The Afghan communist party has been angrily and sometimes bloodily divided between its Khalq and Parcham wings for two decades. A bid to assassinate a Politburo member last month, and two bombs found in the interior ministry, are put down to intra-party feuding.

But the prize for splintering must go to the resistance (see box). The Pakistan-based guerrilla alliance cannot agree even on a permanent chief. One of the seven leaders recently accused another of trying to murder him; such charges are not uncommon. Under Pakistani pressure the guerrillas have formed a vague proposal for a coalition government in Kabul but picked a nonentity to head it, thereby showing they were not serious. The alliance's chairman for the current three months, Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is inadvertently ambitious.

Afghanistan's best chance of peace may lie with the men who are actually doing the fighting. Their hard-learned co-operation in the field puts the shame of haggling of the political bosses who spend their time in Pakistan. The fighting men would not tolerate communist rule (some began fighting it even before the Russians came in to help the local communists), but they may be less ready to die in a struggle over what replaces it. One commander, Mr Abdul Haq, has said he would rather study or go back to his farm. If that sounds too good to be true, remember that this war has killed more than 1m Afghans and of 1m driven nearly 1m into foreign refugee camps and cost another 3m their homes inside Afghanistan.

The levelling of most of the fighting men, and of most of the refugees, remains partly a matter of tactics. A poll in the Pakistans camps last year showed that less than 1% of the refugees wanted any of the faction leaders as Afghanistan's ruler. Some of the commanders in the field, on the other hand, have grown into popular heroes. These men have the support of their own tribes. None, it seems likely, could control the whole country; but between them they can ensure that any government in Kabul will be a weak one. That is in Afghan tradition. Such an outcome would be untidy, but it is what the Geneva signatories should be hoping for. Kipling could have told them so.

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 16 1988


As Russia retreats

WHEN great powers suffer great defeats, the earth shakes. It does not always move. The documents signed in Geneva this week formalised a fact that had long been apparent, not least to Mikhail Gorbachev: the Soviet Union has lost in Afghanistan. For the Afghans themselves, unhappily, the suffering is far from over. ***

Nobody knows much of a chance to the talks that are to start on a Kabul-guerrilla coalition. America and Russia are racing to put as many weapons as possible into their friends' hands before the deal's contorted and conditional restraints on arms deliveries take effect. Who eventually runs Afghanistan is still to be decided by war, or by negotiations after the various sides have weighed up their chances in such a war.

The Afghan jigsaw

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 16 1988



Source: Afghan Information Office

The resistance

Fundamentalists

- Jamiat-e-Islami, led by Mr Bachirullah Rabbani, a reasonable man who was a professor of Islamic law. Run by the best fighters and gets the third-largest weapons allocation from the West.
- Hezb-e-Islami, led by Mr Yusaf Khaisi, an elderly mullah and former commander with a gut-hair of communism. Avoids compromise. Second strongest, gets the second-biggest share of weapons.
- Hizb-e-Islami (rural), led by Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Anti-western and opportunistic. Third-best fighting force despite getting the most arms.

- ★ Ittehad-e-Islami, led by Mr Rasul Sayyat, a Wahabi Muslim. Has bought guerrilla support with huge donations from the Saudis. Little personal following.

Traditionalists

- Harakat-e-Islah-e-Islam, led by Mr Nabi Mohammad, is a party of village mullahs. Ill-organised.
- National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, led by Mr Sayyed Ahmed Gailani, a westernised Pathan with plenty of religious followers because he is a hereditary Sufi saint.

- ★ National Front for the Rescue of Afghanistan, led by Sibghatullah Mojadedi, a westernised professor and monarchist from a leading religious family. Gets least aid, and achieves little with it.

The main guerrilla commanders

- Ahmad Shah Massoud, "Lion of the Panjshir", controls much of the north-east. Affiliated to Jamiat.
- Abdul Haq attacks Kabul and is noted for his assaults on power lines. Affiliated to Hezb (Khaisi).
- Isma'il Khan, operates with deadly efficiency around Herat, close to Iran. Affiliated to Jamiat.

Other anti-communists

- Shia Muslim groups operate, but do little. (All members of the resistance alliance are Sunnis Muslim.)
- Other independent groups, or mixed control

The communists

- The Russians, and the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan. The Afghan party split a few years ago. It was formed in 1965. The city-based Parcham faction is Dari-speaking (a form of Persian), the Khalq faction rural and Pashto-speaking. They hate each other. President Najibullah is the leading Parchamite, the interior minister Mr Mohammad Ghasemi is the top Khalq.

It has nonetheless been right for America to agree to this deal. One reason is that almost all Afghans want the Russians out of their country; they have voted for this with their feet and their lives. The deal shows the Russians firmly to the door. The Afghans may then settle their own differences violently, but at least it is Afghans who will settle them. ***

The Russia that has lost in Afghanistan is in much worse general shape than the American that lost in Vietnam. The United States was then soul-searching over Watergate, and its Johnson-fostered great inflation was in train. But it still had the world's stablest democracy and richest economy. The Soviet Union that is staggering out of Afghanistan is, on Mr Gorbachev's sombre admission, a place in need of revolution. In a few decades its economy will be in a wheelchair pushed by the Chinese unless brave things are done to save it.

Russia is in a bad way. But a bad position can be rescued by good statescraft, and Mr Gorbachev's statescraft is exemplary. ***

Too many people want to believe that Mr Gorbachev is not only a man you can do business with but one who, when you do it, does not drive a hard bargain. His whole programme—the economic reforms, the diplomatic boldness—is intended to make his country a more formidable adversary for the West, not a partner with it. Russia has been beaten by the Afghan guerrillas. Applause for that. But it is still a great power, of great ambition.

APRIL 16

FORMULA FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

The following text was finalized in the late hours of the night of February 22nd by the High Council of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen (IHAM). It sets out a structure for a transitional government in Afghanistan. This agreement has been forwarded to the government of Pakistan.

Now that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, all parties concerned will act with a full sense of their responsibilities and in accordance with the supreme aspirations and in the interests of the Afghan people who have heroically carried on their jihad in defense of their faith, freedom, independence, and sovereignty. Accordingly, the leaders of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen have unanimously decided to accept a settlement along the following lines:

There will be a transitional government which will ensure a ceasefire and the peaceful transition to law and order, to permit the safe and complete withdrawal of the Soviet forces; the return of the refugees with honour and ensure general elections, consistent with Islamic law, within six months after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The structure of the state will include:

A Shoura-e-Ali (Grand Council) which will be the supreme body of the state, comprising the leaders of the seven party alliance. This body will provide joint leadership during the interim period.

A broad-based transitional government representing all sections of the Afghan nation. This government is proposed to replace the present government in Kabul before the signing of the Geneva accords which it will sign under the auspices of the United Nations Organization.

The government will consist of a cabinet of 28 ministers under a Raes-i-Hukumat (head of government) who will also be the Raes-i-Daulat (head of state). The cabinet will consist of fourteen Mujahideen, seven refugees and seven Muslims presently living in Kabul.

The will be a Shoura-e-Shura (Consultative Council) comprising 75 members, one from each province (56) and one third (19) from the Ummah, intellectuals and technocrats. This will frame interim laws to run the country till the formation of the new constitution by an elected Shoura (Constituent Assembly). Provincial councils will be set up by mutual consultations to run the administrations in the provinces in the interim period.

A fully autonomous commission will be set up to draw up procedures and rules for holding elections to the Shoura (Constituent Assembly), immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The name of the future Afghanistan will be "Da'lat-i-Islami Afghanistan" (Islamic State of Afghanistan wherein the Quran and Sunnah will be supreme. It will have an elected Shoura (assembly) and elected head.

IHAM has also decided to set up a Reconstruction Commission immediately and call upon all qualified Afghans to apply for appointments to this body which will start functioning at the Alliance headquarters.

The transitional government will sign the Geneva accords and undertake full responsibility for their implementation including the safe return of the Soviet forces when the accords become acceptable to the transitional government. The transitional government will pursue an independent and non-aligned foreign policy and will have friendly relations with all countries, particularly with its neighbors, provided that there is no interference in its internal affairs.

For the purpose of reconstruction the IHAM requests all the countries of the world, and in particular the Soviet Union, to participate generously in reconstruction of the infrastructure and economy of Afghanistan. AFGHAN NEWS VOL. IV, NO. 5, 1/3/1988

NO SMOKING IN PAKISTAN

The council of the commanders of Panjshir was convened in the middle of December. In this meeting military and non-military matters facing the people were discussed and decisions were made.

One of the items on the agenda was the banning of cigarettes and use of snuff in the valley. In the past the Mujahideen and the people were encouraged to quit smoking and using snuff. The new decision makes the use of these items against the law. According to this law, only smoking cigarettes and using snuff, but buying and selling them and growing tobacco are also illegal and punishable by law.

This decision was taken in accordance with the tenents of Islam which forbid using things that make people unhealthy. Economic considerations also had an important role in the decision to ban smoking.

In other areas controlled by the Supervisory Council of the North, a campaign against smoking has started, and the people are quitting smoking cigarettes and using snuff.

The decision of banning smoking is bad news for cigarette producing companies but very good news for a nation which is fighting for its freedom and needs to quit all bad habits which do not suite its character.

GULBUDDIN'S CAUSE:

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times
PESHAWAR, Pakistan, April 19 — In the crucial period that began just before the conclusion of the Geneva agreement on Afghanistan last week and will end with the beginning of the Soviet troops' withdrawal May 15, the political leadership of the guerrilla movement lies in the hands of the man considered the most formidable and ambitious of the leaders of the seven-party alliance based here.

In a wide-ranging interview last weekend, the alliance chairman, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, disclosed some of his views and gave an idea of the Afghanistans he would like to shape if the guerrillas succeed in dislodging the Communist Government that the Soviet troops will then replace.

Mr. Hekmatyar is a 40-year-old Islamic militant who uses the academic title "engineer," although he completed only two years of study at Kabul University before starting to work full-time to create a government based on his interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law.

His party, the Islamic Party, is regarded by members of other guerrilla factions as the most tightly organized and disciplined.

Moderates regret that the rotation policy, which alternates the alliance leadership every three months, has made Mr. Hekmatyar chairman at a time when he can use the position to advance his ambition to lead a non-Communist Kabul.

Is Democracy in the Future?

Asked about the post-Communist government that he believes should be based on elections and be free, independent, nonaligned and Islamic, he said it would be a "consultative system with a strong center" but did not describe it in detail.

Asked whether women would receive the right to vote, he avoided a reply. Challenged to answer, he declined to comment. "Some brothers have reservations in this regard," he said, referring to the more conservative brothers but not stating his own view. "and we want to avoid controversial issues."

Women have had the vote in Afghanistan since before the monarchy was deposed in a coup in 1973 and continue to take part in elections under the Communists.

Mr. Hekmatyar also refused to reply to a question on whether an alliance government would recognize Moscow's sovereignty over Soviet Central Asia.

The more militant parties, like Mr. Hekmatyar's, consider the "liberation" of the largely Moslem region of Pakistan by the Soviet Union an Islamic duty. Some guerrillas are reported to have staged raids across the border, which were followed by harsh Soviet reprisals.

In response to a question on the current situation, Mr. Hekmatyar, looking impulsive but occasionally toying with a string of white worry-beds, said that rather than a speedy return of the refugees in Pakistan after the signing in Geneva, he foresees a further流 into Pakistan.

"As long as there is war, the refugees will not go home, but more will come here," he said. . . .

Mr. Hekmatyar reiterated the guerrillas' determination to fight until not only Soviet forces but also the Communist Government of President Najibullah are ousted. "No agreement can assure his survival," the guerrilla leader said of the President. "He will be finished even before the Soviet Union is completely beaten."

The guerrilla leader said the guerrillas had begun to put into action a post-Geneva strategy that foresees stepped-up attacks on remaining Soviet bases while the troops withdraw. He said the talks had offered Moscow an agreement under which safe passage would be granted.

Since Moscow refused to negotiate with the guerrillas, Mr. Hekmatyar concluded, the guerrillas are entitled to attack the military bases last week.

The new strategy also includes, according to Mr. Hekmatyar, a decision to concentrate attacks only on major targets, particularly Kabul, the capital.



Associated Press

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of an Afghan guerrilla party, who denies that he is anti-American.

Fearred by Other Rebels

Most diplomats regard Mr. Hekmatyar as the most competent and the most feared of the guerrilla leaders. They say that he was not feared so much by the Communists as by his allies and not regarded as the most aggressive rebel chief. They believe that his commanders, although heavily armed, preferred to save their men and weapons to establish Hizb Islam, a network of smaller guerrilla groups, once the Soviet forces have left the field to the Afghan factions.

Although the Hekmatyar wing is not known to have distinguished itself in many actions against Soviet or pro-Soviet Afghan forces, their leader's Islamic zeal has motivated his troops to move into areas that others have left. The largely Moslem border republics of the Soviet Union are ripe for Islamic revolution.

The raids have consistently been followed by devastating reprisals, in which entire Afghan villages have been leveled, according to diplomats.

These envys and Afghan moderates, who always speak anonymously in public, say that if given their lives they are identified, accused. Mr. Hekmatyar's units also of raiding camps and carrying arms and supplies to forces of other parties. This has included a horse caravan carrying medicine on behalf of the French relief organization Doctors Without Borders.

From a NYT article
by H. Kamm on 3/19.
MORE TO FOLLOW. 16

and a drive to take a major city. He did not specify which one, but diplomats in Islamabad speculate that an attack on Kandahar, the largest city of the south, may be part of the strategy.

Crucifixion of U.S. and Pakistan

Crucially to Mr. Hekmatyar, restored by long-standing criticism of the United States and Pakistan over their readiness to reach the Geneva accord and serve as guarantors for it, he did so in muted terms.

He has denied his earlier accusation that the agreement was the result of a Soviet-American "conspiracy" or his implied threat of disturbances among the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan in reaction to the accord.

But to a large part of the Pakistani public that is hoping for a speedy departure of the refugees, the guerrilla leadership's public stand that the Afghans should remain until peace and an Islamic state have been restored is a disappointment.

Unofficial Afghan sources expressed a belief that once the Soviet withdrawal was completed, many Afghans would defy their political leaders' stand and leave. They said the growing belief among educated Afghans that the alliance leaders fear a decline in their powers once the Soviet Army has departed and settlement of the conflict is left to the Afghans. They said this explains in part the leaders' insistence that the refugees wait and see.

The traditional leaders are at odds with the Islamic fundamentalists.

The seven Pakistan-based leaders are united in their opposition to any role for Communists in a future Afghanistan. They may be right. Traditionalists and fundamentalists groups also say the other grouping is not representative and must be prevented from dominating.

"We are the backbone of this resistance," asserted Gulbadin Hekmatyar, head of the Islamic Party, the strongest group among the fundamentalists. He said the three so-called traditional parties "are part of an old feudal system" that must yield.

"Wishes of the People"

The traditional parties dispute Mr. Hekmatyar's claims, saying that once the war is over, Afghanistan's agenda will be decided by the traditionalists and the Moslem clergymen allied with them.

"What these four parties want is not in accordance with the wishes of the people," said Agha Zulfiqar, Zulfiqarullah Mojadedi, a leader of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front, a traditionalist group. "The people never even heard of them before the war."

Mr. Mojadedi, leader of the Sibghatul Muslim, leader of the National Liberation Front and an outspoken advocate of the return of the exiled Afghan King, which is opposed by Mr. Hekmatyar.

Foreign Aid Failed

Like many other traditionalists, Zulfiqarullah Mojadedi said the anti-Government movement was distorted after the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan chose to support the anti-covert assistance — estimated at more than \$1 billion from all sources last year — to Mr. Hekmatyar or other fundamentalists. Military analysts say the fundamentalists' stronger military than the traditionalists.

Relief workers and others connected to the insurgents say there has been an increase in warfare among the different groups inside Afghanistan.

They also charge that Mr. Hekmatyar's group has attacked other rebel groups and is determined to bring about an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan.

"The Americans took on Gulbuddin because he was the most militant, he had the best organization and it suited their purposes to have a Pakistani involved in the aid," "Now they realize he has to be slowed down."

Mr. Hekmatyar, in an interview, acknowledged there had been clashes but denied that his group had ever attacked any other rebels. "There is no internal fighting on the level of the parties," he said. "If there is an odd case, it is on the individual level."

Legacy of Fundamentalism

The traditionalists are not necessarily secular, and in some cases they have strong ties to Moslem clergy. Islamists are moral and spiritual leaders. But much of their authority comes from the power of hundreds of tribes, clans and other autonomous subgroups in Afghanistan whose leadership has been largely hereditary. Historians say that the king and clan authorities in Afghanistan, in earlier times, have ruled by accommodating these leaders rather than subduing them.

For example, Ahmad Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front, for a long time was a traditionalist, but is also respected as a hereditary leader in the Sufi Moslem sect. He owned a Peugeot dealership in Kabul before the Marxists took over in 1978.

The so-called fundamentalists were mostly trained in secular institutions, such as Kabul University, where they formed a vision of Islam as an all-encompassing guide for life and politics.

All-Encompassing Islam

In the 1960's, many of the current fundamentalist group leaders and the current leaders of the Kabul university were students together at Kabul University, where they held competing demonstrations and forged incompatible visions of Afghan society.

The fundamentalists started their insurgency against Kabul in the mid-1970's, long before the coup of 1978 and the start of the internal conflict.

But the fundamentalists' battlefield credentials might not translate into broad support in peacetime, said Sabah

Kushkaki, who directs a cultural group for the Afghan rebels.

"The Afghan rebels' approach is Islam is different from the one put forward by the fundamentalists," Mr. Kushkaki said.

"But we will never revert to the feudal structure, because these young resistance leaders have come to the fore," Mr. Kushkaki said. "They are people in their 20's and 30's who will never go back to their farms or jobs."

Excerpts from an article by Steven Weisman. NYT 3/1

Afghan Rebels' Discord Widens as Pullout Nears

By HENRY KAJIM

Special to The New York Times

PESHAWAR, Pakistan, March 8 — Moderate officials of parties belonging to the Afghan insurgents' political alliance are fearful of expressing their views fully and frankly because of the threat of retaliation from the advocates of fundamentalist Islam, who form a majority in the seven-party coalition.

A Western official said the moderate parties operate under "a kind of fundamentalist reign of fear."

All seven parties describe themselves as Moslem, but only two are supporting a holy war for Islam, to rid Afghanistan of the Soviet troops and the Moscow-backed Government of President Najibullah. The four parties that oppose the fundamentalists are more moderate than the other two — so-called moderate parties are the only ones that set the tone of the movement.

Differences between the two groups increased rapidly when the leader of the moderate parties, Shiekhullah Mojadedi, was removed from the alliance from the alliance and the party leadership. He said in an interview that he resisted the urging of the four fundamentalist parties to announce an interim government to be headed by Abduallah Shah, an official from one of

parties of modern economic activity by subjecting it to the restrictions on finance imposed by the Koran.

But the fundamentalists

express their views fully and almost openly in support of the Government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in neighboring Iran. They say this is so despite the fact that Iran's dominant faith is Shiite Islam, while in Afghanistan Sunni Moslems make up 80 percent of the population.

But while the fundamentalists express their views fully and almost openly in support of the Government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in neighboring Iran, they say this is so despite the fact that Iran's dominant faith is Shiite Islam, while in Afghanistan Sunni Moslems make up 80 percent of the population.

An Open Threat Is Seen

Moderates see evidence for this view in a virtually open threat last month by Mr. Hekmatyar to continue the war from Iran if Pakistan signs an accord in Geneva that does not assure the rights of the Moslem groups as the fundamentalists define them.

"The war is not just for religion but for national liberty as well," a moderate party official said. "The three moderate parties are also basically secular parties, but they are not like Afghan guerrillas. They are like the Taliban, as a dominant religious group of traditional faith. It is the religion, tradition and social values that make up Afghan identity."

"When you talk of the Afghan nation, you are accused of not being Islamic, and that is why Afghan intellectuals said, 'They say Islam has no rights.'"

All of the resistance parties demand the creation of an "Islamic" government. The term is variously defined.

"The fundamentalists' view of 'Islamic' is to let religious extremists take over," said a moderate party official. "I don't see any of the same ingredients of modernity in post-Russian withdrawal Afghanistan, we are entering into a very dark age."

The official, like many others, cited particularly regression in the gains made by women and in civil liberties made by the Moslem government in Parliament, in the university, a large number in the administration, and female education had begun even in the remote parts of the country," he said.

Moderate Afghans of both sexes, as well as foreigners working among the three million refugees in Pakistan, said that in exile women were being forced by fundamentalist pressure into extreme segregation and repression.

NYT 3/9

CARTOON BY GARY NELSON

SOPHIE'S
GLASS ST. POLY
IS NOTHING NEIL

WE'VE BEEN
COULDING NEW
GROUND FOR
TOMORROW.

AFGHANISTAN

Soldier of
Fortune
4/88

The King and His Kingdom

Asked whether he shared the suspicion against the fundamentalists, Mr. Mojadedi replied: "I'm afraid many fundamentalists have assassinated them."

To the fundamentalists, as well as

their Pakistani backers, mention of Zahir Shah's return in any role is anathema. To the Afghans, the King's 40-year reign was marked by a yielding of Islam to modernity. In Pakistan, he remained a symbol of imperial times, a leaning toward India and the only vote cast in the United Nations in 1947 against the admission of Pakistan.

"No Afghan leader here supports the King openly," Professor Majrooh was the only one who transmuted the true meaning of Afghanistan to the world," one moderate said. "For that he was murdered."

In the moderate view, the fundamentalists are striving to submerge

General Abdul Wali, the South Asian-trained son of the "Conqueror of Kabul," is variously described by his enemies as sinister, over-ambitious, and as thick as two planks.

More importantly, he is the minister of the fast king of the Afghans, Mohammed Zahir Shah, aged 73. Abdul Wali, aged 63 or 64 — he is not sure — keeps such close tabs on the deposed king, that it is said his country's father-in-law, not even God, denied the royal presence wonder if only in jest, whether Zahir Shah is alive.

The king's problem in Afghanistan and among the bulk of the Mujahid resistance is that he is seen as a weak man dominated by his relatives in particular, Abdul Wali.

Zahir Shah began his reign in 1933 as a 19-year-old after his father was assassinated, but his uncles, including Abdul Wali's father, Shah Wali, the legendary conqueror, ruled until the king turned 40.

In 1953, his cousin took charge of him. Twenty years later, he was deposed by a coup, power passing to Mohammed Daoud (who in turn was killed in the 1978 coup that brought Afghanistan's leftists to power).

Even in exile, the king has not escaped his family's grip. While Zahir Shah remains a recuse reading French novels at his home in a suburb of Rome, Abdul Wali is his prime minister, cabinet secretary, chancellor, minister of war and foreign affairs and spokesman all rolled into one.

He alone determines who sees the king. He alone decides what the king will say publicly. Now that the former monarch is being courted by Russia, India and Iran, to a lesser extent, Pakistan to lead an interim government that would supervise the withdrawal of the Russian army, the eyes of the king's relatives are beginning to sparkle.

You cannot see anything in Abdul Wali's eyes. They have the unblinking gaze of a Pathan, though he does smile from time to time. However, he is very pukka, speaks with a clipped military accent and is ever so old-fashioned.

He pulls out someone else's visiting card and says he would never have one with such a shine; his would

be buff, but of course he never carries such vulgar things.

And the king's other relatives receive visitors on the *Via Veneto* in the Excelsior Hotel or at the Cafe Doney — establishments which, like the royal family in Afghanistan, went out of fashion in the 1960s.

Abdul Wali uses the royal "we" when talking about the king, seldom referring to "His Majesty." Asked about his own ambition, he says obscurely that any cadet at a military college would not be worth his salt if he did not want to become a general.

In Peshawar, where the political leaders of the Afghan guerrillas are based, Abdul Wali is a ambition, though he was not in the military. They do not know his past and they do not trust him.

As Commander of the Central Forces which controlled the most important region of Afghanistan, from the Pakistan border to Kabul, his influence in the capital and on the king's government was great. Until the 1973 coup, it was commonly believed that he was the true ruler.

Now his opponents fear he will use the ex-king to put himself in power. Until recently, Zahir Shah had refused to become involved in the conflict in Afghanistan. He said in a statement, presumably written by Abdul Wali, that he was willing to play a role in restoring peace if it was in people's will. He said he had no ambition to restore the monarchy.

The Russians turned to him about a year ago, hoping he would join their national reconciliation — an attempt that has since failed to broaden the base of the Kabul government. He rejected the approach. Unfortunately, for the king and Abdul Wali, met to have been approached by Moscow was the kiss of death. The insurgents already hold the king and his family to blame for the first invasions of Soviet influence in the 1950s and 1960s. This, they argue, made the Russian invasion of 1979 inevitable.

The key to any understanding of an attempt by government to supervise the Russian pull-out is that power, once taken, is seldom given up peacefully in Afghanistan. So the present haggling over a coalition and who leads it is likely to determine who will govern in Kabul once the

Russians have gone.

Abdul Wali knows this; the guerrilla leaders know this and so do the Pakistanis, who want a government in exile.

The three important leaders who support the king, Mr. Sayed Gacani, Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and Sibghatullah al-Mojadeddi, are traditionalists who prospered under the monarchy.

The four remaining guerrilla leaders of the Mujahidin alliance gained nothing from the king, indeed they were persecuted or imprisoned for promoting fundamental Islamic beliefs.

They fear that the king's supporters

will use him to take power. If you are looking to the king as the solution to Afghanistan's problems, you may have to turn your gaze elsewhere. Rather than being a symbol of unity, he has unwittingly become a symbol of division.

Among his fellow Pathans, there are some who see his rule as a golden era. But there seems no great love for him among Afghanistan's other tribes and ethnic groups, such as the Tadzhiks, the Uzbeks and the Hazaras, who are fighting the war far from the comfort of Rome and even Peshawar. — *The Independent*

HONGKONG

STANDARD/EXTRA

February 14, 1988

Afghan Rebel Faction Leader Vows War Beyond Any Pact

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, March 18 —

The leader of a powerful Afghan guerrilla party, which may be the most powerful American military assistance, whose aim is a "pure" Islamic state, consistently accuses the United States of conspiring with the Soviet Union against Afghanistan.

Yet the leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, denies that he is anti-American, as is frequently charged.

"But there are people in America who are against our jihad," Mr. Hekmatyar said in an interview in Peshawar, the Pakistani city next to Afghan border that is the center for the seven parties fighting the Moscow-backed Government of President Najibullah in Kabul. —

"They are in the Government, in the parties, in the public," Mr. Hekmatyar continued, speaking in English. "There is a class of people who support our struggle because they are against the Russians, not as an Islamic struggle."

Mr. Hekmatyar strongly opposes the Geneva talks on Afghanistan, with the United States acting as mediator between the Afghan Government and Pakistan.

"Gorbachev would not have made this announcement without an understanding with the United States," Mr. Hekmatyar said. "The Washington reaction proved that there is a secret conspiracy. If the Geneva accords are signed, you will find us on the battlefield. I personally will be inside Afghanistan."

The rebel leader, a 38-year-old former engineering student, who speaks in a soft but insistent voice with the certainty of a man expounding dogma, leads a wing of the Islamic Party in the frequent discord of the loose guerrilla coalition. Mr. Hekmatyar's wing of the split party stands out for being coherent and consistent.

Currently Leading Rebels

On Tuesday, Mr. Hekmatyar was named chairman of the coalition. The post rotated among three months among the seven leaders.

Mr. Hekmatyar, who always wears traditional Afghan dress, preaches an Islamic revolution. Like his fellow alliance leaders, who strike above all as ethnic and anti-Communist, he has a more radical program that reflects a return to the traditional ways of Islam that dominated Afghanistan during the monarchy that was overthrown in 1973 and survived through the political struggles that preceded the Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979.

"We want a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan," said "Brother" Hekmatyar, as his associates refer to him. "Before 1973? That was never an Islamic system. It was completely against Islam."

The leader was less forthcoming when asked to define the differences between the "pure" Islam he advocates and the traditional system of the Taliban. The leader of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who led the highly Muslim country for 40 years, was not Islamic. Mr. Hekmatyar said.

"Islam says the ruler should be elected by the people," he said. "Not Zahir Shah."

Purity but No Details

Unlike the other rebel leaders, Mr. Hekmatyar, who is aware of the impression his words make on the Western press, was reluctant to spell out his philosophy of "pure" Islam as a political and social system.

When asked about the application of Islamic law with stern corporal punishment including flogging or stoning to death of offending women, he replied, "Islam will be implemented in all aspects."

Asked about education for women, Mr. Hekmatyar said the Koran requires education for all, but whether women should be educated like men as doctors, engineers or lawyers, he said: "There are some differences. Each class should be educated according to its nature. It will be decided in the schools."

Islamic fundamentalists believe that women should be educated for nothing but strict observance of the faith, with a stress on domestic life.

His favored treatment by Pakistani intelligence is believed to stem from his links with the Pathans who stayed at least three years before Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan, and has since maintained close relations with the military and intelligence agencies.

Mr. Hekmatyar is an Islamic leader at Kabul University. He fled here after an unsuccessful uprising against the leftward trend of the Government of President Mohammad Daud. Pakistan favored him because of his opposition to the Soviet invasion of 1979 and to the Pushtun tribesmen, who live on both sides of the border. The separation threat has been a major concern of Pakistani governments since the founding of the country in 1947.

Mr. Hekmatyar is himself a Pushtun but opposes separatism because of his advocacy of a larger Islamic brotherhood transcending national frontiers. Part of his revolutionary doctrine, according to Western sources, is that the abolition of all traditional structures, such as Pushtun tribalism, is in favor of his notion of an egalitarian Islamic state. —

Gunplay at a Meeting


Earlier this month, according to reliable Western diplomats, the animosity between the two harbors against Mr. Hekmatyar led to a gunbattle at an alliance meeting between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Sibghatullah al-Mojadeddi, head of the Afghan National Liberation Front during which both men drew their pistols. They were separated by their allies.



■ King Mohammed Zahir Shah pictured with John Kennedy in 1963. The King now lives in exile and is seen as a weak man dominated by his relatives, particularly General Abdul Wali.

(See also p. 14)

NYT 3/19



The Muslim 2/4

Praise the Afghan Symmetry — and Keep Passing the Ammunition

By Rone Tempest

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN
The successful Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan last week, calling for Soviet troop withdrawal, finally revolved around notions of "symmetry."

Not part of the Afghanistan vocabulary until recently, symmetry is the favorite new word of Reagan Administration officials and conservative politicians like Sen. George N. Mitchell (R-N.H.), who visited the Pakistani capital last week to reassure himself that things were proceeding symmetrically regarding the massive American arms supply to Afghan rebels, known collectively as the *mujahedeen*, or holy warriors.

The Humphrey idea, one shared by at least 76 of his colleagues, according to a Senate vote Feb. 29, is that the United States, as a potential guarantor of the United Nations-sponsored truce between Pakistan and Afghanistan, should not close off its Central Intelligence Agency port of entry to the *mujahedeen* unless the Soviet Union has cut off its supplies to the Afghan regime in Kabul.

Or, conversely, if the Soviet Union

Rone Tempest is The Times' correspondent in New Delhi.

Soviet Afghan Drive Called Decision of a Few

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 29 — Not long ago, Georgi A. Arbatov, a member of the Communist Party Central Committee, declared in December 1979 that when he learned that Soviet forces had swept into Afghanistan:

Mr. Arbatov said he was recuperating from a heart attack in the Kremlin hospital when a fellow patient, Anatoly P. Dobrynin, then the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, phoned him from another ward.

"You won't believe this," Mr. Arbatov recalled his colleague saying, "but our soldiers have gone into Afghanistan."

The point of the story — that neither Mr. Dobrynin nor Mr. Arbatov were consulted about the decision or knew of it in advance — was consistent with other recent accounts depicting the intervention as an act approved by only a small circle of Soviet leaders, perhaps

insists on continuing to supply the Najibullah government, then the United States should likewise continue to supply the rebels. Either way, it would meet the definition of symmetry, at least in the current diplomatic context.

Now the Geneva negotiators have reached that accommodation, to allow both sides to keep the arms and aid flowing.

Actually, it is a mainly symbolic issue. Arms and ammunition are not in short supply on either side of the conflict, according to military and political experts who have carefully observed the war here. In the Kabul regime and *mujahedeen* camps, the American weapons wealth, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerii M. Voroninov admitted as much to Pakistan officials when he visited here Feb. 10.

"He told us the Soviet Union had given the regime plenty of equipment," a senior Pakistani official recalled recently. "He told us the problem was not equipment but the ability of the regime and its troops to use it."

Western correspondents who visited Kabul in December saw huge warehouses and open air storage depots of new equipment, and witnessed dozens of cargo planes arriving every day.

On the rebel side, the group that has

complained most vociferously about a shortage of weapons and ammunition, the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), is famous among journalists for shooting off thousands of rounds of ammunition to impress television cameras — often miles from any potential fighting. A photograph of a NIFA American news agency recalled having to retreat to a Pakistan base camp with a NIFA contingent because the rebels had fired most of their ammunition before entering Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, credible intelligence sources have been saying for the past year that rebel groups were busy hoarding weapons, perhaps in anticipation of renewed tribal warfare after the war ends. Even within some rebel groups are believed to have sold off some weapons to Iranians and other forces in friendly to the United States, including the separated and effective Stinger missiles used to down Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, both the Americans and Soviets appear to have been engorging their supply lines for months to rush in as many weapons as they could before the settlement was reached. The CIA program in Afghanistan, using Pakistan as a willing conduit, is by far the biggest American covert operation since Vietnam.

The letter, according to Mr. Bogomolov, said in part, "The geographical and sociopolitical conditions are unfavorable, and we will have to deal with the interventionists here, the United States and other NATO countries, China, Australia, the Islamic states and an army of Afghan insurgents."

Another point the letter raised, Mr. Gordeev's spokesman said, was that intervention would undermine a trend toward improved relations with the United States and create a political atmosphere that was not conducive to long-term alliances.

Other top Soviet officials have told

Westerners that the decision to send

troops into Afghanistan was made by a handful of senior members of the Com-

unist Party Politburo.

Roman Legvold, director of the Institute of the Soviet Union at Columbia

University, said during a visit to Moscow this month that he has been told that no more than four or five officials

were involved.

Mr. Legvold said the men included Leonid I. Brezhnev, who led the Soviet Union from 1964 until his death in 1982, Dmitri F. Ustinov, the Defense Minis-

ter, Yuri V. Andropov, the former KGB chief who was to succeed Mr. Brezhnev; Mikhail A. Shlyapnikov, his foreign minister; Andrei P. Kirilenko, the longtime Foreign Minister; and others.

But, only Mr. Gordeev, now Presi-

dent, is still alive.

Since the arms-supply taps are open wide on both sides — symmetrically as it were — that should guarantee plenty of weapons to kill everyone in Afghanistan several times over. After all, its prewar population was only 15 million, and as many as 1 million may have died already.

While they have been fighting the Soviets, the loosely affiliated rebel forces have served the U.S. foreign policy handily, embarrassing the Soviet Union and in-

spiring near-unanimous solidarity in the West on the Afghan issue. Yet many of the strongest rebel groups represent fundamentalist Islamic strains not dissimilar to those in Iran.

With one war apparently at an end, the same holy warriors that the United States has armed to the teeth could easily redirect their anger toward the West. How long should the United States continue supplying arms to the rebels?

An answer might be found in statements. Western officials made a month ago before the "symmetry" issue muddied matters on the home front in back-to-back sessions, senior Western diplomats insisted that the goal of continuing the weapons supply was what remained limited, mainly to ensure that the *mujahedeen* had enough guns and bullets to capture Kabul and remove the Najibullah regime from Soviet troops withdrawal.

"A lot of steps will be taken to make sure that the *mujahedeen* have enough on hand by May 15," one official said, referring to the date announced by the Soviets as the beginning of a troop withdrawal. "If we felt the *mujahedeen* like Kabul, there would be no Geneva."

For Americans, American officials, including many Vietnamese veterans, "fall of Kabul" is a shining vision. It would be a perfect reprise, they feel, to the fall of Saigon 13 years ago. Few veteran Afghan experts in the West, however, have high expectations for what might follow the fall of Kabul.

Given the nature and religious zealotry of many of the rebels, they feel, there might not be much profit in attempting to shape a post-Soviet Afghanistan. So the American program in U.S. arms aid to the rebels appears to be to shoot for the fall of Kabul, the fall of Saigon, and not much beyond.

In that regard, perhaps the United States and the Soviet Union will have both learned, in the painful withdrawal process, some lessons about the folly of military intervention. Perhaps there will be symmetry after all. □

LA Times 4/10

Text of the Soviet-Afghan Statement on Accord

Following is the text of a joint statement issued yesterday after a meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, and Najibullah, the Afghan leader, in the Soviet Central Asian city of Tashkent, as released in translation by the Tass press agency:

A meeting between the General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Najibullah, was held in Tashkent on April 7, 1988. Taking part in it were:

Member of the Political Bureau of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Eduard Shevardnadze, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Afghanistan, Rafik Nishanov.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Najibullah exchanged views on the key moments of the international situation and studied in detail topical questions directly concerning the interests of their countries.

They noted that the policy of national reconciliation consistently pursued by the Afghan leadership, its constructive position on questions of the political settlement is the only correct line that accommodates the interests of the Afghan people, all of its neighbors and the interests of the entire international community.

Loyalty and Noninterference Pledged

The sides confirmed loyalty to the old tradition of building relations between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan on principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual advantage and noninterference in internal affairs.

As a result of the meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev and Najibullah arrived at a common view on the following.

First, The Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan will act in accordance with the statements published in Tashkent, Feb. 1, 1988. These statements imparted a new impulse to the process of the political settlement of the most complex regional conflict and made it possible to place negotiations on the plane of a practical solution.

Second, The General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the President of Afghanistan believe that the last obstacles to the implementation of the agreements have now been removed thanks to the constructive cooperation of all who are involved in the settlement, and favor their immediate signing.

Both sides duly assess the role of the U.S. Secretary General and his personal representative, Diego Gorrobo.

The Afghan President welcomes the readiness of the Soviet Union and the United States to act as guarantors of the Geneva accords.

Withdrawal May Start May 15

Third, The Soviet Union and Afghanistan reaffirm that in the event of the conclusion within the shortest period of the same agreements, the Afghanistan-U.S.S.R. understanding that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn within the period fixed by these agreements, starting from May 15, 1988, will remain in force.

Fourth, The policy of national reconciliation makes it possible to settle the situation around Afghanistan, end the war and fratricide, establish peace throughout the country's territory and form a coalition government with the participation of all forces representing Afghan society, including those who are currently opposed to the authorities.

Fifth, The final status of their country among other states will be determined by the Afghans

themselves and nobody but them. The Soviet Union reaffirms its support for President Najibullah's statement on Afghanistan as an independent, non-aligned and neutral state. It proceeds from the conviction that the territory of that country or any of its parts will not be used for purposes hostile to its neighbors, with regard to which Afghanistan will continue a policy of good-neighborly relations and cooperation. This equally applies to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Soviet side backs the Afghan President's statement to the effect that Afghanistan's internal structure will rest on a multi-party system in the political field and on a multi-sectoral basis in the economic sphere.

Refugees' Return is Sought

Sixth, It is of key importance for implementing the policy of national reconciliation to create satisfactory conditions for the return of Afghan refugees who are temporarily in the territory of Pakistan and other countries and grant them rights on an equal basis with all citizens of the country. The Soviet Union will extend assistance to Afghanistan in creating such conditions.

Seventh, The Soviet Union, relying on relations of traditional and historical friendship, expresses the readiness to cooperate with Afghanistan at high level in order to restore the economy and facilitate the economic and social development of the Republic of Afghanistan.

Eighth, The General Secretary and the President call on other states to contribute to establishing peace and national reconciliation in Afghanistan and respect the Geneva accords. This would set a good and encouraging example for resolving other regional conflicts.

"Notable Moscovite trying to make believe he means to leave the spot he occupies."

AFGHAN INFO 2/88



THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 8, 1988

U.S. and Soviet Would Suspend Arms Shipments After an Accord

By PAUL LEWIS

Times Staff Writer

GENEVA, April 7 — The Reagan Administration and the Soviet Union intend to suspend all arms deliveries to Afghanistan after the conclusion of an agreement of a Soviet troop withdrawal and a Geneva political settlement is signed.

The suspension would last for at least nine months, the time that the Soviet Union will have under the emerging agreement to remove its 115,000 troops from Afghanistan on the side of the Communist Government there, the officials said.

But Washington and Moscow will reserve the right to resume military supplies to the faction it supports in the civil war, the other superpower broke the informal agreement and resumes sending arms into Afghanistan, the officials say.

The private agreement means that Moscow can probably argue that its longstanding cooperation agreement with the Government in Kabul will not be interrupted by a troop withdrawal accord, as it has insisted in the Geneva negotiations.

The Reagan Administration can equally say it is not selling out the guerrillas by cutting off their arms supplies.

U.N.'s View of the Understanding

But the United Nations Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuellar, said to state that in his view the United States and the Soviet Union are obliged to do more to end the civil war in Afghanistan indefinitely when the withdrawal agreement is concluded, according to United Nations officials.

The Secretary General will say that as a result of the agreement, the two superpowers are bound to support its aims and objectives, which include promoting peace in Afghanistan and

The informal agreement will provide for rearming.

ending the civil war. Further arms shipments to the guerrillas would violate the spirit of the accord.

The Secretary General plans to take this position to increase international pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union to respect the accords and to promote a political settlement between the Government in Kabul, its guerrilla opponents and other Afghan political factions, United Nations officials say.

But the statement is also intended to give the accord a formal seal. United Nations officials say, as it now emerges, may do little to promote peace in Afghanistan even if it does lead to a Soviet military pullout.

It is because the private agreement between Washington and Moscow came only after they sent large amounts of weapons to their clients in Afghanistan in recent weeks, thus enabling them to continue the civil war.

United Nations officials say the withdrawal agreement is not the price of a wide-scale rearming of both factions that allows them to continue the civil war.

United Nations officials are also unhappy with the private agreement between the superpowers to suspend further arms deliveries.

The Secretary General's planned decision to oppose any formal withdrawal is based on a view of protecting the United Nations against charges that it has done little to end the civil war and may be making it worse.

The military supply issue has proved the thorniest in the current round of negotiations here. Originally, the Reagan Administration wanted a formal

agreement to suspend all weapons supplies between the United States and the Soviet Union, or what became known as "negative symmetry."

Earlier attempts by Pakistan to link a withdrawal agreement to the installation of a coalition government in Kabul have been abandoned largely at the insistence of the Soviet Government, which considers a Soviet military pullout its priority in the negotiations, officials say.

Instead, the participants in the negotiations have agreed on a "positive symmetry" under which Diego Gorrobo, the United Nations mediator, will seek to promote a new political dialogue between the Afghan factions after a withdrawal agreement is signed.

Anguish in U.N. Debates

The possibility that a United Nations-sponsored agreement might do nothing to end the civil war has caused a divided United Nations delegation, senior United Nations officials in Geneva and New York, according to some of those involved in the discussions.

United Nations officials fear that the United Nations' failure to further damage its reputation if it is seen as sponsoring a withdrawal at the price of a wide-scale rearming of both factions that allows them to continue the civil war.

United Nations officials are also unhappy with the private agreement between the superpowers to suspend further arms deliveries.

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agreement to suspend all weapons supplies between the United States and the Soviet Union, or what became known as "negative symmetry."

But Moscow rejected this idea because it threatened to interrupt its Government-to-Government agreement with Kabul.

But the two sides have now agreed on what they call "positive symmetry," which allows them to continue supplies at equivalent levels, but with a private agreement that these levels will be maintained.

"positive symmetry does not mean continuing supplies," a United Nations official said today. "That is the understanding given to us."

Far from continuing civil war is increasing because the guerrilla leadership has rejected any compromise with Kabul and is demanding the end of the Communist regime. But United Nations negotiators here believe the guerrillas will not accept a future freeze on the Soviet forces leave. They also say that Moscow and Washington can probably bring pressure on both sides to compromise and begin searching for a political solution.

But a senior Pakistani official here said that the Soviet Union's insistence on getting the "moral issue" in the negotiations is not to end the war, but to decide "who is the legitimate government of Afghanistan."

Abdul Sattar, the chief civil servant in the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, said that a United Nations-sponsored agreement could not promote peace in Afghanistan when it is clear that political power is held by a government rejected by most Afghans.

His remarks appear to imply that the guerrillas have the right to continue fighting if the Communists in Kabul refuse to hand over power.

Carlucci arrives in India for talks

New Delhi (UPI) — U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Carlucci Monday began what may be a controversial visit to India, a country that has been the target of Soviet military and political influence.

A U.S. diplomat, who spoke on condition he not be identified, said Carlucci's main visit was to discuss the shift in the geostrategic equation resulting from the projected withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops.

A few hours before Carlucci's arrival, a fire and a fire damaged the American center in the heart of India's information ministry.

Another embassy official said there were three explosions when the fire broke out. Dozens of fire-fighters were called to the scene of the four-story building that houses a library and the U.S. information center.

Carlucci's visit to India could have been accidentally by a fire that started on the top floor of the six-story building that houses a library and the U.S. information center.

Another embassy official said there were three explosions when the fire broke out. Dozens of fire-fighters were called to the scene of the four-story building that houses a library and the U.S. information center.

Carlucci's visit to India was connected with Carlucci's visit to Delhi because he had to comment on the cause of the fire.

Bangkok Post

4/5


A card that appears to provide for the evacuation of Afghan officials in the event of a Soviet military withdrawal has been obtained from Friends House, a New York-based organization monitoring political and human rights.

The card, 3 by 5 inches, bears the title "Permit for Special Evacuation" and is imprinted with a red star and a hammer and sickle. It is printed in Russian on one side, and Persian on the other.

The card is "ostensibly to be used by high-ranking Communists and officials of the occupation Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan," said Ludmilla Thorne, a Soviet specialist.

Ms. Thorne said she received a copy of the card from an American friend who had received it from Afghan insurgents forces on a visit to Peshawar, Pakistan, where the insurgents have their headquarters.

The card begins with the words, "Comrade," followed by a blank space, where the name of the holder can be inserted, and continues, "is granted the right of special evacuation by air and land transport, with the retention of



all privileges for receiving a place to board upon arrival."

The card is followed by a blank space, where the name of the holder can be inserted, and continues, "is granted the right of special evacuation by air and land transport, with the retention of

NYT 4/7

Annual Survey of Afghan War for 1987

An annual survey by Agency French Press Pakistan shows that casualties increased by 10.7% in the 8th year of the Afghan war. During Mujahideen operations and clashes against the occupying forces 9,215 Soviet-Afghan soldiers died, 52% being Soviets.

The number of Mujahideen casualties was 2,059 martyred (4% increase on 1986) and 3,158 injured. 4,781 officers and soldiers of the Afghan Army defected to the Mujahideen (35% increase on 1986). On the other hand, 1,913 Afghan Army soldiers surrendered to the Mujahideen and the number of deserters from the Afghan Army is much greater than this.

In 1987, the Soviets lost 251 planes and 211 helicopters (300% increase on 1986). Also, 813 tanks and armored personnel carriers

were destroyed, as well as 1,262 oil tankers, supply trucks and military vehicles. The Mujahideen captured 257 heavy machine guns, cannons and other heavy weaponry, and 8,128 automatic rifles.

An estimated number of 22,294 Afghan civilians were martyred, 90% being women, children and old men, while 24,671 civilians were seriously injured. The year saw the destruction of 2,622 houses, mosques and places of religious significance. The second largest Afghan city of Qandahar took the brunt of destruction and a major part of the city is now in ruins. In Kabul, Mujahideen operations were stepped up from 1986.

A significant event which took place in 1987 was the Mujahideen operations inside the USSR.

Europe, which conducted the hearings. "And we will bring to freedom hundreds of young men who most likely face punishment or death if they are forced to return to the Soviet Union."

The governmental commission was formed in 1976 to monitor compliance with the Helsinki human rights agreements signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and 34 other nations in 1975.

In a moving statement at the hearing, a Soviet electrician, Igor Kovalchuk, described his frustration and depression over being "sucked into a huge bloody whirlpool" of violence as a Soviet sharpshooter in Afghanistan.

Kovalchuk, 27, said that growing up in the city of Kharkov, "I was taught to believe that our system was the best and the most humane in the entire world, while Americans were egotistical exploiters of other people, who want to take over the world and keep it in their

Afghan officials reportedly selling homes and sending families abroad

By Marc Kaufman
Times Staff Writer

NEW DELHI — Leaders of the Soviet-backed Afghan government are beginning to sell their homes and send their families abroad amid growing indications that a Soviet troop withdrawal will begin soon. Western diplomatic sources said today.

Some senior Afghan Communist Party and government leaders have sought refuge in socialist countries. Eastern bloc diplomats have reported, and rumors of such departures are all around Kabul.

The sources also said that Soviet troops had stopped patrolling some of the main Afghan highways they had kept open for years, leaving the job to the Afghan military. And there have been unconfirmed reports that Afghan troops are beginning to take up important defensive positions around Kabul.

In addition, the sources said, the royal palace in Kabul is being prepared for a possible return of the former king, Zahir Shah, whom the

Afghan government and some resistance groups would like to see installed as the head of a coalition government. Zahir Shah has been living in exile in Italy since he was overthrown in 1973.

While the Soviets and the Afghan government are preparing for a withdrawal, the sources said, mujahideen resistance fighters have stepped up their attacks in Kabul and seem to be massing in the valleys north of the capital.

In Kabul, there were reports of 18 major explosions last week, including several inside the Soviet Embassy, the parliament and one at the Afghan radio-TV complex. The explosion at the complex, sources said, seemed to be from a large car bomb.

Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan in 1979, and there are now an estimated 115,000 Soviet troops inside the country. The Soviets have carried on an increasingly successful guerrilla war against the Soviets and their Afghan allies, with substantial aid from the United States for the last few years.

Negotiations to end the Soviet military presence have been going on for years under U.N. auspices. The next round begins March 2, and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has said that if an agreement is reached by March 15, Soviet troops will begin leaving by mid-May.

No agreement has yet been made for an interim government in Kabul after the withdrawal, and the mujahideen have rejected any proposals that would leave the current communist government with a substantial role.

The massing of mujahideen forces in the north and the Logar Valley to the north and northeast of Kabul may be a prelude to a concerted attack once the Soviets have begun to leave, the diplomatic sources said.

Three days after Gorbachev announced that Soviet troops would begin leaving, fighting from Afghanistan by mid-May, Soviet sources said, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, Pavel Mozhov, had a serious heart attack and was flown to Moscow.

Comparative prices of goods in Kabul: AICMB #84

March 1988

Item		Last Year Afs.	Current Year Afs.
Mutton	/kg.	280	550
Beef	/kg.	250	280
Sugar	/kg.	30	80
Potatoes	/7 kgs.	130	220
Onion	/7 kgs.	120	240
Rice	/7 kgs.	600	800
Edible Oil	/17 kgs.	2,000	2,500
Petrol	/litre	14	30
Diesel	/litre	14	14
Bread	/piece	6	6
Dried Milk	/piece	700	900

Kayhan Int '1

3/5

Soviet Defectors Relate Afghan Trauma

By ERIC LICHTBLAU, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Two Soviet defectors Wednesday offered a rare glimpse of life in the Red Army in Afghanistan in hopes of gaining political asylum in the West for several hundred other Soviet soldiers thought to have deserted or been captured by the Afghan rebels.

Then Capitol Hill testimony described in disillusionment that led them to flee their assignments in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Many members of Congress, meanwhile, are trying to pressure the Reagan Administration into setting up a "defector pipeline" to encourage disaffected Soviet soldiers to seek U.S. asylum.

"Having Soviet soldiers defecting in large numbers and telling their stories in the West will put substantial pressure on the Soviets to withdraw," said Rep. Don Ritter (R-Pa.), a member of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in

open hands."

But after being drafted to fight in Afghanistan, Kovalchuk said, he began to grapple with questions about why the Soviets were there. He quoted a Soviet officer as telling his troops: "Stop your babling... American mercenaries are on the territory of Afghanistan and it is our duty to get them out of there, understand."

Kovalchuk told commission members he "smoked dope," cried to himself and sometimes closed his eyes range, shooting someone at close range.

Finally, after a small girl was killed by his unit, Kovalchuk defected to Canada in 1982, he said. He joined and fought with the Afghan resistance and four years later won asylum in Canada.

Similarly, Sergei Busov de- scribed "the lying, the thievery, the servility and the cruelty" that he said prompted him to flee the Soviet army for the foothills of Afghanistan in October, 1983. Ludmilla Thorne, a Soviet hu-

man rights specialist in New York who helped gain asylum for Kovalchuk, Busov and 12 others, said that several hundred Soviet soldiers, either defectors or held captive by the resistance movement, want to leave Afghanistan for the West.

Lawmakers on the commission told Thorne that they would encourage expanding asylum proceedings for would-be defectors and setting up a communication network to let Soviet soldiers know their options for asylum.

A State Department official said later that the Administration supports free choice for Soviet soldiers who do not want to return to their homeland and actively aids those who want to come to the West. But Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.H.) called such assertions "sheer hypocrisy" and told commission members that the U.S. record of "failure" in aiding defectors is "disgraceful" and "intolerable." Others also charged the Administration with dragging its feet on the defector question — perhaps for fear of damaging negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal.

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LA Times 3/24

WHAT HAVE WE HERE...

Mujahideen who kidnapped off an Afghan courier one who worked for the Soviet secret police, the KGB, was not the Afghan version, the Khad — on the road between Kabul and Peshawar, Pakistan, found documents in his possession which set Peshawar abuzz.

AP Wire

SEARCHES OF POSTURE

Are the Soviets preparing their deep-cover agents for a rapid exit from Pakistan-Afghanistan? Or was the whole thing a disinformation play?

Transition

From the Editor:

After 6 years of negotiations, the Geneva agreements have been signed; Soviet troops will go home, to return, it is hoped, only as tourists. What remains to be done in Afghanistan, unfortunately, will make the Geneva talks seem like a fireside chat. The FORUM will continue to bring you all the news that fits with the hope that action will replace speculation so we can return to larger print. In the meantime, get out your lenses.

Recently we spoke to Yuri Gankovsky, the specialist on Afghanistan at the Soviet Inst. of Oriental Studies, part of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Dr. Gankovsky, reportedly, was against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (being an historian) & has been advising the Soviets to get their troops out of Afghanistan for a long time. He gave us the impression that he hoped they would never go back, regardless of what went on inside the country - but - he said it is impossible to guess what might happen. He said that the USSR probably had only 12 real scholars on Afghan affairs, but dozens of "experts," statistics not unfamiliar here. He hopes the Afghans can get their act together without more bloodshed but he is not sanguine about the prospects. He promised to send us an annotated bibliography of the books his Institute has published about Afghanistan. We'll hope to have it for a future issue.

Our thanks to everyone who sent us clippings, cartoons & news. Please continue. The deadline for the next issue is 6/15.

The only common prediction among officials at the State Department and intelligence agencies is that Najibullah, the Soviet-backed leader of Afghanistan, is unlikely to retain power for more than a year after the Soviet forces leave. Beyond that, there is ample speculation.


An official who studies Afghanistan for the United States Information Agency said the guerrilla commanders would want to hold on to the territory they now control, and, he said, "You might have continuous squabbles" among them. The United States wants to discourage such fragmentation. But having supported the guerrillas in their bloody eight-year struggle for self-determination, the United States is not about to impose its preferences on the country now, American officials said.

In accords signed this month, the United States and the Soviet Union agree to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. But as Soviet troops prepared to withdraw, Western diplomats in Pakistan reported last week that tons of Soviet supplies, including arms and ammunition, were still being flown into Kabul. And Mr. Reagan declared, "We will continue to support the mujahedeen for as long as the Soviets support the Kabul regime." The rebel leaders, who did not sign the agreement, have vowed to fight to oust Mr. Najibullah.

The shape of any future Afghan government depends on whether it is formed through negotiation or more war, officials say. Diego Cordovez, the United Nations official who negotiated the agreements on Soviet withdrawal, has a mandate to help the Afghan people try to put together a government representing all elements of the Afghan nation. But there is no guarantee he will succeed, given the intense hostility between the Kabul Government and the mujahedeen.

Another possibility, according to American officials, is that the rebel leaders may put together a provisional government as a rival to the one in Kabul. They might set up such a government in another Afghan province, like Kandahar in the south or Paktia in the east, to conduct the next phase of the struggle, with the hope of eventually replacing the Government in Kabul, the officials said.

This alternative assumes that the guerrillas can forge a political structure of their own. If they cannot, the guerrilla commanders might go their separate ways, and the shape of the next government would then be determined by the outcome of the fighting between the Kabul Government and various rebel groups. Finally, American officials said, there might be a coup in Kabul as the Soviets withdraw, and the leader of the coup could negotiate with the rebel leaders, regardless of whether they have formed a provisional government. . . .



AFGHAN INFO 2/88

THE NEW YORK TIMES APRIL 14, 1988

BY ROBERT PEAK

Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S.

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17 — With help from China and many Moslem nations, the United States led a huge international operation over the last eight years to arm the Afghan guerrillas with the weapons they needed to drive the Soviet Army from their country.

The effort is one of the largest ever mounted by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to American officials and foreign diplomats. It dwarfs American efforts to aid the Nicaraguan rebels, but its details are much less widely known because it encountered little opposition in Congress. **Cost Totals \$2 Billion**

Indeed, Congress was continually prodding the C.I.A., the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department to provide more support for the Afghan guerrillas, who limped along with relatively ineffective weapons until they got Stinger antiaircraft missiles in September 1986. They used the missiles to shoot down armored Soviet helicopter gunships, and as a result, the guerrillas and their supply caravans have been able to move with much less fear of being attacked from the air.

As Afghanistan and three other nations signed agreements last week providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, these details of the supply operation emerged from interviews with members of Congress and officials at the White House, intelligence agencies, the Defense Department, the State Department and the Office of Management and Budget.

Arming the rebels has cost the United States more than \$2 billion over eight years, although the exact amount of appropriations are secret because the operation is not officially acknowledged by Washington. The program has had a steady stream of support in Congress throughout.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has generally matched the United States financial contributions, providing money in a joint fund with Washington to buy hundreds of Stingers for the Islamic guerrillas even though Congress would not permit such sophisticated weapons to be sold to the Saudi rebels. In addition, several wealthy Saudis, motivated by a sense of religious duty and solidarity, gave cash contributions to the guerrillas.

Tennessee mules have made an invaluable contribution to the guerrillas' campaign, transporting tons of equipment, food, clothing and medical supplies across the frontier from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Hub R. Reese Jr. of Gallatin, Tenn., who runs what he describes as the world's largest mule trading and auction company, said that in the last year he delivered 700 mules to an Army base in Kentucky for shipment to Pakistan.

China, which has a short border with Afghanistan, "worked hand in glove with the United States" in supplying the guerrillas with rocket and anti-aircraft missiles, according to a military officer who served at the American Embassy in Beijing. But Iran, which often portrays itself as a leader of the Islamic world, provided very limited, indeed token support to the guerrillas, who came themselves mujahedeen, or "holy warriors."

Administrators cite their support of the guerrillas as a success for President Reagan's policy of helping indigenous groups resist Communist control of their regional conflicts. But many officials were initially reluctant to provide vigorous support for the Afghans, fearing that it might unrealistically raise their hopes for a military victory or provoke Soviet reprisals against Pakistan, which could put the United States in a difficult position to aid to the guerrillas.

Stanfield Turner, who was Director of Central Intelligence under President Carter, said some intelligence professionals believed the United States should be putting money into "a hopeless cause."

Fred C. Ikle, an Under Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1984, said in a February interview that the first three or four years of the Reagan Administration, there was a general shyness and hesitation, a reluctance to make a more concerted effort, to provide more instruments and tactics to freedom fighters.

In October 1984, Congress passed a resolution saying, "It would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom."

The measure had been introduced two years earlier by Senator Paul E. Tsongas, a liberal Massachusetts Democrat. Senator Malcolm Wallop, a conservative from Wyoming, who was chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business in 1984, had a more moderate position to the resolution that has come essentially from the C.I.A. and the Department of State."

Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, a New Mexico Republican who is chairman of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, said in an interview this week, "The C.I.A. was very reluctant in carrying out its responsibilities for so long a time." But he and other lawmakers gave the administration high marks for making a much more efficient operation in the last couple of years.

Inset: Arms in Early Program

What follows is a history of that operation, as described by people who supervised it or followed it closely.

More than 30,000 Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan with planes and tanks in the last week of December 1979. On Jan. 1, 1980, the Soviet Government newspaper *Izvestia* charged that the Central Intelligence Agency had been secretly training Afghan rebels in camps in Pakistan. The State Department refused to comment.

In mid-February of 1980, Egypt's Defense Minister, Lieut. Gen. Kamal Hassan, said that his military was training Afghans in guerrilla tactics and would send them back to their homes to fight against the Soviet-backed Government. At about the same time, six weeks after the Soviet intervention began, White House officials said President Carter had approved a "covert operation" to supply the guerrillas with small arms of Soviet origin, including Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles.

For five years, American officials provided the guerrillas with equipment designed and manufactured by the Soviet Union or other East Bloc countries so they could deny that the United States was supplying such assistance. They could maintain that the rebels had captured the weapons from the Afghan Government or from Soviet troops.

But that strategy created immense problems for the guerrillas. "For most of the first five years of the war, the mujahedeen lacked any effective anti-aircraft or anti-range weapons," said Alexander R. Alexiev, a former member of the Rand Corporation, an expert on Soviet affairs who has analyzed the war in Afghanistan under a Pentagon contract.

Despite the presence of vastly superior weapons in the Soviet camps, he said, "the resistance was supplied primarily with 1930's vintage antiaircraft machine guns that were hardly a

match for the heavy armored and deadly Soviet gunship helicopters. On the ground, the rebels' main long-range weapon was the Soviet-model 82-millimeter mortar, not known for either superior range or accuracy. As a result, the Soviets enjoyed virtually a undisputed dominance in the air."

First Reagan Effort Falls Short

When Mr. Reagan took office in January 1981, his appointees were told that support for the Afghan guerrillas was not a priority in the first operation being conducted by the C.I.A.

In the fall of 1982, the President decided to increase the quality and quantity of arms supplied to the insurgents. In December, Congress agreed to one more \$2 billion in military aid, mainly to buy more Stinger missiles.

Administrators said they had no dramatic improvement in the flow of arms.

André Eiva, a former director of the Federation for American Afghan Action, a private group that lobbies for military aid to the insurgents, said that through 1984 they were still getting weapons of relatively poor quality, like the 82-millimeter mortar and the Soviet SAM-7 antiaircraft missile. Even when they got good weapons, like the 12.7-millimeter heavy Soviet machine gun known as the Dushashka, they did not get nearly enough ammunition to fire it effectively, he said. Soviet helicopters, according to Mr. Eiva, who was an Army infantry officer in the Green Berets in the 1970's.

In the fall of 1983, Representative Charles E. Wilson of Texas, started a campaign to supply the guerrillas with a more effective antiaircraft weapon. "Opposition to the Stinger was so great that we had to settle for something less than a missile," said a source, including William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, who would not push for Stingers.

At the end of 1983, Mr. Wilson persuaded his colleagues to provide \$40 million for weapons, and much of that went for 107-millimeter antiaircraft missiles made by a Soviet firm, Oerlikon. The guerrillas began to get the automatic cannon in late 1984, Mr. Wilson said in an interview.

In January 1985, Congress formed a Select Committee on Afghanistan to investigate the guerrilla needs and to put more pressure on the Administration.

A turning point came in April 1985, when Mr. Reagan signed a classified order clarifying the rules of covert operations. One goal was to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan "by all means available," it said. That declaration eventually cleared the way for the use of Western-made weapons to the guerrillas.

The budget for the covert operation more than doubled, to \$280 million in the fiscal year 1985 from \$122 million in 1984, according to members of Congress. The guerrillas got their first effective surface-to-surface weapons, 107-millimeter multiple rocket launchers made in China. They have a range of about five miles, so the guerrillas could fire on Soviet and Afghan Government installations from a safe distance.

Nevertheless, according to Mr. Alexiev, 1985 was "the bloodiest and most difficult year of the war for the mujahedeen." After Mikhail S. Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, Soviet forces dramatically increased the number and intensity of their attacks on the guerrillas and the civilian population, he said. The offensive intensified into the spring of 1986.

Feeling that the United States had violated its own principles in the Ticos Message, the President seemed to step up America's commitment to insurgent forces in the third world. Paraphrasing a line from the Ticos resolution passed by Congress in 1984, he said, "We will support you with moral and material assistance, your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom."

After several months, conservative groups that the president had harshly criticized John N. McMahon, who was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, on the ground that he was blocking efforts to send Stingers to the guerrillas. In early March 1986, Mr. Reagan approved delivery of such missiles.

At about the same time, Mr.

McMahon, who had served 15 years with the agency, resigned for what he described as "personal reasons." He said his resignation was not "an expression of discontent with the President's policies."

The first Stinger was used in Afghanistan on Feb. 26, 1986, and the launcher now hangs on a desk in Mr. Wilson's office in Congress. Three Soviet Mi-24 helicopters were destroyed by the new weapons on the first day of their use in Afghanistan. Since then, according to American officials, 270 guerrillas have shot down at least 270 Soviet aircraft.

In 1986, the insurgents got two other types of portable antiaircraft missiles, the Stinger and the Blueeye, the American-made Redeye. But neither was as effective as the Stinger.

"We were startled by the success of the Stinger," Mr. Wilson said. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a Democrat, said, "It's rare to see one weapon can transform a situation so radically."

THE NEW YORK TIMES

APRIL 18, 1988

John Gunston, former British army officer, now a free-lance reporter and photographer, recently returned from a visit to the combat areas of Afghanistan, where he observed the war between Soviet and mujahedeen forces. His report on the use of Stinger missiles by the mujahedeen is one of a series of reports on the war he has written for AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY (AW&ST) Mar. 26, 1984, p. 54; Oct. 29, 1984, pp. 38 and 44.)

DEPLOYMENT

• • • When the Stinger missiles were first deployed operationally in October 1986, mujahedeen gunners claimed they were destroying at least one aircraft each day. A year later, the missiles obviously were still effective despite Soviet countermeasures, although the number of aircraft claimed by the missile gunners has declined considerably. The mujahedeen gunners still claim a 65-70% kill rate per missile launch, although the number of launch opportunities has declined due to changes in Soviet operating techniques. About one aircraft per week is a good estimate of Soviet losses at present. . . .

After each mission into Afghanistan, the launch teams return to their pickup point to be debriefed by U.S. and Pakistani officials and to exchange the tubes of the Stingers they have fired for new missiles. Each team is issued two new missiles for each empty tube, up to a maximum of eight missiles. Three batteries are issued for each missile. The teams also receive one Stinger launcher.

The mujahedeen missile teams are trained at a base in Pakistan, outside Islamabad. Training on the Stinger is performed by members of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate General of the Pakistani military. ISI is the agency through which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency funnels all military aid to the Afghans.

ISI Stinger instructors attend a six-month course in the U.S. Pakistan's forces also are equipped with the missile. U.S. instructors also are stationed at the base to ensure the standard of training is maintained.

Operational deployment of the Stingers was at first limited by fears that some might be captured by the Soviets, or that the Afghan air force might fly retaliatory strikes against border villages inside Pakistan.

The missiles were kept in the border areas during late 1986 and early 1987, at least partly at the insistence of the Pakistanis. Beginning in early 1987, the border villages inside Pakistan were an almost daily objective at this time.

The situation changed in late 1987 when Ahmed Shah Massoud, the mujahedeen commander in the Panjshir area, received his first Stingers. The missiles have now been deployed in the distant northern provinces of Afghanistan, near the So-

west border.

Initially, 300 Stingers were allocated to the mujahedeen in 1986, with another 600 in 1987. A number of these were surrendered in the first few months of their deployment. Some were turned over to the Afghan military by mujahedeen commanders who took advantage of the Kabul government's amnesty program, which includes generous cash payments for such weapons as Stingers and British-supplied Short Brothers Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles.

There have been continuing rumors in both Pakistan and Afghanistan that approximately 16 Stingers were sold to Iran in 1987 by commanders of the Islamic fundamentalist faction Hezbollah-Islami for approximately \$1 million. This is denied by other mujahedeen leaders, who claim that the missiles, if they were obtained by the Iranians, were stolen from mujahedeen units. Batteries for use with the Stinger missiles were found on board a boat operated by the Iran Revolutionary Guards in the Persian Gulf on Sept. 21, 1987.

In addition to the Stingers, about 300 British-supplied Blowpipe missiles were provided to the mujahedeen through the same channels as the Stingers. These arrived in Afghanistan in early 1986, before the first Stingers were received. Training was the responsibility of the U.S., and the mujahedeen apparently never gained confidence in the weapon, which uses a line-of-sight guidance system and is somewhat more complicated to operate than the Stinger.

The kill rate of the Blowpipe was low in comparison to the Stinger and its use has been terminated. □

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY

April 4, 1988

CIA Opposed Stingers for Afghan Rebels

By JOHN WALCOTT

AND TIM CARRINGTON

Special to THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The Reagan administration's most ambitious covert operation is increasing pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, yet the program encountered resistance from a surprising quarter: the Central Intelligence Agency.

Although William Casey, the agency's late director, championed covert operations, he and other high CIA officials delayed for about a year giving the Afghan guerrillas the weapon now credited with turning the tide against the Soviets: the Stinger anti-aircraft missile.

The story of how the administration, after a long debate, decided to send Stingers to Afghanistan in 1986 should be the usually cautious State Department and Congress, which is habitually wary of secret wars, overcame CIA reluctance to the deployment of the effective missiles.

Military Quagmire

Strangely, the CIA resisted a move that has enabled the Afghan guerrillas to create a military quagmire, so costly to the Soviets this month offered to begin withdrawing their 115,000 troops from Afghanistan by May 15. "We moved from a typical containment approach in 1986 to the first case ever of a Soviet World War II of actually reversing a Soviet invasion," said Efraim Karlovski, the Pentagon's director of strategic defense.

President Jimmy Carter had started supporting the rebels in 1980, shortly after the Soviet move into Afghanistan. The Reagan administration has increased aid to about \$600 million a year, yet the program's aims weren't clear until the administration worked out a presidential directive early in 1985.

Officials say Morton Abramowitz, the State Department's top intelligence officer, along with senior Pentagon officials, inserted into the directive language calling for an expansion of the program every year to force Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to decide whether he was willing to pay an increasing price to keep Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

But the CIA moved cautiously, wary of provoking Soviet retaliation against Pakistan, precipitating a surprise Soviet strike, or establishing a long and complex supply train to the Afghans that might actually hamper their fighting ability.

The mujahedeen and their supporters lobbied for more effective missiles. In the middle of 1985, Pakistani President Zia told a congressional delegation that he thought the mujahedeen needed Stingers, according to sources who were present. The CIA's chief in Islamabad, who attended the meeting, relayed the request to CIA headquarters, but senior agency officials decided to sit on it. Intelligence sources say.

Then, late in 1985, the State Department's Mr. Abramowitz returned from a visit to Pakistan convinced that the mujahedeen needed Stingers. "Mort Abramowitz became the proponent of Stingers," an intelligence official recalls.

Hot-Seeking Guidance System

The shoulder-fired Stinger, developed by General Dynamics Corp. in the 1970s, weighs only 16 kilograms, but its heat-seeking guidance system can home in on aircraft up to 80 kilometers away. The Soviets took effective defenses against the missile.

Senior administration officials say Mr.

Abrahamovitz and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost began negotiations to supply Stingers to the Afghans. At about the same time, a Pentagon group began recommending Stingers. But the CIA remained skeptical. At a White House meeting in 1985, Bert Dunn, then the chief of the CIA's Near East operations division, said the Pakistanis opposed equipping the mujahedeen with Stingers.

The stalemate over sending Stingers to Afghanistan finally broke in January 1986, when another congressional delegation met Mr. Zia in Islamabad. The Pakistani leader said he had asked for Stingers and was turned down by the CIA. "Zia couldn't have been more clear that this was the one thing the mujahedeen needed or they would be butchered," Rep. James Courter, a Republican recalls.

Limited Number

The Planning Coordination Group met again in Afghanistan in late February, and this time the CIA's Mr. Dunn, who earlier had opposed Stingers, was present. The Pakistanis opposed Stingers and the CIA had "no objection" to providing them, sources who were present say.

The Joint Chiefs recommended to President Ronald Reagan that the Afghans get a limited number of Stingers. Officials say, and in April Mr. Reagan directed the CIA to supply the missiles. The administration notified Congress of its decision.

But even the president's order wasn't enough to overcome the resistance from the CIA, which in May bought 50 Stingers from the Army but shipped them only as far as a storage facility in Virginia. Sixty days later, when Mr. Dunn officials asked where the missiles were, he was told that they hadn't been shipped because they needed to be tested against a new defense that had appeared on a Soviet helicopter shot down in Angola.

The first Stingers finally arrived in the mujahedeen camps at the end of the summer of 1986. For their own political reasons, the Pakistanis insisted the first of the prized weapons be delivered to a rabidly American group commanded by a pro-Iranian Islamic fundamentalist named Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Pro-Western resistance groups began to receive their allotments of Stingers a couple of months later.

The new weapons lived up to their advance billing. On Sept. 26, rebel forces downed three Hind helicopter gunships near Jalalabad. Within six months, senior U.S. officials say, the Stingers had a major effect on the war, improving the morale of the rebel forces and neutralizing the Soviets' air power.

Among other things, U.S. officials say, the mujahedeen began using the Stinger as an offensive weapon, a tactic that didn't occur to the Army. On one occasion, intelligence sources say, a rebel band took its Stingers to the Soviet air base at Qandahar, set up shop not far from the end of the runway, blasted a few Soviet planes as they tried to take off laden with fuel and ammunition, then melted into the hills.

Ineffective Tactics

The Soviets have tried to defeat the Stingers by dropping parachute flares and by flying at higher altitudes. Neither tactic has proved effective. Last February, a congressional panel observed that Soviet aircraft were flying so high they sometimes bombed their own troops.

The weapon has been effective enough. U.S. officials still worry about its falling into the wrong hands. The CIA demands that rebels account for every missile fired and compare these counts with its own intelligence before issuing new missiles. If the war ends, officials fear that the mujahedeen might sell the highly prized weapons to Iran.

AVWS 2/22

Terror Use of Afghan Rebel Missiles Feared

By ROBERT C. TOTH and MICHAEL WINES, *Times Staff Writers*

WASHINGTON — The U.S. weapons that many believe turned the tide against Soviet forces in Afghanistan — Stinger anti-aircraft missiles — are now causing "serious concern" that they will fall into the hands of Iranian or other terrorists when the Afghan war ends, senior U.S. officials said last week.

Many hundreds, perhaps more than 1,000 Stingers have been shipped to the region since mid-1986 when the war was made, under considerable congressional pressure, to provide the weapons to Afghan mujahedeen, the Muslim guerrillas fighting the Kabul government and Soviet occupation troops. Between 100 and 200 Stingers are believed to be in guerrilla hands inside Afghanistan at present, and one U.S. official has suggested that there is the potential for 20% of them to be lost.

Even a few Stingers in terrorist hands could pose great danger to civilian aircraft. For example, shoulder-launched Stingers that home-in on the exhaust heat of jet aircraft have been called "the perfect terrorist weapon."

Authoritative Administration officials Saturday denied published reports that Stinger shipments to the Afghan guerrillas have been cut off in anticipation of a peace settlement being negotiated.

Other sources said the entire 1988 Stinger consignment has already been delivered. The rest of the military aid congaignment, esti-

mated to be worth \$300 million, has also been filled. No cutoff in aid is contemplated until a settlement is achieved, sources emphasized.

"The Stingers not now in mujahedeen hands (those in the weapons pipeline or in storage in Pakistan) we can get back, but the rest we have no control over," said Richard E. Armitage, assistant defense secretary for international security affairs. "It's been a concern steadily."

In fact, according to a senior U.S. official, the danger that is now causing anxiety here was a major reason why the CIA initially objected to providing the weapons to the rebels. The Pentagon also shared this fear and suggested that the missiles might be too complicated for them to handle.

Fantastic Success'

However, the rebels proved exceedingly adept at using the weapons. "They've had a fantastic success rate, averaging maybe one aircraft a day for the past year," one senior official said. "Without the Stinger, I doubt the Soviets would be leaving. I think this weapon has turned the tide."

Use of the ground-to-air missile is easier in Afghanistan than other areas for several reasons, he explained. There are no friendly aircraft in the sky, so identification of friend or foe is no problem. And the mountainous terrain favors those with Stingers, because the rebels can get above the aircraft attacking in the valleys and because there are limited landing places even for helicopters.

"It's good ambush territory," the official added, "but these mujahedeen actually go after the aircraft. They go to where the aircraft are based and taking off rather than wait for them to come to attack," he said admiringly.

U.S. officials hope that with the end to the Afghan conflict, the guerrillas will find little use for Stingers and may return them, or even trade them for more useful weapons, such as light machine guns or "tiny-ak" schemes.

The mujahedeen are now divided among at least seven major groups.

"Once the various factions fall to squabbling among themselves — or once there's a coalition government, if that happens — machine guns are going to be much more important determinants of political power than Stingers," one source said.

But Armitage said the Afghan guerrillas' affection for the Stingers means they will keep the weapons at least "in the near term. In the long term, we don't know."

Moreover, there are various members of the Stinger. The basic "plain vanilla" missile, one source said, needs two batteries to operate. Each battery has a one-year life expectancy, and the batteries are not readily available in the region. Only the Saudis and the Israelis could provide them, he said.

But terrorists have shown themselves excellent improvisers in such circumstances in the past, and U.S. officials knowledgeable about the Stingers fear that the weapons that won the war against the Soviet invaders will "turn around and bite" the United States and the West in the future.

Los Angeles Times

March 27, 1988

Zia looks beyond Geneva

By a correspondent in Islamabad

General Zia-ul Haque and his hand-picked civilian government have recovered from the initial shock following Gorbachev's February announcement that he is prepared to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan within 10 months (now reduced to 9), if the Pakistani and Kabul regimes sign the Geneva accord, guaranteed by the US and his government, by March 15. In the bargain he has secured validity for his civilian government from the opposition and endorsement of his policies which it had consistently withheld. Nineteen opposition parties were called to a two-day conference in Islamabad by prime minister Muhammad Khan Junco on March 5 for consultations about the Afghan issue.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 made Pakistan a frontline State in the US strategy against the Soviet Union, and also brought a flood of refugees to Pakistan which over the years reached the 3.5 million mark. General Zia, capitalizing on these developments, agreed to play the US game of turning Afghanistan into a Soviet 'Vietnam'. As a result, massive US aid followed giving a new lease on life to the general who, until then was despised in the west. US aid to Islamabad opened avenues of even better life for the officers of the Pakistan army. In Zia, they found the greatest defender of their interests, on whom the Soviet invasion was a godsend.

As refugees poured from Afghanistan, humanitarian aid flowed to Pakistan, enriching the bureaucrats as aid to refugees was channelled through the regime's machinery.

The Afghan *jihad* that began before the Soviet invasion also became relevant to the US's policy of letting the Russians know. The Saudis and Gulf Sheikdoms moved in with their millions to play their part in this crusade; and the number of *mujahideen* groups fighting the Marxist regime in Kabul multiplied. With their eyes on the future each donor propped up its own group, but all used the cover of Islam to legitimize their divisive and subversive role in the struggle. The US aid for the *jihad* peaked to about a billion dollars a year; this and much of the other aid too passed through the Pakistani authorities before reaching the *mujahideen*.

Despite all the aid and interference the ordinary *mujahid* fought for his honour and for the glory of Islam. As the struggle raised the Soviet cost of occupation and it became apparent that the continuation of direct occupation would eventually lead to the creation of a single powerful Islamic movement and an Islamic State, the rules of the game changed. The US was no more interested in bleeding the Soviets to the last Afghan'. No one wanted another Islamic State in the world to destabilize the bi-polar world.

At the superpowers' summit in Washington last December, Gorbachev pointedly asked whether Washington really wanted to see the emergence of a 'government of

millahs Tehran-style' in Kabul with all its repercussions on neighbouring Pakistan and elsewhere. The speed with which the US has moved to bail out the Soviets without having to suffer the humiliation of defeat, points to the convergence of superpower interests. The aim is to deny the fruits of the struggle to the genuine *mujahideen*. Further rewards to the Zia regime depend on how neatly they play their act in the drama.

The Soviet occupation has devastated Afghanistan, made five of the 18 million people refugees, killed another 1.2 million and left four times as many injured and maimed. Today, no western government or media is raising the question of war reparations or putting the Soviet leaders on war trials for their crimes against humanity. Had the victims been Armenians or Jews, the situation certainly would have been different.

There is no talk of dismantling Soviet bases either; no calls for the withdrawal of Soviet 'advisors' or their stockpiles of arms being left behind for the benefit of their allies in Kabul; or the return of tens of thousands of Afghan children taken to Moscow for indoctrination. In its zeal to bail the Soviets out, the UN Human Rights Commission has even discovered, early this month, that the human rights situation has improved under General Najibullah; only a few weeks ago he was supposed to be killing his opponents in cold blood.

The Zia-Junco regime is concerned about the fate of US aid when Pakistan will no more be a frontline State. The \$4.02 billion US aid package, suspended last year for allegedly re-starting its nuclear programme, was restored only just before the Washington summit last December to assure its hosts that the US means business. And only recently did the US assure Zia that it does not wish to 'end aid to the *mujahideen* until the final phases of the Soviet troop withdrawal'.

No less is the concern about the future government in Kabul. The past regimes had laid claim to parts of Pakistan. Therefore, either a border demarcation between Pakistan and Afghanistan to be made part of the Geneva deal or the installation of a friendly regime in Kabul is what Islamabad is keen on. Further, it wants a settlement that would ensure the return of the 3.5 million refugees to Afghanistan.

An Islamic State in Kabul is not General Zia's priority. Indeed, he is reeling to US policy needs to prevent such a development taking shape. If that happens, it will not only be a betrayal of the Afghan Muslims but also of the Muslims in Central Asia who have been inspired by the jihad in Afghanistan.

The major worry is how the *mujahideen* will react when the Geneva accord is signed. So far they have said that they will not accept any agreement which excludes their participation and curtails their ability to use Pakistan as an operational base.

Gulbadeen Hikmatyar, leader of

Hizb-e Islami, has gone as far as to say that his group will continue its struggle until the Marxist regime is removed, and will move their headquarters either to Iran or inside Afghanistan if Pakistan gives in to Soviet pressure.

But General Zia does not think that the view is either generally shared or it is the last word from the *mujahideen*. (Ominously, the first rumbling of disagreement among the *mujahideen* alliance — which the west is keen to exploit — has come from Professor

Sibghatullah Mojaddadi who has made public his disapproval of the 'fundamentalist' tilt). Pakistan is placing its faith in the US and the Soviet Union to impress upon the *mujahideen* that an interim government is the best inducement for refugees to return home. So far Washington and Moscow have refused to accept this argument totally. Both want to be sure that in the process 'fundamentalists' will be eliminated. ■

CRESCENT INT'L
3/16-31/88

Derailing 'Day One'

William Safire

WASHINGTON

Here is how our State Department's secret agreement to sell out the Afghan freedom fighters was stopped by the light and heat of pitiless publicity.

late in 1985, as the Reagan Administration's foreign policy makers were wading into the morass of supposed mistakes, three State Department functionaries cooked up a plan to accommodate Soviet demands about withdrawal from Afghanistan. The key concession: permit the Russians to continue arms shipments to its proxy Government while the U.S. cut off aid to the *Mujahideen* (affectionately known in Washington as 'the Moodie').

A letter to the U.N. mediator was prepared by Robert Peck, Arnold

but Don never raised it with me. I would have thought that George Shultz, who I saw several times a week, would have brought it to my attention. That something of this importance was proposed without the Chief Executive knowing is — well, puzzling."

Doesn't puzzle me: 1985 was the year of one Reagan had not knowing what the other was doing. But in early 1988, the Russians in Geneva started to hold it to the understanding in the Walters letter, and the odor from this Day One dead fish began to rise.

The conservative R+H club — Senators Humphrey, Hatch, and Helms — began in February to denounce the 'indecisive' Day One agreement and to demand answers on what secret commitments had been given to Moscow on Afghanistan, the majority leader, Robert Byrd, announced he would hold the L.N.F. treaty hostage to a 'full understanding' of the agreement.

Two powerful columns by my New York Times Op-Ed colleague, A. M. Rosenthal, focused Washington's attention on the incredible secret deal. Even President Reagan, after a couple of years in the dark, finally saw the contradiction between Moodie sellout and counter-support; he said it was his understanding that aid to the Afghan rebels would continue until all Soviet troops were withdrawn.

All this political heat and Op-Ed light overwhelmed the secret dealers. The State Department spokeswoman, goaded by Senator Humphrey, announced that the U.S. would not end aid to the *Mujahideen* without a "symmetrical cessation of military supplies to the regime in Kabul." The Day One deal was dead.

Great chunks of fudge are being spewed out of the Fudge Factory to cover its embarrassment. 'Tick-tocks' are being prepared to show how the Day One deal was being renegotiated back at the November summit, and how a symmetrical cutoff had been agreed on all along. Besides, we are told, the Moodie will surely defeat the well-armed Kabul regime as soon as the Russians have gone, presumably with bare hands.

Unfortunately, this frantic posterior-covering causes The New York Times to deplore the 'pandering to Congressional pressure to toughen up the terms'. Mr. Gorbachev's retreat, it says, must not be 'put at risk by bargaining for cosmetic advantages.'

Accommodationists fret because the Soviet negotiator is understandably sore: we renged on a secret deal. Heed the lesson in this watershed episode: No secret deals repugnant to American values will be honored. The only covenants to be kept are the ones dragged out into the open. □

Canada's Best Article on Afghanistan, 1987

After reviewing hundreds of newspaper articles published across Canada in 1987, its author, Tim Dooley, a freelance journalist based in Toronto, returned from Afghanistan in June. This article appeared in the *Toronto Star*, *Kingston Whig Standard*, *Calgary Herald*, and *(London, UK) Daily Telegraph*.

By Tim Dooley

©1987

YATTABAD, Afghanistan — By the time anyone hears the planes it is too late. Within seconds the bodies have fallen completely destroyed the village, killing almost half the population and leaving many wounded.

Within seconds, though, just a few seconds before, there are now only grossly disfigured bodies among the scattered food and broken cups and plates. Some still cling to pieces of freshly cut bread. Injured goats and mules sprawl on their sides kicking, trying to stand.

As the two Soviet MiG jets sweep low over the ruined buildings and fields, disappearing along the valley, the survivors of the small village of Yatatabad in the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan are left with a choice: stay, without shelter or crops, or journey across the mountains to the refugee camps in Pakistan.

After the 34 bodies have been buried and the wounded tended, the men gather to discuss the situation.

The women and children sit outside in the snow waiting for their decision. I sit with them — an “unbeliever,” a non-Moslem, I am buried from the group.

The leader of the house is a man called Noor Ali Khan. Since he deserted the Afghan army in 1982, he has made 25 trips back into his homeland from Pakistan, not to fight, but to act as a guide to the constant stream of refugees fleeing the war.

In five years he has helped hundreds of men, women and children avoid the army patrols and cross the mountains into Pakistan.

When he was still in the army, Noor Ali Khan lost 11 members of his family, including his parents, his wife and his three children.

His reason for helping is simple: “I come here to help other families as I could not help my own. You see, these people here are my

father, my mother, my brothers and my children. There are enough people fighting the Russians, but there are not enough helping our people.”

After three hours of angry talk, the men come outside and tell us they have decided to leave for Pakistan. Noor Ali Khan will take them. It has obviously been a difficult decision.

One village elder expresses the feelings of many. “Why did they do this to us?” he wonders. “We have never harmed them. My family has lived here for generations. We would stay, but look at our homes. There is nothing left, we must go.”

The next morning before dawn, 41 survivors set out from the village. Thick snow already covers the ground and the air is frigid. The children and injured began to fall behind.

Most of the livestock have been killed in the air attack, and the group has only one mule. It carries the three most serious casualties, leaving the rest to walk.

By the end of the fourth day, six of the old and injured have died. They are buried hastily in the snow before the group moves slowly, heads down, trudging forward hour after hour.

Meals are scarce and usually uncooked, and as the water runs out everyone begins to eat snow. May grow weak, and most of the children cough badly.

On the morning of the sixth day, as we approach the mountains, the snow gets deeper and the temperature falls further. During the night two of the children die, and now all the younger ones have to be carried.

I have five-year-old Mohammed on my shoulders. He rests his chin on the top of my head and wraps his arms around my neck, keeping my ears warm. As we walk, he stares straight ahead at the mountains, repeating over and

over again the word *Inshallah* — “God willing.”

Meesha, 7, clings to my hand constantly. Her parents have been killed in the attack, and I am the only adult in the world she trusts. She keeps up a constant barrage of questions in a language I can’t understand. I reply in a language she can’t understand, but she seems happy with my answers.

The adults are not so easily reassured, and every night they sit around arguing about the decision to leave their homes.

I ask Noor Ali Khan if we will get them all to Pakistan. “Not all of them,” he says. “Some will not make it over the passes where it gets even colder. But I worry about the small ones; it is so cold. I do not know what will happen to them. We must pray to our God.”

Many refugees who make it this far are caught and sent back, others are attacked by helicopter gunships.

The pass that Noor Ali Khan has chosen is a narrow valley about 10 kilometers long, with the mountain walls towering above it on either side. Once inside, there are few places to hide and fewer exits. It is the most dangerous terrain to pass through, and also the most likely to rain.

We travel at night, the darkness at least protecting us from the army patrols and helicopters.

By the end of eight hours walking on the first night, we have covered only seven kilometers of the valley. We walk in single file, following the next person’s back never more than six paces ahead, the only thing visible.

Sometimes, muffled conversation drifts back along the line, and although uninterpretable, it is reassuring.

On the morning of the second day in the valley, two of the group are missing — an elderly couple who have found the walking difficult from the start. We search for most of the day but never find them.

As the sun rises above the mountains next morning, Noor Ali Khan announces that we are inside Pakistan.

Many of the group immediately fall to the ground and pray. Some cry and a few turn around and silently stare back at the mountains. Thinking one man has not understood the message, Noor Ali asks him if he knows where we are.

The men remain staring at the mountains and quietly say: “I know we are in Pakistan, but will we ever see Afghanistan again?”

The survivors from Yatatabad now live in a ramshackle formation of tents made from scraps of cloth. These offer little or no protection from the elements, and subsequently many of the children have died from pneumonia and Meesha, my two charges, both died three weeks after reaching Pakistan.

The camp is set on a dry river bed 30 kilometers outside Peshawar, on stones and rock where nothing will grow. The refugees fear that when the rains come later in the year, everything will be washed away.

They have no aid from the Pakistani government, although they have been registered, and as farmers they cannot find work. Some feel they would be better off in their old village.

Of the 75 original inhabitants of Yatatabad, only 20 are alive today. The conditions they live in are harsh and unyielding. Disease is rife and spirits are low. They have lost their homes and their families, and now many have lost hope.

Noor Ali Khan has not lost hope, and he has gone back across the mountains.

“I will keep going back to help these people leave their country,” he says. “But one day, I do not know when, I will take them home.”

HCI News #1 1/88

Pakistan's Zia Sees Turmoil For Afghanistan

By FREDERICK KENNEDY

Staff Reporter for the *Calgary Sun* — *International*

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq deflated some of the euphoria over yesterday's signing of the Afghanistan accord in Geneva, predicting “trouble and turmoil” ahead. He pledged to continue backing the Afghan resistance in its efforts to topple the Moscow-backed Kabul regime despite the likelihood of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Speaking defiantly and confidently in a three-hour “lunch session” with reporters, the Pakistan president for the first time blamed saboteurs for an ammunition-dump explosion in Islamabad Sunday that left at least 10 dead and 1,100 injured. Most of the weapons lost in the explosion had recently arrived on U.S. transport planes and were intended to give a shot in the arm to the resistance. President Zia also made clear that although the first of 115,000 Soviet troops would start leaving Afghanistan on May 15, the test of wills over the future of Afghanistan would continue.

His statement was the clearest signal yet that Pakistan, the critical conduit for arms to the resistance, intends to remain a major player despite a portion of the Ge-

neva accord that obliges it not to support “directly or indirectly, rebellious or secessionist activities” in Afghanistan.

Contradictory Agreements

That portion contradicts a separate agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union under which the two superpowers have been supporting anti-Soviet guerrilla Afghan parties. President Zia’s statements are likely to heighten tensions between Moscow and Islamabad despite the signing of the accords.

“Perhaps Pakistan will have to pay a little more price until the *mujaheedin* (Moslem resistance) achieve their aims in Afghanistan,” he said. “If worse comes to worst, the Pakistanis will face the music and pay the price,” which he said would be “arm-to-arm” fighting, border-bombing and other things.”

Although President Zia didn’t mention the Soviets or the Soviet-controlled Afghan government by name in connection with the Sunday explosion, he said it was “my own personal assessment that they couldn’t be blamed for this ineffective act of sabotage.” He declined to give details, but said the saboteurs wanted to embarrass the Pakistani military and create tensions between it and the people.

President Zia was clearly buoyed by the Geneva signing, though he said it doesn’t satisfy Pakistan’s two remaining goals of repatriating the estimated 1.5 million Afghan refugees and bringing about a normalized, self-determining Afghanistan.

Terming the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan a “miracle of the 20th century,” he said: “I openly confess that I was one of those who said it was impossible.” He said the fall of the Najibullah government in Kabul is inevitable and predicted the emergence of a Sunni Islamic regime.

He shrugged off comments that Pakistan would have to violate the Geneva

agreement in order to back the resistance. “We are going by both what is in the accords and what is not in the accords,” he said, smiling. He quoted U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz as saying it was up to the lawyers to find out how that could be done. In Geneva, Mr. Shultz pledged continued U.S. supplies to the Moslem guerrillas, but U.S. statement added: “Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to rebels in Afghanistan, the U.S. similarly will exercise restraint.”

Mr. Zia made clear that Pakistan would allow the three million Afghan refugees to remain inside its borders until they decided of their own free will to go home.

“They [the resistance] haven’t got much confidence in the accords and I can understand their point of view,” he said. “I foresee trouble in Afghanistan.”

Lost in Negotiation

Pakistan had sought arrangements in the accord for an interim regime to reduce the chance of civil war. It had also sought a clause requiring Washington and Moscow to cease military deliveries to the warring factions. Moscow refused, insisting it couldn’t be because of treaties with Kabul.

President Zia scoffed at suggestions that deep divisions among the seven Afghan guerrilla groups might prevent them from toppling the Kabul regime. Many Western experts say the Soviet troop withdrawal will set off a bloody competition for power among moderate and fundamentalist Islamic resistance groups.

Mr. Zia said that despite their differences, the resistance would overthrow the Kabul regime. “Look at the Palestinians, they have been fighting for their rights for 40 years,” he said. “They haven’t achieved what seven divided Afghan parties have achieved in eight years.” If the resistance feuds over power once the Kabul regime falls, he said, “I couldn’t care less.”

WSJ 4/15



LA Times 2/21

To Avoid Losing the Peace, West Must Build Afghan Unity

By DANIEL PIPES

What are the Soviets up to in Afghanistan? Their willingness to withdraw forces can be interpreted two ways.

The optimists (which includes the Reagan Administration) believe that Mikhail S. Gorbachev means to get out of the war in Afghanistan if he is to go forward with his plan for *perestroika*. According to them, the war is an inherited burden ("bleeding wound") that must be cast off as quickly as possible.

The pessimists hold that Gorbachev's fine words and fresh spirit must be seen in the light of a 70-year history of unrelenting Soviet military ambition and territorial expansion. They are wary. Not knowing Gorbachev's motives, they want the United States to prepare for the worst. They fear that the Soviets (ostensibly moves to leave the country notwithstanding) still plan to consolidate their control of Afghanistan. Pessimists suspect an application of that classic Russian adage—one step back, two steps forward.

The main reason, the pessimists point out, to doubt that the Soviets really intend to withdraw is that they have too much to lose by leaving Afghanistan. Even though Soviet forces have not been able to pacify the entire country, they nevertheless enjoy significant benefits there. They control several principal cities and are feverishly exploiting Afghanistan's extensive mineral and energy resources. In addition, they control forward bases that bring Soviet forces hundreds of miles closer to the Persian Gulf and potential hegemony over the huge oil and gas reserves there. Control over these would give the Soviet Union major leverage over the world economy.

Abandoning Afghanistan would exact more than a material price; the psychological cost for the Soviet state would be immense. Moscow's place in the world, after all, depends on its being perceived as powerful—a defeat by rag-tag insurgents would badly erode its reputation. Also, there would be domestic consequences for Gorbachev, as Soviet military leaders will surely not accept a defeat in war with grace.

For all these reasons, abandoning the country will cost the Soviets dearly. Why, then, do they agree to withdraw their forces? Recent Soviet activities suggest that they are embarking on a new and more sophisticated strategy to achieve precisely the same goals they have fought for since 1979. Withdrawal may provide the most realistic and least costly means of doing this.

Moscow's problem lies in the worldwide agreement that the Red Army brutally and wrongly invaded Afghanistan. Afghans and Americans, as well as the Pakistani and Chinese leaders, all agree on this, as do many West Europeans and Muslims. There is no other issue in the world today that generates such wide anti-Soviet hostility. This consensus carries great weight; indeed, it is the single most important source of support for the Afghan *mujahideen*, or resistance fighters. Without such massive backing, the *mujahideen* would be a far weaker force.

From the Soviet point of view, the enemy's center of gravity lies in its far-reaching popularity. If Moscow can change public opinion, it can reduce the widespread opposition to Soviet troops in Afghanistan, undermine the pro-*mujahideen* consensus and undercut the opposition. The battle for Afghanistan would effectively be over if Moscow could only make the *mujahideen* in the kind of controversy that faces the other forces fighting the Soviet bloc. In short, Moscow needs to turn the *mujahideen* into *consensus*.

How to do this? An answer can be found in the steps actually taken by the Soviets in recent months. Very cleverly, they have offered to undo what everyone objects

to—the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan—while preparing the way for a more nuanced role. They have created the conditions for a scenario that will go something like this:

Moscow may rapidly withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, so that a majority of course, military "advisers" and KGB agents will remain. This has two consequences for the Soviets. First, they will gain goodwill internationally, erasing the years of obloquy that they have suffered. Indeed, there will undoubtedly be many observers who will seek to reward the Soviet authorities for taking this step. This will render future assistance to the *mujahideen* very problematic.

Second, the withdrawal creates a power vacuum in Afghanistan that the pro-Soviet government in Kabul and the anti-Soviet *mujahideen* scramble to fill. Worse, the long-term relations among the seven resistance groups erupt into open discord and possibly into civil war. Anarchy follows, with murder and atrocities becoming common. Afghanistan comes to resemble Lebanon, lacking a central authority and torn by groups competing along ideological, religious, geographical and tribal lines.

Anarchy would irreparably sully the high reputation that the *mujahideen* have sustained through eight years of valor in war. Their true toughness, even barbarian, will suddenly become apparent, leading to a general disavowal of their wide backing.

And finally, with a clear-cut opening for Soviet forces to return. At the minimum, Moscow could fall back on "the protection of Soviet personnel" line to justify renewed military action in Afghanistan. At best, it could get a legitimate Afghan group to request its aid. Alternatively, the Soviets also seem to have prepared the way to split off the northern portion of Afghanistan and bring it under their direct control.

In any case, the Soviets would return to a brutalized country where the locals had shown themselves incapable of self-government. These conditions—so completely different from 1979—would win grudging acceptance internationally. If the chance is the Soviets or carnage, most observers would choose a Soviet *pax*. This is, after all, what permits the Syrians to operate in Lebanon or the Vietnamese in Cambodia without serious international opposition. In these conditions, it would be only a matter of days before Afghanistan fell wholly under Soviet control.

The Soviets would then have achieved politically what they had failed to win militarily.

The United States has a tradition of winning the war and losing the peace. After both world wars, Americans washed their hands of conflict to get back to more pleasurable pursuits. In both cases, this quick loss of interest created terrible problems in subsequent decades. It is important to keep a close eye on Afghanistan to make sure that eight years of war are not in vain.

What can Washington do to prevent losing the peace? Much hangs on *mujahideen* disunity. As long as there was a joint enemy, disunity was manageable. But it could have a lethal effect once most of the Red Army evacuated and Afghans are left to govern their own country. If Afghanistan is to regain its independence, the *mujahideen* must unify to form a single authority that can govern the country. Until that happens, the Soviet forces will continue to threaten.

Therefore, the West should concentrate on helping to end Afghan unity. The composition and orientation of the government matters less than its ability to control Afghan territory. (The same applies to Iran. Bad as it is, the Khomeini government is far preferable to a breakdown of authority and the threat of a Soviet invasion.)

Keeping this in mind, Washington should work with others to establish a government in Kabul. Efforts devoted to getting the seven *mujahideen* groups to cooperate have so far had little success. And with the taste of power in their mouths, the *Peshawar* leaders are less likely than ever to work together.

New thinking is needed here. One idea is to pick just one *mujahideen* group and build up its power and authority. This group alone would then receive all the outside world's financial aid and diplomatic backing. If arms continue to be supplied, it alone gets them. With luck and dexterity, concentrating resources in this fashion would lead to the emergence of a single authority capable of maintaining order in Afghanistan.

We have now entered the critical moment of the war. The Geneva accord is important, but it must not blind us to the complexities that follow. If the U.S. government does not act with care and imagination, 1 million deaths and the sufferings of 5 million refugees will have been for naught.

Daniel Pipes is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. He recently returned from Geneva, where he covered Afghan affairs as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

Los Angeles Times

4/4

ON MY MIND

Saigon and Kabul

A. M. Rosenthal

In the 1970's, when the United States was facing military disaster in Vietnam, the Soviet Union stepped in to help the Americans save face and salvage as much political capital as possible.

First, Moscow worked out an international agreement permitting American troops to withdraw over as many months as Washington thought necessary, without any verification. Then the Soviet Union, along with the South Vietnamese Government, the battered American ally, could remain in power in a strongly fortified Saigon, with full international recognition.

In its desire to help Washington, Moscow also agreed that the American combatants guarantee the Vietnamese regime continued economic aid. Thousands of American-trained CIA agents remained in the country after the troop withdrawal.

And the Soviet Union informed the Vietnamese that the American military aid would be sent, unless the Americans added someday to the huge stupendous the U.S. was leaving Saigon.

Naturally, the Vietnamese did not like all this and felt it deserved to take over power in Saigon, as the American forces left. After defeating the United States and the South Vietnamese. But Moscow, eager for agreements with the Americans, overrode the Vietnamese entirely. The only comfort it gave its allies was to assure them that one day the Vietnamese would indeed triumph, so it was all good luck.

A fantasy, but something like it is being played out in Afghanistan, in very real life. The Russians, faced with military defeat, have wisely agreed to pull out. They are doing it precisely on their own terms, and they are trying to keep the Afghan Communists in Kabul in

power as long as possible.

The Kabul Government will probably be defeated one day. But before that day a lot more Afghan blood will have to be spilled to give the resistance the fruit of victory it has already earned—a chance to form a new government.

Americans do not seem to care a great deal. The major reason probably is that the withdrawal of Soviet forces is so welcome and desirable. It overshadows the fact that it will take place under conditions of Soviet choosing that will determine the war, not end it.

And Americans do not care where powerful groups in the Afghan government are that are totally repugnant to them—fundamentalist Moslems, who keep women in deep purdah and are eager to establish a Khomeini-type government.

But Afghan specialists believe that most Afghans are not fundamentalists and that the Khomeini government would emerge as the choice of the people and most of the resistance. The longer the fighting goes on, the deeper the sense of betrayal, the more the likelihood of a turn toward Iran and the emergence of a new Afghan Khomeini.

A Senate resolution demanding a solution acceptable to the resistance was approved by 70 senators. Some were conservative, some were among the Senate's most liberal members.

But in news stories, columns and editorials, Senate attempts to examine and question conditions in Soviet withdrawal under the still-unsigned Geneva agreements are constantly referred to as "hard-liners."

The most important questions in the agreements seem just a step to the right and diminish its importance.

The Soviets could simply do what Americans had to do in Vietnam—get out by getting out. But a formal withdrawal agreement

is to be signed this week, in the summit meeting. He won't be bothered with Afghanistan. President Reagan still owes the "valiant" Afghan resistance fighters he loves to practice—and the American public—specific answers to specific questions.

Does the agreement insure the removal of thousands of K.G.B. agents, Soviet and Afghan? How?

Will the thousands of Soviet specialists embedded in the Afghan Government get out too?

Who will run the huge air bases and intelligence centers built by the Russians?

Are Moscow and Kabul turning the northern part of Afghanistan into a Communist bastion from which to fight politically and militarily if Kabul is lost?

How much of a military stockpile is the Soviet Union leaving for Kabul? What economic resources will continue to flow to the Afghan Communists?

Will the thousands of Afghan children now in the Soviet Union be allowed to return home? When?

Two fantasies: one is coming true.

Precisely what are American plans to help the Afghan resistance win the independence it has been fighting for 10 years—the establishment of a non-Communist government? Or are we just going to wish them well? 4/12

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Hunger may greet Afghans on return to shattered land

By Arthur Kent
Special to The Star

PESHAWAR — International relief officials are warning that the current wrangle over a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan could see the welfare of the people at the heart of the crisis — 3 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran — leave the shuffling of diplomatic paper.

If and when peace is achieved, dispossessed families will return to a devastated countryside incapable of feeding them.

But, even while one branch of the United Nations presses for a speedy exit of Soviet troops at peace talks in Switzerland, another U.N. agent, the High Commissioner for Refugees, has been, in the words of one respected aid worker, "asleep at the wheel."

"...we are not prepared to walk up to the fact that this will be the largest single repatriation of refugees in its history," says Anders Fange, chief of the Swedish Committee for Afghan Refugees.

Destroyed lands

"They're caught totally unprepared — there's absolutely no plan in place to prevent chaos."

The Swedes are one of the many private voluntary agencies already operating small health, education and emergency aid programs inside Afghanistan from offices on Pakistan's northwest frontier.

But the U.N. commission's strict mandate has prevented their own relief effort from reaching across the border into the war zone. It's a handicap, say spokesmen for the voluntary agencies, which will cripple the commission's effort to cope with the Afghans' return.

"They know the refugee camps, that's all," says Fange. "Inside Afghanistan, there's a crisis of destroyed lands, of depleted livestock, of political disputes that will threaten everything you do to try to rebuild the country. What they're beginning to realize is that the toughest, most dangerous work has just begun."

The refusal of U.N. officials to negotiate a return to come in any way on the Swedes' terms is an indication of the procedural straitjacket in which they find themselves. While insisting that initial planning is under way, one commission worker — who requested that he remain anonymous — admits "Any UNHCR program to assist civilians inside the country would be subject to prior arrangement between the organization and the government of Afghanistan."

"You guess as to what that government will be and when it'll be in place — it's going to be when the picture looks even worse."

What everyone connected to the current relief effort fears is a mass migration into famine, a tragedy that could well exceed the estimated 1 million civilian war dead. Although some discount warnings of a disaster on a par with Ethiopia, many observers feel there's a real risk of an even greater catastrophe.

After a Soviet withdrawal — a move that will prolong the flow of arms and ammunition to both sides in the warring countryside. "Even if all-out civil war can be avoided, how can civilian farm families be expected to pick up what's left of their lives in what amounts to an armed battleground?"

For their part, the private aid agencies have launched an urgent study which will likely advocate an entirely new relief system, guided by their own veterans. The U.N. refugee commission won't touch its plans, but word on the front line is that the agency's officials are doing much the same things these days as the refugees in the camps.

They are praying for deliverance.

□ Arthur Kent is a freelance journalist based in Asia.

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TORONTO
THE SUNDAY STAR, MARCH 28, 1988

End Game:

By HENRY KAMM

But even if the return to Afghanistan is a carefully staged phased movement, it will be a harrowing one. The refugees will have a problem providing for a great mass of uprooted people coming home to a devastated country.

Underdeveloped as Afghanistan was before the Soviet troops arrived, it still provided a minimal infrastructure to support a huge and rapidly growing population. Some 15 million Afghans are now refugees. But current intelligence reports, which officials say are corroborated by the accounts of travelers from Afghanistan, describe a country of scattered earth.

The major problems associated with the refugee return are these:

How to make the return coincide with the food-growing season. Wheat, Afghanistan's principal food grain, must be planted by November for harvesting in May.

How to provide the essentials to raise such a crop. This begins with the removal of the mines that the opposing forces have sown in generous quantities. Large numbers of unexploded Soviet bombs are also reported to litter the countryside.

How to prepare for replanting fields that have lain fallow for years. Draft animals and tools have been destroyed. The animals have been scattered by lack of use, requiring metal plows and other tools not available in Afghanistan.

How to insure a sufficient supply of seed, fertilizer and pesticides and distribute it over a heavily damaged network of roads speckled with mines.

How to provide food to tide the refugees over until they can provide for themselves.

How to repair an ancient system of irrigation canals that has been largely destroyed or made unusable by lack of maintenance.

How to provide minimal housing. Many villages have been razed to deny them to the guerrillas; others have been destroyed in battle, and still others have collapsed from disease. While mud huts will not be too difficult to rebuild, wood for roof beams is scarce.

The United States, Japan and Western European nations appear ready to meet their most elementary needs.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

MARCH 29, 1988

Afghans living in hope that talks will end the exile

PESHAWAR — "If the Russians leave, we'll go home."

The speaker was Iman Jan, one of three million Afghans refugees in Pakistan keenly following United Nations talks on ending the nine-month war that drove him out of his country.

"Most of us want to go home," he said and a line of grey beards behind him nodded in agreement.

Refugees gathered in one of the scores of mud-built camps along the Afghan border, had just stood in line for their daily ration of wheat flour and tea.

"I am grateful for this but I once grew my own wheat ... I will again. God willing, after the Russians go," said Maimang Abdulah Khan, who had been a shepherd there for 90 per cent of his life before the bombing and shelling stops.

"Most are farmers and in a traditionalist society like Afghanistan, where the ancestral soil is very strong,"

Many of Pakistan's thou-

sands of Afghan town dwellers and traders also want to go back even though they have prospered outside the camps doing everything from driving taxis to selling costly carpets.

Refugees in several other camps revealed the same determination to leave.

Their main concern was for safety, not the type of government which would oversee their return.

Some feared an Islamic government, others wanted the return of former King Zahir Shah, who was toppled after a 40-year reign in 1973.

All support the Muslim rebels fighting the Russian-backed Government and reject offers to share power.

They want the Pakistan make up the biggest refugee population in the world.

Islamabad, which is negotiating a peace accord with the rebels in Geneva, says it fears the rebels will go home unless a neutral government takes office while Moscow pulls out its 115,000 soldiers.

Aid workers, however, believe it will be difficult if they can be certain Russians are no longer there to carpet-bomb and shell them.

"Even if the Kabul Government hangs on after a

Nevertheless, the farmers have illusions about what they face when they return.

"The Russians have ruined our houses and fields," Abd-ullah said. "We have to rebuild everything. I have 25 acres which have gone to waste. It will take at least four years to bring them in shape."

Russian forces continually bombed and shelled farms and villages to push civilians off the land and to rob the rebels of food and shelter. They destroyed irrigation systems, irrigation canals, orchards and cattle, cut down fruit trees and mined roads.

"The rehabilitation of Afghanistan is going to have to be massive. It's going to take years to bring back," says a agricultural expert hired by a Western aid agency to gauge the war damage.

Reuter

SCMP 3/29



A father and his daughter wait out the war at a refugee camp on Pakistan's Northwest Frontier. They, like three million other Afghans in Pakistan, hope the Russians will soon leave their country.

Isolated Afghan Refugee Camp Life Turns Women Into 'Birds in a Cage'

By HENRY KAMM
Special to The Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, March 25.— "We never ask... we women," Sultan Mohammad said indignantly.

Mr. Mohammad, a 43-year-old Afghan farmer and a refugee in the Thar coast south of Peshawar for five years, was referring to his wife and daughters, anger only by the tradition of hospitality under the roof of his hut. He had been asked whether the men would consult their wives before taking the vital decision on when to return to the Afghanistan.

Sadia Ansari, a young teacher, was asked what had changed in the lives of women since they went into exile. "This," she said, pointing to the hut she was sitting in her head. "Purda. She was referring to the custom of Moslem traditionalists of cloistering women from the view of outsiders by making them stay indoors and wear a veil in company.

Fundamentalists Dominate

The customs of Mr. Mohammad, the farmer, have been imposed on the educated women of Kabul like Miss Ansari in this exile. The Moslem fundamentalists have become the dominant force of Islamic fundamentalists in the war against the Soviet-backed Afghan Government and among the three million refugees. Pakistan has made the life of the refugees even more restricted than it was at home.

"The women are the main victims of the war," a refugee official said.

Arabs flock to join Afghan Holy War

ISLAMABAD: Several hundred nationalized Moslems of Arab states have joined the Moslem Mujahideen in their Jihad or Holy War against Soviet troops defending the Kabul regime, a number of sources have said.

Most of these Moslem fighters, who have come from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and Palestine, are aged between 20 and 30, and more than half of them have links with extremist Islamic organisations, diplomats and specialists on Arab affairs said.

The embassies of moderate Arab countries are keeping an eye on their nationals, especially those who feel of belonging to extremist movements.

An Arab diplomat said that an eventual resolution of the Afghan conflict would likely see these hardened fighters return to their countries of origin.

They usually stay with Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan or Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan for an average of two years, undergoing intensive military training in guerrilla warfare.

Almost all the Jihad candidates join radical parties such as the Islamic fundamentalist Hezbi Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or the Ittehad-e-Islami headed by Abdurrahman Sayyaf or factions of the Wahabi sect—radical Saudi-backed Moslems—in northern Afghanistan, sources said.

"Some ideologues are the first day to wage Jihad against the communist Kafirs (non-believers) for personal reasons but more than half are sent by capitalist Moslem groups in

Even before the establishment of a Commonwealth Government in Kabul after the Soviet intervention in 1979, middle-class Afghan women had made significant progress toward liberation from Islamic orthodoxy. They wore Western clothes, went to university and held a range of jobs in Kabul and Peshawar.

In the countryside, Afghan women live in villages populated largely by members of their tribes, clans and extended families. Even conservative Moslems, as Afghan villagers were, allowed the women of their families to be outside. Now they are told they must only go to see them when they are confined to their houses, particularly since much of the field work was done by women.

Life in the large and densely populated cities has changed all that. Since there are no tribal or clan boundaries, the need for women to leave the house has diminished. Most, they go to the camp to draw water, veiled and averting their faces from all men.

With the certainty of encountering men from other families and tribes, the men—who make up 26 percent of the total population—competed with 30 percent women and their children under 13—have imposed rigorous purdah throughout the camps. In four weeks of visits, this reporter has not been allowed to talk to single women. She was asked to visit was clean of any females before she was permitted to enter.

Miss Ansari and her principal, Tawakar Kakar, were interviewed at a girls' school run by the International Rescue Committee, an American voluntary organization, in Peshawar, a

city near the border that is the unofficial capital of the Afghan refugees.

Even the men who impose the restrictions speak with sympathy of the deprived lives of women as refugees. "The women are like birds in a cage," a guerrilla commander who gave his name as "Khalid" said in a camp in the Banda camp south of Peshawar. "They have only their houses and nothing else to do. They are not happy."

"The women are confined," said an anthropologist working for an international relief organization. "They do most of the routine agricultural labor. They got out of their houses because village life was much more homogeneous. Now they have no work and no reason to leave the house, while there is a lack of men to be met by men from outside the family."

Boredom and Melancholia

Refugee men, as well as Pakistani and foreign refugee workers, consider boredom and melancholia the women's lot in all the must-hut camps that line the border. For the two Afghan women interviewed, it was the gravest problem they faced.

"Camp life is so sad," Miss Ansari said. "They cry from morning to night. In Afghanistan, wives were not very happy. They worked, they brought their husbands their food. Now they have nothing to do."

The more the young teacher spoke of the situation of Afghan women, the more agitated she became. She said that she cared that the black veil that she wore over her head without covering her face slipped off completely. An educated middle-class woman from the capital, she found even limited purdah a new experience.

"At home, sometimes I wore a little scarf," Miss Ansari said, scoffing at the bigger shawl of black cotton that is her concession to the prevalent traditionalism.

"At home, when men came to visit, I stayed in the room," she said. "Here I am."

"We had more liberty in Afghanistan," said Mrs. Kakar, the principal, who comes from Kunduz, near the Soviet frontier. "We went anywhere we wanted, even at night."

Despite the men's realization of the importance of women's lives, tradition is so strong that it excludes the possibility of lifting the restrictions that makes their exile life more miserable than that of men.

"We won't permit the women to go outside, even if we lose our lives," said Mr. Mohammad. "It's our religion."

Scholars believe that the tribal customs of the Pathans, who live on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border, impose much greater isolation on women than Islam requires.

"Most of the women want psychotherapy for depression," said Dr. Shehzade Qazi, a Pakistani and Pathan who has been a volunteer with the French International Action Against Hunger for the United Nations high commissioner for refugees. "They are sad and worried. I tell them the Afghan problem will be solved when they go home. I just comfort them. In bad cases, I give them Valium."

As in health, in education as well the international aid organizations come up against the resistance of Afghan men. The camp schools run by the United Nations High Commissioner are in the great majority for boys. There are 48 primary schools for boys and 76 for girls, 161 middle schools for boys and 111 for girls, and 4 secondary schools all told.

Total enrollment in the United Nations schools stands at 104,600 boys and 7,800 girls.

Boys go to school for as long as possible, said Mohammad Muktah, a 36-year-old teacher at a primary school at Surkhel camp near Quetta. Girls leave school at age 10 or 11.

"Then they go to weave carpets," Mr. Muktah said.

What if a girl is particularly intelligent? "Whatever her intelligence, I or I'll she has to go to weave carpet," he said. "All the girls think so."

"I don't think it's bad for women to become doctors," Mr. Muktah said. "It's better to weave carpets. They can start earning money from a very young age."

NYT 3/27

Soviets Will See Afghan War Movie

From Reuters

MOSCOW—The first Soviet feature film about Afghanistan will be shown in Soviet cinemas shortly, the Moscow evening newspaper *Vechernaya Moskva* reported Thursday.

The film, titled "Shurav,"—the nickname given to Soviet troops in Afghanistan—is about a young Soviet soldier who was captured by Afghan rebels, tortured and eventually escaped, the paper added.

"Nikolai" emerges from all these difficult situations with honor, remaining true to his soldier's oath to his motherland, it said.

Los Angeles Times
January 8, 1988

The Reagan Administration urged the United Nations to organize a multinational drive to help about 5 million Afghan refugees return home after Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan. The United States is prepared to help, but the United Nations and its agencies "are the logical organizations to coordinate the job," State Department spokesman Charles Redman said. Adding to the difficulty of repatriating the refugees is the likelihood of continued fighting between warring Afghan factions after the departure of Soviet troops, scheduled to begin May 15.

Mr. Noorani returned on Saturday to Geneva, Washington and London on Afghan peace prospects with US Secretary of State George Shultz and Britain's Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe.

Foreign Ministry Secretary Abdal Sattar is currently holding talks in Iran, another major backer of the anti-communist Afghan guerrillas.

Pakistan is due to resume direct talks with the Kabul government in Geneva on March 2 on a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a halt to aid for Afghan rebels based in Pakistan.

Mr. Noorani's travels follow the offer two weeks ago by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to pull out troops by May 15. In March 1989, Pakistan signs an accord by March this year. Pakistan says a new broad-based government must take over in Kabul before it signs an agreement.

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EDUCATING AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN

Many readers are familiar with the problems of educating Afghan refugee children in Pakistan; fewer know about the situation in Iran. Until quite recently there were no educational opportunities offered to Afghan children in the Islamic Republic nor for the first several years after the Soviet invasion were Afghans accorded refugee status. In February 1980, this writer was rebuffed by the then Deputy Minister of Defense & the Director of the Pasdaran Inqilab, Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei (the current President of the Islamic Republic), when I suggested that Afghans be recognized as refugees by the Iranian authorities and that schools be created for Afghan children. In the absence of "refugee" recognition in Iran, the Afghans were deprived of any international help and were barred from any sort of formal education. As "illegal aliens" Afghans in Iran also fell outside the programs of the regular Iranian charitable organizations, such as the Red Crescent. As illegal aliens, the Afghans could not establish any educational - or other - organizations. Afghans could not buy houses. Even now, properties have to be registered in the name of an Iranian citizen for the Afghans. Afghans could not carry on regular trading, such as hawking wares in the bazaars, without harassment by the police. Often, Afghan goods were taken by the police and never returned.

According to Hojatolislam Khamenei, there were more than 30,000 Afghans in Iran in 1979. Most settled in the provinces of Khurasan and Zabul. A few even moved to the western part of Iran but were turned back by the Kurdish communists. Many eventually settled in Shiraz, Isfahan and Tehran as well as places in between. None of these places had schools of any kind for the Afghan refugees. Immediately after the Soviet invasion, tens of thousands of refugees poured into Iran from places as far as Parwan and Maimana. Afghan and Iranian educators (mostly retired teachers and Khurasani relatives of the Herati refugees) opened several "schools" for the Afghan children. However, the educational problems were overwhelming.

In a Letter to the Educators dated 5/6/80, I wrote the following:

In a recent visit (February 1980) to Afghan refugee camps in Iran, I and several Afghan & Iranian teachers established schools (essentially a room in a house) for the children of refugees. After establishing several of these schools we discovered that the children, after testing, did not retain as much of the material as the same age cohort did two years ago in Afghanistan (where I was on sabbatical doing field work). The refugees scored 20-30% lower than their counterparts. They also scored far below similar Iranian students. We discussed the reasons for this and identified the following as possible factors:

- 1) Children of the refugees are not the same as those with whom they are located &, therefore, feel like strangers in a not-too-friendly environment.
- 2) Most of the children do not have parents; they either have been killed or are still fighting in Afghanistan.
- 3) They do not see much of a connection between their curricular materials (as meager as they were) & their environment & for cultural & political reasons resist re-socialization & acculturation to the Iranian way of life.
- 4) Teachers (both Iranian & Afghan) do not know how to go about socializing these young Afghans who do not expect to settle permanently in Iran. Since no one is able to guarantee that they will eventually go home, something analogous to a total anomie seems to be taking place in the Afghan refugee community, especially among the school-age population. Students & teachers exhibit behavior that would seem pathological under normal circumstances, but has become routine in the camp environment. This behavior ranges from naked aggression on the part of some students & teachers to almost complete withdrawal and regression on the part of others.

- 5) The refugees interpret moves by the Iranian authorities, ostensibly to ameliorate their pitiful lot, as devices to scatter them or "Iranicize" them. Therefore, they resist any form of overtures toward them by the host country. To the refugees, these moves by the Iranian Gov't mean the abandonment of their own culture & tradition to some degree.
- 6) Many of these children are traumatized & "shell shocked" as a result of seeing many of their relatives killed & their villages destroyed by the Russian armed forces.
- 7) Some seem to be in need of psychiatric treatment & all are in need of the basic necessities of life such as food & shelter.

The "schools" were soon closed by the Iranian authorities. Some of the Shi'i Afghans were able to utilize Iranian charitable organizations like the Red Crescent. The children of these Afghans were also able to enroll in the regular Iranian schools. And, to my knowledge, there was no overt prohibition of the children of Sunni Afghans enrolling in the schools of the Islamic Republic. The Sunnis simply refused to enroll their kids in the Iranian schools. Some Iranians privately were able to help a handful of the Afghans who were sick & wounded and some Afghans were able to create schools in secret for their children. I think the Iranian authorities ignored these schools rather than being unaware of their existence.

But the regular Iranian schools did not teach the elementary matters of the Sunni version of Islamic history, let alone anything about Afghanistan. This latter problem is similar to the one Afghan children confront in regular Pakistani schools. In these schools the Afghans apparently learn the Sunni version of Islamic events in Urdu (as the medium of instruction) & learn nothing about Afghan tradition & culture. The Islamic Republic, however, has been quite willing to send Iranian textbooks for distribution within Afghanistan. But these books, because of their Shi'i view on fiqh & history have not received the seal of approval of most Afghan mujahideen.

It was not until 1986-87 that a few schools were opened in Iran for the Afghan children. Private communications & meetings with Iranian Education Ministry officials have assured this writer that Iranian authorities are helping Afghan educators. Recent issues (Oct.-Nov. 1987) of the Inqilabi Islami Afghanistan (a Jamiat Islami Afghanistan publication from Tehran) herald the opening & functioning of several schools (elementary & secondary) for both Afghan boys & girls in the Mashhad area. Let us hope that this trend continues & the schools are permitted to receive some very vital financial & educational help from the Islamic Republic, international organizations & interested individuals.

M. Mobin Shorish
Univ. of Illinois - Champaign

... and, on the other hand, Afghans

As if the Gulf war were not headache enough, Iran has trouble on its eastern border too. The rebellion in Afghanistan has made it the reluctant host of up to 2.5m Afghans, who form the world's second-largest horde of refugees after the 3.5m in Pakistan. The office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Refugees reckons that Iran has done a remarkable job with the Afghans, few of whom have been put into camps. Voluntary agencies, and refugees who have lived in both countries, are less enthusiastic.

Only 54,000 refugees receive what is called "care and maintenance" - food, shelter, clothing in reception and transit centres, according to the Commissioner's office. A report published in January by a group of British-based aid agencies says that "the rest have to fend for themselves, and that they are restricted in the sort of jobs they can do and where they can live. Most refugees are in the border provinces of Sistan-Baluchestan and Khorasan, but Af-

ghans can be found all over the country, working in the construction industry or picking fruit in the orchards. In some Iranian cities whole neighbourhoods are Afghan.

The refugees get by because most of them speak Farsi or dialects of it. The Iranians give them ration cards like the local population, so they have access to heavily subsidised basic food. Those who have not bothered to register are helped along by friends but have difficulty getting work since labour inspection is fairly stringent. Iran has begun accepting official help for its refugees but does not allow international voluntary agencies to work there.

The worst conditions are in the new Afghan villages near the border, peopled almost entirely by women and children while the men look for work in the cities, or fight at home.

Iran has given ungranted moral support to the Afghan resistance. It insists on the Afghans' right to choose their own

government, and it boycotts the UN-sponsored peace talks because they include the Russian-backed Kabul regime (this does not stop Iran from having a large mission in Kabul). The Iranian government likes to hint that its long border with Afghanistan and its influence with a lot of Afghans would enable it to sabotage a deal it disapproves of.

The Russians clearly take these threats seriously. A Soviet official visited Iran just before the Afghan peace negotiations resumed in March. The United Nations takes care to tell Iran how the negotiations are doing. But Iran may not have the leverage it claims. It has given the Afghan guerrillas little material support, and not many weapons get across its border. Fewer than 20% of Afghans are Shi'a Muslims, and the rest do not necessarily admire Shi'ism. Nor do the Shi'a live in the militarily interesting bits of Afghanistan: not the capital, or the Salang highway to the Soviet border. The "Afghan card" that Iran so often hints at in the Gulf-war



peace talks may not prove to be a trump after all.

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 2

Home thoughts from abroad: Afghans in Iran

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"An End in Sight?" by E.W. Desmond in TIME, April 18. Pp. 34-37.

"Stingers Used by Afghan Rebels Stymie Soviet Air Force Tactics" by John Gunston in AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY April 4. Pp. 46-48. (See p. 20)

The April 1988 issue of SOLDIER OF FORTUNE carries the following articles on Afghanistan: "Assignment Afghanistan" by Harry Bateson (how the US news media aid the KGB in spreading disinformation on the Afghan conflict); "Four Battles in Afghanistan" by David Isby (Operation Avalanche & battles at Arghandab, Jadi & Kalafghan show how the mujahideen are destroying the myth of Soviet invincibility); "Endgame in Afghanistan" by Louis Dupree & David Isby (when & if the Soviets leave, will the rival parties honor a negotiated settlement?); & an editorial on "Russian Retreat" by SOF editor Robert Brown. Upcoming issues of SOF will carry articles in Afghanistan by Peter Douglas, Jake Border & Mike Winchester.

"A Reporter at Large (Afghanistan)" by Eqbal Ahmad & Richard J. Barnet in THE NEW YORKER, April 11, 1988. Pp. 44-86.

GORBACHEV'S NEW STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN by Marin Strmecki, originally published in STRATEGIC REVIEW*, has been translated into Dari & published by the Afghan Jehad Works Translation Center in Peshawar, January 1988. * Summer 1987.

The JOURNAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST STUDIES SOCIETY at Columbia University lists the following Persian language publications on Afghanistan: THE HISTORY OF THE EVENTS & INCIDENTS OF AFGHANISTAN by E'teżād al-Saltāneh, 'Alī Qolī, Tehran, 1986; THE HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN AFTER ISLAM by 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, Tehran: Donyā-ye Ketab, 1984. Subscriptions to the Journal are \$10/year (2 issues) and can be ordered from the Middle East Studies Society, Columbia University, 1111 IAB, 420 W. 188th St., New York, NY 10027. Institutional subscriptions are \$20.

"In Peshawar, Everybody Comes to Green's" by George Foy in ROLLING STONE, 2/11/88. "Spies, mercenaries, drug smugglers & journalists all converge on a seedy hotel to conduct the business of the brutal Afghan war." Pp 75-86.

AFGĀNSKÝ ZÁPISNÍK (Afghan Notebook) is a new publication published by the Association Solidarność Afghanistan & Wydawnictwo KONTAKT in Paris. This "International Magazine for the Support of the Fighting in Afghanistan" began publication early in 1988 and is edited by Jan Tesař & Bohumil Krčil. It is an offspring of the Polish quarterly "Biuletyn Afgański" and carries translations of various int'l reports & interviews as well as original information from Czech & Slovak sources pertaining to Afghanistan. The 120-page 1st issue contains articles by Rabbani, Bennigsen & Majrooh, reports on human rights violations, proclamations, maps, addresses of organizations, etc. For more information write KONTAKT - AFGĀNSKÝ ZÁPISNÍK, 42, rue Raymond Marcheron, F-92170 VANVES, France.

BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT: VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, a Helsinki Watch/Asia Watch Report, NY/Washington, D.C., March 1988. 90 pp. \$8 from Human Rights Watch, 36 West 44th St., New York, NY 10036.

"Afghan War Horses: People aren't the only ones fighting & dying in Afghanistan" by Hunter Penn, WESTERN HORSEMAN, January 1988. Pp. 32-39.

AFGHANISTAN: TAKING THE PATH OF RECONCILIATION is a collection of Najibullah's speeches published by the Gov't Committee of Press & Publication, Kabul 1988. 173 pp.

"The Persian Literature of Afghanistan, 1911-78, in the Context of Its Political & Intellectual History" by Ashraf Ghani appears in PERSIAN LITERATURE, Columbia Lectures on Iranian Studies, edited by Ehsan Yarshatar, published by the State University of NY Press, State Univ. Plaza, Albany, NY 12246. 562 pp. \$19.50 paper (\$49.50 cloth).

IL TESORO NASCOSTO DEGLI AFGHANI
Lucia Serena Loi, il cavaliere azzurro, Bologne, 1987. 178 pp. #16 in the series Quaderni del Seminario di Iranistica, Uralo-altaistica e Caucasiologia dell'Universita degli Studi di Venezia.

"Southeast Afghanistan & the Borderlands in the Early Historical Period: Some Further Observations & Suggestions" by Willem Vogelsang appeared in the NEWSLETTER OF BALUCHISTAN STUDIES, #4, Summer 1987, ISMEO, Rome.

Continued on p. 32

ORGANIZATIONS

The AFGHAN ASSISTANCE COUNCIL, P.O. Box 162, Orinda, CA 94563, founded last year, has written to Pres. Reagan expressing its concern over the possibility of the US ending its support to the mujahideen and calling attention to several other issues: 1) The return of the Wakhan Corridor. 2) The return of over 50,000 Afghan children from the USSR. 3) The withdrawal of Soviet & East European civilian personnel from all advisory positions. 4) The revocation of bilateral treaties on political, territorial & military issues concluded between the USSR or other communist countries - and the Kabul regimes since 4/26/78. The re-negotiation of commercial & economic treaties concluded during the same period. 5) The return of all military installations & bases established after the Soviet invasion, to the gov't of free Afghanistan. 7) Guarantees of future Soviet non-interference in Afghanistan's internal & external affairs, countersigned by Afghanistan's neighbors & by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Board members of the organization are M.S. Noorzoy, R. Farhadi, P. M. Koshani, Y.M. Mojaddedi, Q. Kochai & A.H. Hamid. The Council also wrote a 21 point set of conditions & demands for a peace settlement with the Soviets, to be presented to them after the current Kabul regime is eliminated. The document was presented to the Peshawar Alliance and was adopted by the Alliance for implementation at the proper time.

FREEDOM MEDICINE publishes DISPATCHES, a bi-monthly sheet describing its activities, listing items the organization needs, and carrying articles by some of its personnel. The organization has medical clinics and paramedic teaching facilities in Pakistan near the Afghan border. For a copy of DISPATCHES - or to make a contribution, write them at 941 River Street, Suite 240, Honolulu, Hawaii 96817.

The SOCIETY OF AFGHANS RESIDENT IN THE U.K. opened a school last December. About 40 children are learning Pashto, Dari, mathematics & religion. The Society has also printed some textbooks. For information on the plight of Afghan

refugees in Britain, subscribe to the quarterly Newsletter of the AFGHAN REFUGEE INFORMATION NETWORK (ARIN), 77, Chelverton Road, London, SW15 1RW, United Kingdom. Subscriptions in the US are \$7/year.

EVENTS

Cellist/composer David Darling will play a benefit concert for the AFGHAN REFUGEE FUND at 8 p.m. on 5/28 at St. Peter's Lutheran Church (Lexington Ave @ 54th St. NYC). Tickets are \$15; call (212)873-7761 for reservations.

AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS & RAMIFICATIONS OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL was the title of a discussion at Duke University on 4/6. Participating were Nazif Shahran, "Politics in Afghanistan"; Robert Canfield, "Religion in Afghanistan"; Farhad Kazemi, "Politics in Iran"; Robert Wirsing, "India & Pakistan" & Alex Alexiev, "USSR." Louis Dupree chaired the session.

ASAPC Conference
Calif State University
Northridge, California
June 24-26, 1988

Ram M. Roy*
Dept of Political Science
Calif State Univ-Northridge
Northridge, CA 91330

Mid-Atlantic Conference
Indiana University of
Pennsylvania
Indiana, Pennsylvania
October 21-23, 1988

Robert Gardella*
Dept of Humanities
US Merchant Marine Academy
Kings Point, NY 11024

Midwest Conference
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin
September 23-25, 1988

Edward Friedman*
East Asia Studies
1440 Van Hise
1220 Linden Drive
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

Western Conference
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
Date to be announced

Frank Conlon*
History Department
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195

*Program Chair

BOOK REVIEWS

THREE WOMEN OF HERAT, Veronica Doubleday, Jonathan Cape, London, 1988. 222 pp. text + 19 color photos + 30 pencil drawings by the author. £12.95.

Three Women of Herat is a delightful read. At the same time it is an important contribution to the field of Afghan studies. In it Ms. Doubleday relates how she developed close friendships with three Afghan women and their extended families. The narrative flows easily, yet every day chores, rituals, attitudes and emotions are described in minute, colorful detail.

The three women and their families were quite different, Miriam was a self-contained woman from an hereditary musician family that allowed her to visit freely the homes of her extended family and worship at shrines on the outskirts of Herat.

Mother of Nebi was reclusive and isolated because she had lost her rural support network and her husband kept her close to home in the city. She was popular for her improvised renditions of songs learned during her rural childhood, however, and was consulted for her powers as a diviner through voluntary spirit possession and as a preparer of amulets for curses and protection against the evil eye. These were unusual services for a woman to perform.

Shirin was the most outgoing and independent; a professional musician with her own women's band. She taught the author to sing in the difficult Herati mode and to master the intricacies of the daira, the Afghan tambourine. Ms. Doubleday was an apt pupil and ultimately became a bona fide member of Shirin's band.

Veronica Doubleday did not go to Herat with the intention of exploring the world of Herati women. In 1973-74 she accompanied her husband, ethnomusicologist John Baily, while he conducted formal research. On returning in 1976-77, she decided she was tired of being an "honorary male" and chose to study music so as to participate more fully in the life of Herat. Needing no interpreter, she established rapport quickly and was accepted as a member of the families of each of her friends. Her account, therefore, is intimate and personal and catches the infectious liveliness of the women, as well as their moments of pain and despair.

Most importantly, this work illustrates the importance of women's communities in Afghan society. Women's support networks such as those described in the book have broken down among the refugee populations. Those who are concerned with the reconstruction of Afghanistan would do well to pay close attention to Three Women of Herat. The future stability of Afghan culture will depend, in large part, on re-establishing such strong women's communities.

Nancy Hatch Dupree
Durham, North Carolina

THE AFGHANS IN AUSTRALIA, Michael Cigler, AE [Australasian Educa] Press, Melbourne [74 Railway Road, Blackburn 3130], 1986. 163 pp. text + 5 maps + 41 photographs. A\$14.95 (US\$10.72).

Michael Cigler's The Afghans in Australia is part of the Australian Ethnic Heritage Series; the research was undertaken under a grant from the Commonwealth Schools Commission; its purpose is to illuminate Australia's diverse cultural heritage. The textbook style, therefore, is predictable, but a plethora of vintage drawings, lithographs and photographs are great fun.

The book is filled with more precise data concerning the attributes and feats of camels than most Forum readers will probably care to know. On the other hand, those

with a penchant for trivia will find all manner of fascinating bits. Where else would one learn that Afghans helped build a 1,620 km fence to keep rabbits away from the settled districts of Western Australia? (p. 110)

More seriously, this work does succeed in documenting the very real contributions Afghans made in opening up the central part of the Australian continent, 70% of which is arid or semi-arid. The author speculates that without the Afghans and their camels development would have been delayed by at least 50 years.

Afghans participated in the initial exploratory expeditions and, as settlers moved in, provided nearly all the transport, supplying homesteads and mines with provisions and carting ores, wool and other products out to the coastal cities. All the important national projects begun in the late 19th-early 20th centuries depended on Afghan expertise in hauling supplies and equipment. These included the famous 'Ghan' - the train to Alice Springs, a large 'Ghan Town' and center-point of camel hauling during the heyday of camel transport from 1860 into the 1920s. The author estimates that about 3,000 Afghans were involved over a 60-year period.

Those who have read May Schinasi's meticulously researched The Afghans in Australia (The Asia Society Afghanistan Council Occasional Paper #22, October, 1980) will know that all the "Afghans" were not from Afghanistan. The Australians were not precise observers of ethnic diversity. Any turbaned male wearing "floating costumes," as Schinasi quotes, with a camel in tow, was automatically dubbed an Afghan.

Probably most were from Afghan tribes living on "the floating north-west limit of the British Empire of India" (Schinasi, p.5). The first Afghans arrived in Australia in 1860 and large-scale introductions took place in 1865, but the Durand Line demarcating Afghanistan's eastern border was drawn only in 1893. Two reports listing the ethnic and tribal affiliations of contributors to the Perth mosque in 1905 and 1906, the peak of the camel era, indicate that a very high proportion were from Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan (Schinasi, p. 5). But in addition to these Afghans there were large numbers of cameleers from such areas as the Middle East, Egypt, Iran, Sind, the Punjab, and even one from Malaysia.

Cigler emphasizes that the most important, lasting cultural contribution of the Afghans was the introduction of Islam. Some interesting excerpts from newspapers describe religious festivities, but for a meaningful discussion of Islam in Australia during this period one is better off staying with May Schinasi.

Quotes from newspapers do serve to illustrate the depth and viciousness of racial intolerance directed toward some Afghans. Although many applied for naturalization, none were awarded British citizenship in spite of their recognized contributions.


Motor trucks were introduced in the early 1920s and profits from cameleering rapidly dwindled. Unable to pay the grazing fees, the Afghans sadly forced their animals into the wilderness to fend for themselves. Within about a decade there were an estimated 50,000 wild camels which were so scorned as vermin that the government actively encouraged their destruction; in 1935 a local police party shot 153 animals in a single day. Today, happily, these "Skyscrappers of the Givvers," the uniquely Australian version of 'ships of the desert,' are enjoying a come back in the tourist business and as profitable exports to North Africa and the Middle East where they are prized for racing. They even make prestigious gifts. The Australian government sent four wild camels to King Khaled of Saudi Arabia in 1975, accompanied by Sallay Mahomet, son of a Kandahari camel driver who had arrived in 1897 and married a French woman.

The original cameleers had come alone; their contracts specifically forbade them to bring women. Some married local European or Aboriginal girls and their families gradually assimilated, moving into cattle and sheep breeding after the passing of

camel transport; only a few maintain even scant interest in their backgrounds. The lone men took up droving, fencing, odd jobs with the railways, or turned to hawking and merchandizing. Many were lost in the crowds of the cities.

From the 1950s onwards, numbers of Afghans studied in Australia under the Colombo Plan, forging links that would stand them well during the tragic 1980s. Apparently some 2,000 Afghans have resettled in Australia (Refugees, #46, October 1987: 43). A statement by a member of the Dept. of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Canberra, reported that in 1986/87, 450 places were allocated for the resettlement of Afghan nationals, and "it is expected that a similar number will be resettled in 1987/88" (Afghan Mujahideen Medical Journal, Canberra, vol.2, #1, January 1988: 3).

The sequel to The Afghans in Australia is in the making.



Nancy Hatch Dupree
Durham, North Carolina

Recent Publications - Cont. from p. 29

"Afghan Refugees in Pakistan" by Louis & Nancy Dupree in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY - 1987 IN REVIEW, published by the American Council for Nationalities Service, 815 15th St., NW, Suite 610, Washington DC 20005. 84 pp. \$8. The volume also has a directory of refugee organizations & a bibliography.

TÉMOIN IN AFGHANISTAN, published in France by Stock, is a collection of photographs taken by Alain Guillo, the French photographer currently serving a 10-year sentence in a Kabul prison for "illegal entry & spying." The texts accompanying the color photos are dedicated to Guillo & are written by J. Abouchar, H. Amouroux, Ph. Augoyard, P. Bruckner, G. Chaliand, A. Glucksmann, M. Halter, Y. Jouffa, B. Kouchner, J. Lacoutre, B.-H. Lévy & G. Perrault. March 1988. Ff 150. ISBN 2.234-02115-4.

THE TRAGEDY OF AFGHANISTAN, edited by Bo Huldt & Erland Jansson, London, Croom Helm, 1988, is divided into 5 parts: The Country & Its People, articles by Louis Dupree, Nancy & Richard Tapper, Roger Christensen, Richard Frye & Eden Naby; Afghan Learning & Education, articles by S.B. Majrooh (to whom the book is dedicated), Bo Utas, Olivier Roy & Batinshah Safi; The War, articles by Jan Ovesen, Jan-Heeren Grevemeyer, Reider Gronhaug, Moh'd Eshaq & Sabahuddin Kushkaki; Ecology, articles by Terje Skoglund & Moh'd Qasim Yusufi; The Exile, articles by Inger Boesen, Bernt Glatzer & Nancy Dupree.

THE IMPAIRED MIND is published by the Psychiatry Center for Afghan Refugees, G.P.O. Box 641, Peshawar. Pakistan. Contents include case histories, statistics, descriptions of various mental disorders afflicting refugees, etc. Illustrations, graphs.

HUMAN CONCERN NEWS, published by Human Concern Int'l, Box 3984, Station C, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1Y 4P2, appeared in January. The 4-page tabloid-size publication describes the organization's work in Afghanistan & other areas. The organization has also published an 8-page "Afghanistan Crises Overview."

Dye transfer color prints of scenes of Afghanistan are available from Luke Powell, 230 Battell Block, Middlebury, VT 05753. Cards with envelopes are \$6 per dozen, \$35/100.

Eng. Sayd Naim Majrooh has taken over the running of the Afghan Information Center in Peshawar. The son of Syed B. Majrooh, Naim was born in Kabul & graduated from the Kabul Polytechnic Institute. He joined the Kunar resistance in 1979. For the past 7 years he worked as a liaison officer with the ICRC in Peshawar. The AIC Monthly Bulletin is available from the AIC, G.P.O. Box 228, Peshawar, Pakistan. Subscriptions are \$50/year.

"Afghan Aid: The Role of Private Voluntary Organizations" by John Lorentz in the JOURNAL OF S. ASIAN & ME STUDIES, Vol XI, No. 1&2, Fall/Winter 1987.

KABUL NEW TIMES



Islamic research centre.

(Photo by Eesa)

Activities of Islamic Studies Centre

"We have witnessed that during years of the revolution, keen attention has been paid to sacred religion of Islam by the party and state. Besides other effective measures for the establishment of Islamic Studies Centre have been taken in the year 1985 (1364).", said the assistant head of the Islamic Studies Centre.

"For the first time in the history of our country the Centre was established in 1979 with the demand and assistance of the revolutionary state. Among its activities are providing facilities to researchers and establishment of relations with the Islamic

Studies Centres of other Islamic countries" he added.

"At the Islamic Studies Centre seven titles have been published in the fields of Islamic philosophy, history, civilization, and interpretation of Islam. Also, researches are continuing on 20 others projects," he said.

"The Islamic Studies Centre has established contacts with the Societies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, and Iran. These organisations are being assisted by the Afghanistan Islamic Studies Centre through sending of publications and Islamic books."

TENDER NOTICE

Mohammed Ehsan, president of Fazl Ehsan company Ltd. bids to supply three items as per specifications at a total cost of Afz 12000000.

— 2500 thread, Indian colour, 200,000 bobbins, each Afz 790.

— Horn button, Indian overcoat colour, one million, each Afz 4.

— Horn button for trousers and coat, ten million, each Afz 4.

Individual institutions and the agents of the foreign companies willing to bid should attend the bidding at the procurement department of the Ministry of Defence, located at the Darul-Aman at 10 am on February 22, 1988, which is the last date for bidding. Terms and conditions plus samples can be obtained, bid bond in cash, commercial licence, bill and invoice are required.

2/14

Kabul New Times
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983 Kabul,
Republic of Afghanistan.

KU doctoral programme

KABUL MARCH 1 (RIA)

Thirty-seven scholars have applied for doctoral programme in Kabul University this year.


The university offers doctoral degrees in Philosophy, Modern Afghan History, World History,

Pashto, Language and Literature, Physics and Geology, Hydrogeology, Agronomy, National Economic Planning, Psychology, Public Law, Dari Language and Literature, Journalism and History, World History.

According to a source of

KU, "each candidate will have an academic advisor from among KU professors and foreign instructors. Also, each candidate will be provided with an opportunity to continue his or her research programme abroad."

3/2



An Ariana airliner

(KNT photo)

Ariana Airlines exceeds plan target

Ariana Afghan Airlines carried 217,000 passengers and 6,801 tons of cargo on its domestic and international flights in the past 11 months.

A spokesman of the Civil Aviation Ministry said that the Airlines had carried 62,25 passengers

on its international flights and 152,000 passengers on the domestic flights, which is 18 per cent more than the plan and shows a 28 per cent increase in cargo transport and 18 per cent increase in passenger transport over the same period last year.

Thirteen experts of the United Nations and 60 Afghan experts are working in the modern workshop of the Kabul airport.

The Civil Aviation Ministry has 12 planes in its fleet for domestic and international flights.

3/4

How art critics function

Author: Wahid Samadzai.
Director: Nasir Al-Kash

The short film 'Qab' (a picture frame), screened last Sunday was a product of intellect. In a short time of just five minutes, the film describes the basic problem faced by literatures and art critics which forms its theme.

A brief review the film will elucidate this point.

A young woman painter holds an exhibition of her works, and Editor-in-Chief of a daily assigns the head of the cultural section of the daily to write a critique on the works.

After returning home from office, the head of the cultural section looks at all the magazines in a bid to find an article

about the art and personality of the artist, but he is completely helpless. He has heard about the beauty of the painter that makes her paintings look more beautiful.

The painter is distressed at the attitude of the critic. The exhibition opens and all come to the gallery. When all spectators walk out of the hall, only the critic remains. Instead of paying attention to the paintings, he stands there with his eyes riveted on the critics.

Critics are exchanged between the critic and the artist who pretends to be interested in him. They walk out from the exhibition hall for an interview, go to a place for re-

creation and become close. The film ends with an exhibition of two pictures of the girl and the critic singing and dancing in the hall.

The end of the film in fact is its essence. The short film shows the state of art and art critics in our country. The conclusion drawn from this film is that the critics in our country base their writing on personal relations rather than on scientific, artistic and literary norms and principles.

It is a fact that some critics are greatly influenced by groupism and affiliations. In such circumstances, one can imagine the significance of critics in correctly guiding the art and literature in the country.

(Hamid Mehrwari)

Rare reliques housed in ethnographic museum

Over 800 historical and cultural relics which depict the old times and civilisation of the people of Afghanistan are on display in the ethnographic museum located in Koti Baghcha in the capital. Historical relics includ-

ing costumes, jewelleries, old furniture, arms, hunting equipment and cultural artifacts are arranged in eleven booths.

The reliques which belong to Pashtoon, Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek, Nuristani and Turkman nationalities and

the Hindu community are separately arranged according to the general director of the museum.

He added that though all museum objects were valuable the oldest and rarest reliques were Nuristani wood carvings.

2/7

Key role of ministry of nationalities

Following is an interview with Mohammad Akbar Shorsham, Minister of Nationalities on the activity of his ministry which was constituted two years ago.

Q: Would you please elucidate what was the objective of establishing the Ministry?

A: To implement the humanitarian policy of national reconciliation and reach nationwide accord, for ensuring peace in the country, grave tasks have been assigned to the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs that necessitated extensive work and attraction of all fraternal tribes and nationalities for their active participation in the process of national accord, their mobilization around the revolutionary government. The Central Committee of the PDPA and the Council of Ministers therefore approved the establishment of Ministry of Nationalities.

Q: Could you explain the basic directions of the activities of the ministry to the light of the

documents of Loya Jirga and the constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan?

A: The tasks of the Ministry are inseparably linked with the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation. They can be solved only with active participation of fraternal nationalities under the peace programme.

The duties and activities of the ministry are summed up as follows:

— Expansion of various mass activities among different nationalities residing in the country for further accelerating the process of national reconciliation and maintaining nationwide peace.

— Struggle for ensuring unshakable unity and solidarity of fraternal nationalities;

— Study of national, historical and cultural characteristics of different nationalities;

— Identifying the nee-

ds and demands and formulating proposals of various nationalities in different fields.

— Efforts for popularizing, developing and enriching the culture, language and literature and other values and traditions of nationalities.

— Consistent and fruitful political work among nationalities.

— Struggle against the attempts of reactionaries who want to intensify hostilities, and ethnic and tribal discrimination.

Efforts for creation of objective conditions for guaranteeing the rights and equality of nationalities.

Carrying out the above tasks which would create objective conditions for equality of rights of nationalities, consolidation of unity and cohesion among the fraternal peoples of Afghanistan and finally solution of national issue.

Q: How do you evaluate the role of the Minis-

try with regard to the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation particularly after its second phase?

A: The Ministry of Nationalities was born in the course of implementation of the peace programme and certain tasks are assigned to it for realizing the objectives of the programme. For instance, convening of tribal jirgas, meeting elders and influential social figures and explaining the noble aims of the peace policy are our prime tasks. To date the jirgas of Nooristan, Pashay, Uzbek and Turkmen have been held in which necessary decisions were adopted for attracting broad masses towards the people's power, peace and prosperity. To organize better work in localities the proposals of the participants of the jirgas were collected and submitted to concerned organs. Also specific measures are taken for further growth of culture, language and literature of nationalities.

Cuban doctor at home in Kabul

Among the international friends of Afghanistan who assist our people in different ways is a medical team from Cuba serving in Kabul for the past six months.

Pedro Alfonso, an internationalist of the members of the Cuban team was all enthusiastic about his work in Afghanistan when your correspondent met him.

"Our group of eight members arrived in Afghanistan six months ago and would stay here for two years to serve Afghan people", he said.

"The Cuban and Afghan and Cuban are far apart geographically, our hearts are close", he added.

"The Cuban people follow the events in Afghanistan with great interest and rejoice in your victories. When we were asked who would go to Afghan-

istan to serve, I and my friends responded immediately.

"I receive letters from my relatives asking about Afghanistan and write to them about the natural beauty and the hospitable people of your country".

Pedro Alfonso explained that he is married and has one child. Asked what he liked last in our country, he replied: "I would have only one memory of Afghanistan, that is the affection, love and hospitality of Afghan people".

"The Cuban and Afghan and Cuban are far apart geographically, our hearts are close", he added.

"The Cuban people follow the events in Afghanistan with great interest and rejoice in your victories. When we were asked who would go to Afghan-

(By NEMAN)

appointments

Najibullah Massir, as chief representative of the Council of Ministers for the northern provinces with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister.

Feda Mohammad De-

heshan, as President of the Department of supervision of mass publicity and extension, attached to the Council of Ministers.

Sayed Murtaza, as first Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee.

Sultán Husain, as first Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee. (BIA)

and Minister of Foreign Affairs to Kuwait, Libya, Syria and Jordan, and noted that the visits to these Arab countries before the commencement of the current round of Geneva talks and convening of the conference of foreign ministers of Islamic countries were important and were a follow up of the recent statement of Najibullah, General Secretary of the PDPA, CC and President of the Republic of Afghanistan and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Politburo assessed as positive the results of these visits for expanding the political contacts and explaining the peaceable and patriotic, national and international stands and status of the country in the conditions of national reconciliation and the process of establishment of peace. The Politburo entrusted the Foreign Ministry of the RA certain tasks for activating diplomatic relations with Kuwait, Jordan, Syria and other Islamic and non-aligned countries, including Arab countries.

The Politburo also assigned the strengthening of party political work among Afghan students abroad and entrusted concrete tasks to responsible organs for better selection of students to be sent abroad for studies and strengthening of party political work among them, and speedy resolution of their problems.

The Politburo also assigned a report on the visit of the delegation of the Republic of Afghanistan, led by Abdol Wakil, member of the Politburo of the PDPA, CC

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PB decides to set up Islamic univ.

KABUL, MARCH 12 (BIA)

A periodic session of the Politburo also considered the military patriotic education of youth in the conditions of realization of national reconciliation, and noted that there still exist serious defects and shortcomings in this field and that military communists do not take active part in it.

The Politburo, assessed as poor the contribution of the DYOA committees and organizations to the military-patriotic training of youth and criticized the activity of the Ministry of Education and Higher Professional Education and mass media in this work.

The Politburo passed a resolution on improving matters in the above.

It also discussed and adopted necessary decisions on the recruitment to the armed and reserve forces of activists and professional cadres of the PDPA, social organizations, publication organs of the PDPA and party members in state organs who are eligible for service.

authorities for starting lessons in the faculties of the university.

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leadership of youth and the elevation of the role of party and DYOA committees and organizations in this connection. It pointed out that still all the youth cannot find employment according to their profession and liking. Enough attention is not paid to the protection and sound upbringing of children; a large number of young persons still do not own land, are unemployed and the new agrarian policies are thus far not benefited from its advantages.

The Ministries of Education, Higher and Professional Education, and Vocational and Technical Education do not pay necessary attention to the increase of enrollment of students, provision of facilities for the children of poor families and martyrs.

The DYOA committees make use of the potential available for strengthening influence on the youth, carrying on vast propaganda work among the people, do not accomplish political organizational tasks in a concrete manner and do not pay attention to the demands of the youth.

The Politburo added that serious defects are observed in the work of party committees amo-

ng the youth. Many PDPA committees have not yet felt the serious responsibility of work among the youth, keep themselves away from the work of youth committees and are unaware of the problems of the youth.

The Politburo decided on urgent measures for improving work among the youth political and patriotic leadership of youth and the elevation of the role of party and DYOA committees and organizations.

The session also reviewed preparations for elections to the National Assembly of the Republic of Afghanistan and entrusted tasks to responsible organs.

The Politburo discussed as the strengthening of party political work among Afghan students abroad and entrusted concrete tasks to responsible organs for better selection of students to be sent abroad for studies and strengthening of party political work among them, and speedy resolution of their problems.

The Politburo also assigned a report on the visit of the delegation of the Republic of Afghanistan, led by Abdol Wakil, member of the Politburo of the PDPA, CC

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EXCERPTS FROM SULTAN ALI KESHTMAND'S ADDRESS ON THE BUDGET TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Esteemed members of the Council of Ministers,
Dear comrades and friends,
After a few days, the year HS 1366 will be registered as a year of practical realization of national reconciliation policy, establishment of peace, and tranquility in our suffering land would come to an end. . . .

It should be kept in view that the current year shows a rise in the level of activity of our political and state leadership in the international arena, particularly constructive initiatives have been set forth for the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

The statement of Najibullah, President of Afghanistan and Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU CC General Secretary on Afghanistan's major importance for restoration of peace in our country. All obstacles created by Pakistan with regard to the peaceful settlement of the problem of Afghanistan and signing of Geneva agreements have been practically removed with these statements. During that year, enormous measures were taken to promote the living standards of the people of Afghanistan. The salaries of the personnel of armed forces have been raised. The salaries of soldiers have been raised from 5 to 10 rials. The military stores where the personnel of the armed forces and their families can buy foodstuffs and industrial products at low prices have started functioning practically.

State assistance to food allowance of government employees has been increased by one and a half times. The free distribution of flour, wheat and edible oil to state workers and employees, disabled veterans of revolution and work as well as the families of martyrs against coupons has been generalized. Currently, 340 thousand households receive 56 kg of flour or wheat and 5 kg of edible oil.

Extra salaries are paid according to climate and regional conditions to workers and employees. Taken these as a whole, around four million citizens of the country have enjoyed these facilities. This is considered one of our greatest achievements and all this has been realized in one year. . . .

Some of the data and figures concerning the realization of socio-economic growth of the country during 1987 are as follows:

During 1987 there was a sharp increase in the gross social product increased during 1986 by Af 3.7 billion or 2.4 per cent and national income by Af 2.4 billion or 2.3 per cent respectively.

Definite positive achievements have been made in various spheres. Gross agricultural production during 1987 showed a growth of 0.7 per cent compared to 1986. The gross efficiency of agriculture, the government has distributed 150 thousand tons of chemical fertilizers and Af 108 million worth of pesticides to farmers. Peasants have also received improved wheat, cotton and sugarbeet seeds. Mechanized agricultural implements are greatly utilized.

As you know, this year we devoted a much attention to cotton procurement. The purchase of wheat reached 170 thousand tons. The level of purchase has been recorded for the first time in the history of the country. Increase has been achieved in the products of coal, cement, bricks and gravel. The production of power, wood, light industry and foodstuffs have been stepped up. . . .

One should say that besides fall in the production of cotton goods its quality has also not improved. The idle time of gin and press factories and non-utilization of their capacities due to lack of cotton are greatly increasing. In the jargon of cotton growers which we heard recently we announced the need for motivating the interest of peasants in raising production of this important industrial crop, that is cotton. But, to realize all the predicted measures aimed at increasing the production and purchase of cotton we should utilize all the possibilities. . . .

The Ministry of Defence has not executed its plan for cotton production, the Interior Ministry in furniture production, the Ministry of Commerce in processing walnut, raisin and production of animal fodder. The plans for sugar, fruit and vegetable preserves would probably not be realized.

Apart from their material value, the fall in their production means not ensuring the supply of essential goods to the production in industrial private sector is assessed at 94.4 per cent during the current year. The main fault for such a state of affairs is lack of access of private enterprises to material resources, particularly raw material, to make use of their production capacities. . . .

The ministries and departments must take definite measures to overcome the defects in the industrial field. The plan of HS 1367 places many and serious tasks before us. The overall growth of industrial production is predicted at 6.2 per cent. Of which, state and joint sectors are to achieve 7.8 per cent, private sector 12.5 per cent and handicrafts 10 per cent.

In this way, production of power will increase by 8 per cent, of construction material by 7.2 per cent, machine products and iron smelting by 13.2 per cent, chemicals and pharmaceuticals by 28.2 per cent, light industry by 23.8 per cent and foodstuffs industry by 12.3 per cent. . . .

Taking into account the limitation of currency funds in HS 1367 foreign exchange for the development projects has been predicted at two times than in 1987. The assistance of friendly countries and international organizations is used as usual for the development projects.

The total volume of foreign assistance for HS 1367 figures out to 222.3 million dollars which is 14.5 per cent more than in the previous year.

As in the past, a major part of this assistance (that is, 87 per cent) comes from the Soviet Union and CMEA countries. The share of Soviet Union accounts for 81 per cent of the whole assistance. It is necessary that a number of defects and hardships that need to be removed in the process of realization of 1988 plan should be pointed out. Some projects of great importance have been entered in the plan without the complete technical documents or without protocols with the concerned countries. . . .

THE STATE BUDGET:

The report presented by Mohammad Kabir, Minister of Finance on implementation of the state budget in HS 1365 and the review for HS 1366 as well as the draft of the budget for 1987 have been carried out by the Ministry of Finance, other ministries, offices and municipalities in attracting resources to the state budget for financing various socio-economic projects aimed at promoting the living condition of the people. Special allocation is made in the budget of the current year for realization of the policy of national reconciliation.

During this year special concessions were made in tax payments by repatriates and families of remote areas of the country. The salaries of some categories of workers and state employees were raised.

Similarly, some other necessary measures were adopted during this year. All these needed additional financial resources in the current year. A thorough review of the implementation of this year's budget indicates that despite the efforts made for its realization there existed difficulties and problems caused by objective factors. Part of these shortcomings resulted from the defects in the work of some ministries and offices, which did not discharge their budget and financial responsibilities, they did not observe economic measures in spending. In order to realize the tasks pertaining to increasing in budget revenue and reduction of expenses on low priority schemes the Council of Ministers adopted its special resolution No. 277, dated Jaddi 9, 1366. It was envisaged in the resolution that necessary measures should be adopted for realization of the budget plan and reduction of expenses in various state institutions.

It should be pointed out that some of these problems will be carried over to the next year. One of these problems is the existence of defects in the budget which did which is carrying through military stores. The ministries of commerce, defence, interior and state security need to improve their work in this connection considerably. They shall deliver their incomes to the state budget in proper time.

The Minister of Finance, Mohammad Kabir, shall intensify the work of tax collection and payments due to the state and reduce credits given to enterprises, institutions and individuals.

Another reserve exists for increasing the state budget in the new year.

I would like to point out that due to difficulties, the state income decreased by 6 billion Afcs because of the fall in the extraction and supply of natural gas. Nevertheless it is envisaged that the increase in the state budget for next year will increase 12 per cent from domestic sources and 8 per cent from foreign sources as compared to the current year.

In the draft of the HS 1367 budget, for the first time some income is anticipated from voluntary loans in order to rehabilitate those branches of national economy which have been damaged during the war. The state has attached great hope

to state loans in order to reactivate the national economy. It is necessary that this economic measure becomes a good example for mobilization of all strata of the people of Afghanistan including workers, state employees, peasants, craftsmen, intelligentsia, private entrepreneurs and traders so that they revive our economy which has been damaged by the war. This will contribute to restoration of mosques, schools and health centers. The organization and administration of these voluntary and important measure must be important tasks before the Ministry of Finance, the Da Afghanistan Bank as well as other ministries, offices and social institutions.

The expenditure in the state budget for the year HS 1367 despite economization will increase by 18.3 per cent as compared to 1366.

In the next year's budget additional expenditure has been envisaged for financing the ministries, offices and new institutions which are going to be set up.

Similarly additional expenditure is envisaged in the budget of the new year to finance assistance to repatriates, pension and aid to the families of martyrs and the handicapped. Repayment of the credits given by other countries has also been taken into consideration. Similarly, expenditure reimbursement of the cost of courses has been increased considerably. This is the first time in the history of the country, special expenditure is allocated to those families whose children are attending school. It is proposed in the plan of 1367 to distribute free uniforms and stationery to school students. The monthly allowance of the university students will be increased. School students will be supplied free breakfast. In order to fulfill these tasks, total of 1.5 billion Af will be earmarked. It is required that the ministers, presidents of state offices together with executive committees should supervise the economization measures which are to be adopted in the state institutions and attract domestic resources for state revenue.

During the last two years as an experimental measure, loans for 1987 have been planned for Kabul city and districts. We shall have to wait to see their results. In our view this experiment was successful. A total of 4 billion Afcs has been allocated for 29 provinces, Kabul city and the Khost division of Paktia province in HS 1367. . . .

Out of 24 state institutions, 24 per cent of them belongs to air ministry, 12 per cent of transport 4 to ministry of light industry and foodstuffs, 5 to ministry of agriculture and later 10 to ministry of power energy, one to ministry of construction affairs and one to ministry of mines and industries. All of them function below self-sufficient level. . . .

The leadership of the state ministries and the ministry of transport justifies lack of self-sufficiency in the transport institutions due to low tariffs for delivery of goods. However the government taking into account the fact that the low tariff is kept by two times, but still the vehicles are kept for long periods loaded, they are parked for long periods on the highways, the goods are transported only from one side and finally the improper utilization of parking lots altogether have contributed to lack of self-sufficiency in the transport sector.

As a result, it could be stated that it is not the low rate of transport delivery of goods which have caused the problem. The main reason should be sought in the organizational work of these enterprises. Another reason for the low level of self-sufficiency in the state enterprises is that many of them have become used to receiving state subsidy to compensate their deficits. Thus, they never work at improving the state of affairs in their enterprises. Every fourth one of the state enterprises function below self-sufficiency. Such a state of affairs cannot be permitted any more. Resolute measures should be adopted so that state enterprises become self-sufficient and are able to finance themselves. . . .

Of course it is not an easy matter, it requires serious supervision by the related ministry, offices, state planning committee, the ministry of finance and the Da Afghanistan Bank. They should simplify and improve the system of mutual responsibility towards state budget and regularly repay their loans from their profits. They should give up the practice of complete deduction of their profit in the enterprises and should add to the revenue of the collectives. This will improve the economic accounting will strengthen the economy in general. . . .

In order to create some new facilities and order in improving the relations between the centre and the local organs, and to promote the prestige of the council of people's deputies, the council of ministers adopted the resolution No. 169, dated Aqrab 27, 1365 and No. 134 of Saratan 20, 1366 endorsing the organisational structure of the executive committees of councils of people's deputies in the provinces. The new organisational structure is based on democratic centralism. It has a dual character. That means the state offices in the provinces are subordinate to the executive committees as far as their budget, plan, employment and relief of cadres, and the execution of their daily tasks are concerned. At the same time these offices and institutions in the provinces are subordinate to the concerned ministry or central administration in Kabul from where they receive practical assistance and their general policy. Also the central administration trains their professional cadres.

Similarly, in order to create a unified system for appointment and relief of cadres the Council of Ministers adopted resolution No. 95, dated Ja-wza 19, 1366 entrusting special powers to the executive committees of the provinces. Accordingly the provincial executive committees have the authority to appoint or relieve state cadres upto rank three. Likewise, the provincial executive committees have the authority now to appoint or relieve the governors of districts and subdistricts as well.

The dual system has been ensured in most of the provinces. The assessments made of the implementation of new organisation based on democratic centralism and the dual subordinate system show that a certain order has come into being in provinces, the relations of the capital with local organs have improved in localities, and chaos in this regard have been prevented. The centralism of administration has shaped in the executive committees and caused the elevation of the role and authority of executive committees of provinces.

The executive committees of provinces have not yet realized the division of power with the opposition forces. As it is necessary, and paid less attention to the creation of the nucleus of coalition administration at the levels of villages, sub-districts and districts.

Establishment of contacts with the opposition groups for their joining with the state power or conclusion of protocols are poorly conducted. Necessary use is not made of the possibilities and the role of individuals in the administrative activities of the opposition groups. Adequate use is not made also of the possibility of drawing opposition groups in localities in activating the administrative units and villages that are not under state control. It is necessary to act with courage, care and vigilance, in carrying out the said tasks.

One of the main issues in the process of the policy of national reconciliation is the return of emigrants. Special works have been accomplished, and there are progress in this regard too. We have to organise the affairs of repatriates and to give them befitting welcome 22 frontier reception centres, 22 peace guest houses and 10 peace townships have been set up. The total number of repatriates exceeds 120,000. So far a large number of repatriates have been employed, and their children are in schools.

Direct ties have been established between 29 provinces, Khost division and Kabul city with the republics and cities of the Soviet Union, and cooperation protocols involving over 70 million rouble assistance, have so far been concluded.

The planning commissions of provinces should make effective and full round use of these possibilities and assistance rendered by the Afghan provinces according to the protocols of direct cooperation signed with the republics and provinces of the Soviet Union, for complete fulfilment of plans of socio-economic development.

Dear comrades,

The plan of socio-economic development and the state budget for HS 1367 (beginning March 21, 1988), have placed before us great tasks. But determination of objectives and tasks are not alone sufficient if all existing possibilities are not utilized, and accurate and practical work not organized. Our main task begins just today, that is, to accomplish tasks envisaged in the plan and budget for the concerned organs and to search ways leading to their realization.

Confidence can be expressed that the government members would exert all their efforts for accomplishing the tasks envisaged in the state plan and budget for HS 1367 which in itself is a concrete contribution to the realization of the policy of national reconciliation in the country.

(TMA)

Valuable service done by Ulema's high council

"Over 35,000 ulema, clergymen and imams of the country are organised in the high council of ulama and clergymen. The council provides valuable service for the improvement of their life," said Mawlawi Ghulam Sarwar Mansour, chairman of the high council of ulama and clergymen of the Republic of Afghanistan.

"The council is a religious and social organisation. It was established in 1986. Eighty one permanent members, 23 members of the executive committee and five members of supervisory committee were elected in the third conference of the council which was held in 1986.

"225 residential apartments have been distributed by this council to clergymen and ulema of the country in the Microrayon. The salaries of ulema and clergymen have been increased and these figures are now enjoying the coupon privilege.

"About 400 to 500 ulema and clergymen from different provinces of the country are sent abroad every year for exchange of views with ulema and clergymen of Islamic countries," he continued.

"The council has established relations with si-

milar institutions in the Islamic countries. By sending letters and messages on different occasions and religious days it consolidates its relations with similar councils in these countries.

"Fortyseven ulema and clergymen are mobilised in the commission for national reconciliation of this council. They have

gone 97 times to 27 provinces of the country to explain the holy religion of Islam and the programmes of national reconciliation. Over 31,000 pamphlets, leaflets have so far been distributed by this commission in the sub-districts, districts and provinces of the country. 215 letters have been sent to comp-

atriots who are living abroad. As a result, one thousand ulema and clergymen have returned to the country. They have received also the membership cards of this council.

"Irshadi Islam is the weekly organ of the council. The religious articles of ulema and clergymen, poems and students of religious madrasa and the theology faculty are published in this weekly," he added.

(By Our Reporter Aman)



FEBRUARY 10, 1988

Ghulam Sarwar Mansour.

(KNT Photo)

Theatre:

Rashid Latifi led the way

FEBRUARY 15, 1988

Abdul Rashid Latifi who founded the theatre in Afghanistan, had trained a large number of talented youth and organised for them courses in acting. Such well known actors as Ustad Bala, Mashal Hamed, Hamed Jalali, the late Ustad Rafiq Sadig, Naim Farhan were among his disciples.

Besides being the father of Afghan theatre, Rashid Latifi was also a writer, who wrote for his people.

The first play staged in Afghanistan was written by Abdul Rashid Latifi. Later his other plays like 'Silver chandelier', 'Miserable life', 'He is not my father' were also staged. In 1945 he was appointed director of theatre. His coming to the theatre brought about drastic changes in the theatre.

Rashid Paya, head of the theatre section of the Union of Artists said: "Latifi used to write, direct and decorate the stage, direct plays and tried to keep the torch burning bright during the time he was responsible for theatre in

Afghanistan. It was a golden era of theatre and arts and developed strong bonds with the people."

Wali Latifi, actor and director of cinema and a nephew of Rashid

Latifi says: "My uncle Latifi had links with both theatre and cinema. He always displayed innovations and initiatives. He also served the press of the country."

The magazine 'Green leaf', a publication of the then house of prostitutes and Seysi, a magazine in Arabic which Latifi published in Cairo when he was the press attaché of Afghanistan in Egypt are examples.

The first Afghan film called 'Love and friendship' was made by him in India with the collaboration of some other directors.

Wali Latifi added: "The first feature film written by the late Rashid Latifi was called 'Exhort of the hall', and his last 'biat' was 'He is not my father'."

Latifi used to translate plays from Russian, Arabic and French, direct and stage them. Dying of

lung cancer in the last days of his life, he directed 'Gogol's' 'Govanni'.

Abdul Rashid Latifi died on June 11, 1985 when he was only 52.

Wali Latifi, recalling the past, said: "I was still a minor when my uncle initiated me into acting. I played my first role in a production of 'The tragic comedy' and romantic roles were also given to me. I acted in plays from my seventh standard upto the graduation from Kabul University, that is, 13 years. I was also included in the first group which was sent to the Soviet Union for study in cinematography.

Rashid Latifi, I studied cinematography in the Soviet Union for seven years. I became a film director, above all, due to the encouragement received from my great Ustad Abdul Rashid Latifi."

"'Difficult day' was the first feature film, which Wali Latifi directed in 1973. Since then he has directed other feature films like 'Spring comes',

'One day and one year', 'Haiting aggression' and 'Hot summer of Kabul'.

He has to his credit also many documentary films like the 'celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the party', '20th anniversary of Kabul Polytechnic', 'Kabul Pre-fabricated Housing complex' and 'Afghanistan in the fall of 1986'.

All his films have won diplomas. 'One day and one year' won a diploma in the Moscow film festival, while 'Haiting aggression' won a diploma of the GDR state, and 'Afghanistan the revolution continues' the state order of the Soviet Union.

Retail sale of fish

The supply of fish to Kabul citizens has begun through the Afghan poultry company and retail stores of the Ministry of Commerce.

According to a spokesman of the Ministry of Commerce each kg of fish is priced at 130 Afghanis in Afghan poultry company and its outlets and at 135 Afghanis in the retail stores.

Sufficient quantity of beef and chicken are also supplied through the two outlets at 215 and 180 Afghanis per kg respectively.

FEB. 14

CHRONOLOGY

2/20 - BIA - ROA Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil returned from his visit to Kuwait, Libya, Syria & Jordan.

2/21 - BIA - A protocol of cooperation between The Georgian SSR & Kapisa Province was signed. The Georgians will train Afghan cadres in the agricultural, health, light industries & educational fields.

- The two huge statues of Buddha in Bamyan are "still firmly standing in their places despite hundreds of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, storms, etc."

2/24 - Los Angeles Times - The 7-Party Alliance in Peshawar proposed a coalition gov't with a 28-member cabinet of 14 ministers from the Alliance, 7 representing the refugees & 7 Muslims from the Kabul regime (see p. 14).

2/25 - BIA - On the Islamic Alliance's plan for an interim gov't (see 2/24): "Such futile design & desperate strivings...run counter to any moral & legal principles & are resembling hysterical dreams."

- The Chairman of the State Committee for Returnees met with a delegation of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Kabul at the invitation of the ROA Foreign Ministry to talk on the "provision of aids for the refugees."

- Since 1/87, over 1,100 emigre Afghans have returned from India, Japan, England, the FRG, Turkey, France, Switzerland, the US & Austria.

2/26 - LA Times - The Reagan Administration predicted that the current Kabul regime will collapse after the Soviet withdrawal. A Defense Dept. official said that Soviet troops will probably leave from southern & western Afghanistan 1st, & then from areas south & east of Kabul. He said that Afghanistan has about 40,000 regular army troops, 7,000 air force members & another 100,000 irregulars, "including tribal militia of uncertain loyalty." The Kabul regime will remain well armed.


2/28 - LA Times - India says the US asked her to take an active role in the peace talks. Rajiv Gandhi has invited Ziaul-Haq to Delhi to discuss the Afghan issue but Zia has yet to respond.

2/28 - BIA - The UNHCR delegation (see 2/25) visited Herat. On 3/1 BIA reported that they also visited Torkham & other villages in Nangarhar Province.

3/1 - The Outlook (Santa Monica) - The US Senate yesterday voted 77-0 on a "non-binding resolution to warn the Reagan Adm. not to end US military aid to the mujahideen before a Soviet withdrawal of all troops & advisors was complete. The resolution also gave strong support for the formation of an interim gov't in Kabul & for a UN peace-keeping force to protect withdrawing Soviet troops from attack & to keep the peace in major cities while an interim gov't is being organized.

3/2 - NYT - The State Dept. said the opium supply from Afghanistan in 1986 was 400-500 metric tons, & increased to 400-800 metric tons in 1987. Hashish exports remained constant at 200-400 metric tons. Pres. Reagan announced "mostly symbolic" penalties against some drug producing countries including Afghanistan.

3/3 - LA Times - The Geneva talks began yesterday. On 3/1 Pak. Dep. For. Min. Zain Noorani said that an interim Afghan gov't should be a condition of a Soviet withdrawal; the US feels that would be "desirable" but will not insist that it be a condition for an agreement. The NYT quotes Abdul Wakil as saying that "an interim gov't is a matter for the Afghans to decide."



- NYT - The UN has drawn up plans to send about 40 military observers to Afghanistan & Pakistan in May to monitor a peace agreement. The officers will be drawn from the UN Truce Supervisory Organization, a 298-member force now monitoring cease-fire agreements between Israel & its Arab neighbors.

- BIA - A school is to be built in the Kirghiz SSR for the children of martyrs of the April

Revolution from Wardak & Bamyan. Presently 100 such children are being taught by Afghan teachers in the Kirghiz city of Kand.

- The Byelorussian SSR will help Kunar & Laghman in the fields of education, communications, agriculture, land reform, public health & trade unions. The 797,000 rubles worth of aid will start in 1989.

3/4 - LA Times -

At Geneva, the Soviet pullout timetable was shortened to 9 months with $\frac{1}{2}$ of the 115,000 troops scheduled to leave in the 1st 3 months, according to ROA Foreign Minister Wakil.

- NYT - Wakil said Kabul was ready to start talks on a new gov't after a peace settlement was signed but he warned that such power-sharing negotiations could take a long time.


3/5 - BIA - In a clash between the groups of Gulbuddin & Khalis, 2 French citizens & some "extremist elements" were killed.

3/5 - Kayhan Int'l (Tehran) - Iranian Dep. Foreign Min. Larijana called for an unconditional Soviet pullout from Afghanistan & said that the mujahideen would not stop fighting until the Soviets left. He said that Iran would help the Afghan people get their rights.

- LA Times - US officials assured the mujahideen that their weapon supply would continue & perhaps increase until 5/15.

... Many of the guerrillas, after present and not represented, eight years of fighting against Soviet and Afghan government troops, fear that their effort will be traded away in a foreign conference room where they are not "Liberation Front..".

- The UN Commission on Human Rights, in a report issued on 3/3, concluded that only a representative interim gov't could ensure the orderly return of refugees. While Diego Cordovez admitted that civil strife has always been a part of Afghan life, he said that now "I have the feeling they want peace," & that the question



Abdul Wakil

Associated Press

of a gov't "cannot be part of an int'l agreement."

3/6 - LA Times - Senator Gordon Humphrey (R - NH) said, after a visit to Pakistan, that there had been a sharp decline in the flow of US aid to the mujahideen. "I want to know if this is negligence or a sellout of the Afghan resistance," he said. Meanwhile, Pravda charged that the rebels are moving large quantities of weapons into Afghanistan.

- BIA - The traditional Red Rose Picnic in Mazar-i-Sharif will begin on 3/21 & last 40 days. The city will be illuminated; there will be art exhibits, sports shows & buzkashi.

3/7 - HK Standard - Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo held sessions allowing all 19 Pakistani opposition parties to give their views on whether Pakistan should sign a Geneva agreement. Benazir Bhutto gave the strongest plea for an early settlement.

3/8 - BIA - The ROA & USSR signed a protocol on the "consolidation of the Amu (Oxus) River shores & the erection of a protective wall in the Hairatan Port." The USSR will give a ruble 15m loan for the "concretization."

3/9 - NYT - Sibghatullah Mojaddedi resigned from the 7-Party Alliance & as leader of the Jabha-i-Nijat-i-Milli Party yesterday. He said he resisted the urging of the 4 fundamentalist parties to announce an interim gov't headed by Ahmad Shah.

3/11 - NYT - Last week the US said it would not stop aiding the Afghan guerrillas unless Moscow agreed to stop sending military supplies to the ROA. The Soviets said they would not stop & accused the US of holding up the Geneva agreement. Nikolai Kozyrev who heads a Soviet team monitoring the indirect talks said that such a suggestion was outside the Geneva accord. (See 3/13)

3/13 - Sydney Morning Herald (Australia) -

"We have been rendering military assistance to this country for more than 70 years and to many governments, not just the present one," the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Nikolai Kozyrev, told a news conference.

"The question of ending military aid to Afghanistan is to interfere with the internal affairs between our two countries. It is tantamount to our saying the United States should stop its military aid to Pakistan."

- Mojaddedi withdrew his resignations (see 3/9) after appeals from his party members & other members of the Alliance.

3/13 - NYT - In Geneva, officials see little chance of a 3/15 signing of the peace accord but officials say that Moscow & Kabul may no longer insist on a 60-day interval between the signing & the start of the pullout. Moscow may want the withdrawal to start before Reagan & Gorbachev meet in late May & before the Soviet Communist Party Congress in June.

- Soviet army defectors in Afghanistan sent telegrams to Geneva negotiators urging that Soviet prisoners in Afghanistan be given the choice of returning to the USSR or going to a "free country."



3/14 - TIME - Mujahideen say CIA arms shipments to them via Pakistan have declined 50% over the past 2 months, and

Last De-

ember the U.S. shipped almost 2,000 Tennessee mules to Pakistan to their new climate. Some stan to carry rebel supplies have died, others have developed conjunctivitis, and many are just too wobbly to work.

- KNT - The 1st issue of Adalat (Justice), the monthly organ of the Peasant's Justice Party of Afghanistan, appeared last week. Abdul Hakim Tawana is the Party Chairman.

3/15 - HK Standard - The 7-Party Alliance met yesterday to try to find a new leader after the resignation of Yunis Khalis. (See 3/17)

- Najibullah set up a council to advise him on Islamic Affairs.

3/16 - NYT - The USSR said it was postponing its troop withdrawal because of "procrastination & delay" by Pakistan & the US.

- BIA - "Any case of AIDS has not yet been registered in Afghanistan but the Public Health Min., with WHO assistance, has taken all precautionary measures to prevent AIDS in the country."

3/17 - HK Standard - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was chosen Chairman of the Alliance on 3/15. [Rumor has it that Pakistan had a strong hand in his election. Ed]

- NYT - Zain Noorani said that Shultz & Shevardnadze could play a role in unblocking the Geneva talks when they meet next week by agreeing on a "symmetrical" cutoff in military aid.

Mr. Noorani said at a news conference today that the Afghan insurgents control 80 percent of Afghanistan and that they are the true representatives of the Afghan people.

The Pakistani negotiator made clear that his Government would sign a peace agreement only if all Afghan political factions agreed to talks on forming a Government. The new Government would take power once the Soviet forces withdrew. He said that

the various **Afghan factions** must agree to continue talking even after a peace accord comes into force.

Mr. Noorani insisted that Pakistan was not making the prior formation of such a Government "a precondition" for the signing a peace agreement.

He said Pakistan wanted representatives of all the factions in Afghan political life, including "refugees, resistance fighters, émigrés and representatives of the present regime," to come together in Geneva, Vienna or elsewhere and start to form a new Government.

3/18 - SCMP - The USSR will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, Geneva agreement of not, but it still hopes for a settlement.

3/18 - BIA - The RC approved the draft of the Law on Elections (8 chapters, 58 articles), next year's budget, & friendship & cooperation treaties with Vietnam & Kampuchea. Najibullah issued a decree on the formation & composition of a central election commission. NF Chairman Abdul Rahim Latif will chair the 33-member group which is to supervise the election for National Assembly members. Deputy Chairmen are Mir Saheb Karwal, Revolutionary Org. of the Working People of Afghanistan (ROWPA); Dr. Dehzad, Working People of Afghanistan (WPA); Abdul Hakim Tawana, Peasant's Justice Party; Abdul Sattar Serat, Islamic Party. 9 places on the commission will be left vacant for "opposition" representatives. (See 3/19)

3/19 - BIA - The Afghan Nat'l Assembly will consist of 2 houses: the Senate & the House of Representatives. Candidates can be put forward by the NF, the political parties, social organizations and the President.

Terms are 5 years. House candidates must be at least 20; Senatorial candidates at least 30. All Afghan citizens over 18, except prisoners & madmen, may vote. Polls will be open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. & the results will be published 7 days after the elections. (See 3/21)

3/19 - HK Standard - Singapore Pres. Lee Kwan Yew, visiting Pakistan, said that progress toward ending the Afghan conflict would have a "positive impact" for resolving the Kampuchean problem.

3/20 - BIA - Sultan Ali Keshmand spoke at the inauguration of Balkh University.

3/21 - HK Standard - Najibullah has called for elections from 4/6-15. 229 seats in the Council of Reps. & 62 seats in the Council of Elders will be contested. Some seats will be kept vacant for the rebels if they fail to run for office now. Najibullah will process all nominations.

A Hezb-i-Islami spokesman said the elections were "another trick to deceive the (Afghan) people & world opinion."

- NYT - Soviet For. Min. Shevardnadze arrived in Washington for a round of discussions that will include Afghanistan.

3/22 - NY Newsday - Pres. Reagan proclaimed "Afghanistan Day" yesterday at a White House ceremony.

- BIA - 120,787 people have availed themselves of Nat'l Reconciliation; 63,634 from Pakistan, 55,966 from Iran & the rest from other countries (see 2/25).

3/23 - NYT - The Durrand Line at Geneva:

But officials say agreement on a fifth instrument, offering Afghanistan guarantees against outside interference in its internal affairs, has been blocked by Kabul's unexpected decision late last week to raise an old colonial border dispute with Pakistan, apparently in defiance of Moscow's wishes.

The dispute concerns the so-called Durrand Line, a boundary drawn in 1893 between what was then British India and Afghanistan and which the Afghans have never accepted. The frontier line divides the Pushtun tribal area, which Afghanistan claims.

By reviving the dispute now, officials say Kabul has raised an emotional issue in Afghanistan that is likely to unite all Afghans including Communists and guerrillas, straining relations.

3/24 - BIA on the Durrand Line issue: "The State of the ROA decisively condemns the issue & regards it as another pretext of the Pakistani side bringing the talks to a standstill."

- SCMP - Signs of a Soviet pullout:

• Soviet civilians in the capital of Kabul were being relocated to newer, more easily defensible buildings near the Soviet embassy.

• All members of the Khad, the Afghan secret police, had their leave cancelled and were to return to active duty, the report said. "Soviet authorities in Afghanistan have begun an inventory of 204 Soviet military and civilian installations with a view to transferring some equipment to the gime, along with the facilities," the report added.


3/24 - BIA - The Politburo discussed the establishment of a new province, the former district of Sar-e-Pul, in the southern areas of Balkh & Jauzjan. State organs were instructed to set up elections, make appointments & establish social organizations in the new province. (See 4/1)

3/25 - SCMP - Sec'y Shultz offered a compromise to Shevardnadze whereby Soviet aid to the ROA would be cut off for only a year, starting at the beginning of the troop pullout. The US would stop aiding the mujahideen during that year. Shevardnadze rejected the idea declaring that Soviet deliveries were legitimate since they were based on a bi-lateral treaty. "We have had this sort of relationship with Afghanistan since 1921," he said.

- LA Times - The US, Pakistan & the USSR will "paper over" their differences on the makeup of an interim gov't in Afghanistan, leaving military aid the only hitch.

3/26 - HK Standard - Pakistan is willing for the Soviets to withdraw while Diego Cordovez consults with the warring factions on the formation of an interim Gov't in Afghanistan.

- NYT - Robert Joffrey, born Abdulla Jaffa Bey Khan in Seattle in 1930, the son of an Afghan restaurant owner & his Italian wife, died yesterday in New York. He was the founder & artistic director of the Joffrey Ballet.



Robert Joffrey

Herbert Migdoll

• Afghan Government ministries were told that from now on they would be responsible for their own security.

3/26 - BIA - The PDPA, ROWPA & OWPA (see 3/18) have formed the Left-Wing Democratic Parties Alliance of Afghanistan. The Alliance's leading body is the Coordinating Council on which each party has a representative.

3/27 - The Daily Breeze (Santa Monica) - The US State Dept. was close to proposing a halt in covert US military aid to the mujahideen but Reagan rejected the idea. The Administration is ending its Stinger shipments but is rushing \$300m worth of other equipment, including 120mm Spanish heavy mortars. Dep. Asst. Sec'y of State Robert Peck said the US will continue its assistance to the mujahideen "until it is no longer needed. There have been no secret deals. No deals at all."

3/28 - The ROA & Bulgarian Chambers of Commerce signed a cooperation protocol in which Bulgaria will help the ROA establish some medium & small industries.

3/29 - BIA - "Following the visit of Burhanuddin Rabbani to Iran the extremist leaders have recently sent their representatives to...Iran... The extremist leaders have gifted 12 Stingers to the Iranian leaders. This has not been confirmed so far by other sources."

- Najibullah called upon Masood, Mullah Nasim (Helmand), Capt. Ismail (Herat), Sayed Jaglan (Ghazni), Frarid [sic] (Kapisa), Jalaluddin Haqani (Zadran), Basir Khaled (Badakhshan) & all other opposition commanders to participate in the national elections. 25% of the seats will be held for the opposition. "We are prepared to consider your proposals on forming a coalition gov't. Don't miss this historic chance."

- NYT - A car bomb exploded in Kabul killing 5 people. At least 5 other bombs have exploded there during the past week. On 3/30 it was reported that Saleh Moh'd Zeary, a senior Politburo member, was slightly injured in 1 of the blasts.

3/31 - NYT - The USSR hinted that it would consider allowing US military aid to reach the guerrillas after the cutoff date set in the Geneva agreement.

3/31 - SCMP - Ahmad Shah, designated head of the 7-Party Alliance interim gov't, said the Alliance would form its gov't in the mountains bordering Afghanistan. A 14-member cabinet will be named within 90 days & will consist of 2 reps. from each of the 7 parties.

Associated Press



Afghan coalition leader Ahmad Shah

- Najibullah offered the rebels the posts of Prime Minister & Vice President. He said the ROA could implement the rebel proposal for a coalition gov't.

4/1 - BIA - Najibullah stated that the PDPA was not a communist party & "our revolution is not a socialist revolution. The April Revolution is a nat'l & democratic revolution... Time has changed & is changing the forms & period of the realization of the objectives of our revolution." "The 400,000 strong Afghan armed forces will be able to defend the gains of the revolution provided interference from abroad is caused [sic]." The PDPA does not want to guide the coalition gov't but it will take part through its representatives.

- NYT - Sar-e-Pul, the new Afghan province (see 3/24) could serve as a stronghold for Soviet forces & be used to reassure the PDPA

that Moscow will not desert its ally. It will increase the number of seats in parliament &/or insulate the Muslim Central Asian republics from any Afghan fundamentalist influences. Experts also say that the



province will leave the flat northern portions of Balkh & Jauzjan with a defensible southern frontier against the rest of Afghanistan. Mazar-i-Sharif will be the main city of the new province.

- LA Times - A tentative agreement has been reached in Geneva but the arms supply dispute still threatens it. State Dept. & White House officials said the US is following a policy of "symmetry & balance" & that the US will continue its support of the mujahideen as long as the Soviets continue theirs of the Kabul Gov't.



4/3 - LA Times - The Soviet Amb. at Large Nikolai Kozyrev suggested that the Geneva agreements be signed without the US. Afghanistan & Pakistan would sign documents covering noninterference in each other's affairs & the return of the refugees. Moscow would sign the troop withdrawal document & the US would be dropped as a guarantor.

- Gulbuddin said the mujahideen would continue to fight the Kabul Gov't if the UN-mediated agreement is signed in its present form. An agreement that fails to set up an interim gov't & stop military aid to Kabul is unacceptable to the Alliance.

- BIA - Gorjistan Magazine, the organ of the Central Council of Hazara Nationality, recently made its debut.

4/4 - LA Times - Soviet For. Min. Shevardnadze flew to Kabul to discuss what to do if the Geneva talks fail. Diego Cordovez proposed writing a memorandum recording the US intention of cutting aid to the rebels only as long as Moscow curtailed its weapons' supply to the ROA. The USSR would not stop the supply but would recognize that she took a risk in continuing.

4/4 - The Outlook - The US has stopped supplying Stingers to the mujahideen (see pp. 18, 20, 21).

4/5 - BIA - Voting began in the ROA. A photo & biography were attached to each candidate's box (see 3/21).

- NYT - US officials reported that the USSR seems to be preparing to withdraw its troops. Some units in exposed positions have already been pulled back.

- LA Times - Senator Humphrey said he thought the US was too optimistic in thinking the Kabul regime would fall in a matter of weeks. He thinks it may take over a year.

4/6 - NYT - At Geneva "negative symmetry," the joint ban on military supplies, may be replaced with "positive symmetry," continued arms supply. Positive symmetry might be ok with the US if it provided for "balanced, reciprocal obligations" on both sides.

- LA Times - More on the ROA elections: a third of the Upper House seats will be filled by presidential appointment, a third chosen by Provisional Councils & a third elected over the next 10 days.

4/7 - NYT - Mikhail Gorbachev flew to Tashkent to meet with Najibullah & Shevardnadze. (See p.18)

- Senator Humphrey called the Geneva documents "fundamentally flawed." He said that as it stands Pakistan would be violating the treaty if she allowed the US to continue supplying weapons.

4/8 - NYT - A 9-month suspension of all arms deliveries will go into effect at the conclusion of the troop withdrawal agreement. Both Moscow & Washington reserve the right to resume military supply if one side breaks the informal agreement.

4/9 - NYT - Full agreement on a 4-part treaty for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was reached in Geneva yesterday. (See 4/15)

4/10 - NYT - Gulbuddin said the mujahideen will not be bound by the Geneva agreement:

"No agreements can be implemented in Afghanistan without the consent of the mujahideen," the guerrilla leader warned. He said a Geneva agreement could not "terminate the war, nor can it result in the voluntary return of the refugees."

4/11 - LA Times - Yesterday Afghan guerrillas shot down an AN-26 airplane carrying passengers from Maimana to Mazar-i-Sharif. All 29 people aboard were killed. - Explosions yesterday in an ammunition dump near Islamabad killed at least 75 & injured hundreds (see 4/12, 15).

- Najibullah sent a sympathy message to Zia ul-Haq for the "sad incident" of the ammunition dump explosion.

4/12 - NYT - Reagan Administration officials said that weapons for the mujahideen may have been destroyed in the Islamabad explosion but that there were "plenty more" weapons in the pipeline (So far 93 have died & 1,100 have been injured) Pres. Zia said that the claim that guerrilla weapons were at the depot was "mere speculation." (See 4/15)

- The US & Moscow agreed on the Geneva accords:

Under the accords, Pakistan pledges "noninterference" in Afghanistan's internal affairs. But unless Moscow stops aiding the Kabul regime, Administration officials say they have been assured that Pakistan will remain a conduit for aid to the Afghan guerrillas.

Mr. Shultz declined to comment on how Washington would respond if Moscow charges Pakistan with violating the terms of the accords.

"I'm not going to step in that hole," Mr. Shultz said.

The accord permits continued American aid to the Afghan guerrillas so long as Moscow provides such assistance to the Kabul Government.

"I believe that the U.S. can now join

the Soviet Union as a guarantor of the Geneva instruments," President Reagan said in declaring Washington's acceptance of the accord.

Promise of 'Continued Support'

"This development would not have been possible had it not been for the valiant struggle of the Afghan people to rid their country of foreign occupation," he said. "We take great pride in having assisted the Afghan people in this triumph and they can count on our continued support."

Senator Humphrey denounced the agreement as a "slow-motion sellout" of the Afghan resistance.

4/14 - NYT - The poppies are blooming along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Estimates of Afghan production range from 500-1,000 tons. Growers get \$60-130/kilo. (See 3/2).

4/15 - BIA - 1,547,000 people voted in the ROA elections & winners will be announced shortly. Najibullah said, "It will not be deplorable for those who did not win as they will use their experience & knowledge in other spheres of life." 5 political parties, 9 social organizations, & opposition candidates proposed candidates; "70% of the candidates nominated themselves." However, in some opposition-held areas, elections were not held.

- NYT - The Geneva accords were signed by US State Sec'y Shultz, Soviet For. Min. Shevardnadze, Pakistan Acting For. Min. Zain Nooran & ROA For. Min. Abdul Wakil (see p. 11).

- Zia ul-Haq said he believed the ammunition dump explosion (see 4/11) was an act of sabotage & indicated that at least part of the material stored there had been intended for the mujahideen.

- The Exiled King Asks Tribal Parley

Special to The New York Times

ROME, April 14 - The exiled King of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, has asked the tribal leaders of a "loya jirga," a traditional assembly of tribal chiefs and other leaders, to oversee the formation of a transitional government.

The King made the proposal when asked through a spokesman for his


reaction to the Soviet withdrawal agreement signed in Geneva today.

The assembly, the King said, should be "representative of all the elements inside and outside the country" and constitute the "real Afghan nation." The purpose of the assembly would be to "oversee and endorse the formation of a transitional government acceptable to the majority of the Afghan people," the King said.

The King has lived on the outskirts of the Italian capital since he was deposed in 1973 after ruling for 40 years.

4/16 - NYT - Iran denounced the Geneva agreements & said it would continue to support fundamentalist Afghan guerrilla groups.

- The UNHCR has asked the Afghan Gov't to give it exclusive control over the resettlement & protection of Afghan refugees. High Commissioner J.-P. Hocké said he had also asked the Peshawar Alliance for the same guarantee. UN members will be asked to pledge "several hundred million \$" extra this month for the refugees. The US has criticized the UN for "foot-dragging" in planning the refugee's return. It wants an int'l coordinator appointed with the clout to deal with the problems of such a vast repatriation program. (The Aga Khan has been mentioned.)



- BIA - Afs. "1 thousand 100 million" will be spent to repair reservoirs & underground canals this year.

- Gen. Shah Aga was injured in an "extremist attack" while on his way to Kabul from Pul-e-Matak. He died in a hospital shortly thereafter.

4/13 - The Outlook - There has been a sharp increase in military activity in Eastern Afghanistan during the past 2 weeks as spring thaws have opened the mountain supply routes.

AFGHANISTAN FORUM



CONTENTS

May 1988

VOL. XVI

NO. 3

News Stories	Begin on page
Chronology.....	3
Excerpts from the Geneva Accord.....	11
Articles.....	12
Organizations.....	2
Events.....	2
Educating Afghan Refugees in Iran.....	27
Recent Publications.....	29
Book Reviews.....	30
Items from the <u>Kabul New Times</u>	33

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ABBREVIATIONS USED



AICMB	- Afghan Information Center <u>Monthly Bulletin</u>
AWSJ	- <u>Asian Wall Street Journal</u>
BIA	- Bakhtar Information Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>
DRA	- Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
DYOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FEER	- <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u>
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
IHT	- <u>International Herald Tribune</u>
KNT	- <u>Kabul New Times</u>
NFF	- National Fatherland Front
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- <u>New York Times</u>
NYCT	- <u>New York City Tribune</u>
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PSFO	- Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization
PT	- <u>Pakistan Times</u>
ROA	- Republic of Afghanistan
RTV	- Refugee Tent Village
SCMP	- <u>South China Morning Post</u>
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WDOA	- Women's Democratic Organization of Afghanistan
WSJ	- <u>Wall Street Journal</u>

Line drawing from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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